better than you've done.' I cannot support a tax increase to further escalate an Americanization of the war in Vietnam.

"Many of us questioned the policy of steady escalation, but have not expressed direct opposition until the results could be seen. Now after this period of time we find neither a military victory nor the creation of a popularly supported government in South Vietnam dedicated to the eradication of corruption or to the promotion of land reform.

"Our policy of Americanization of the war has tended more and more to make the South Vietnamese dependent on us, rather than to fulfill their own responsibilities."

The reason many of us were not vocal in support of the so-called Nixon plan of de-escalation is that we suggested this as far back as March 1967, during the debate on the supplemental defense authorization bill, and we feel that progress in the last four years has been far too slow. The result has been that the domestic disasters which we predicted both on the floor and in speeches throughout the country have come to pass.

A BIPARTISAN FOREIGN POLICY FOR PEACE

My position this year has been that the leader of the party in opposition to the Administration should affirm a bipartisan policy for peace and move away from our former bipartisan policy for war. The Democratic party should continue to confirm to the President its support for a definite date to end the war in exchange for a release by Hanoi of all prisoners of war. Further, a definite timetable (whether it be six months or nine months is academic) should be indicated during which time the government of North Vietnam and the NLF would demonstrate their good faith by returning prisoners and observing a ceasefire, while at the same time the American government would show its good faith by withdrawing its troops to meet the withdrawal date. At the end of that period of time, the situation would be one of the South Vietnamese facing the North Vietnamese in Indochina with certain knowledge that they must settle their own differences, as has always been the case. This would give the government in South Vietnam a final period of time to carry out necessary social, political and economic reforms to create a popularly supported government in the fall elections. It would also provide for our troops being withdrawn and our prisoners of war returned by a date certain.

If such a policy were developed by the leader of the major opposition party as it stands on American foreign policy, then President Nixon should have confidence that the war would not be a major political issue between the parties and it would truly be a bipartisan foreign policy for peace in Indochina.

FUTURE OF INDOCHINA

I do not think anyone should try during this process to predict the political future of Indochina, and in particular whether or not the South Vietnamese government will survive or whether Indochina will be communist, neutral or something else. No one can predict what will happen on that peninsula, but then no one knew in 1967 and no one knows today. Above all, the American people should not be led into any further great expectations about the future of Vietnam or of any of the emerging nations.

I think we can end this war now. As I have said continuously for the past four years, we have done all we can in South Vietnam. We have carried out our com mitments, whatever they may be, and the future of that country must be left in the hands of the people who live there, which is where it always as been and always will be.

We can form a new policy for peace and not retreat from the reality of the world. In fact, the realistic position is to stop this Vietnam disaster and start on

a new course.

ISOLATIONISM AND MILITARY INTERVENTION

We face the fact that a majority of Americans between 15 and 30 will probably oppose any military involvement by the United States any place in the world for almost any reason for the rest of their lives. This is a great tragedy. A generation of Americans who should have nurtured upon the idealism of the 1950's, epitomized in the election of John F. Kennedy, has become cynical or disillusioned. This generation has lost the vision of America as the moral leader of the free world.

Many young people both here and abroad look upon this country as a grasping, unconcerned military monster.

The world of the next 20 years will be a violent world in many ways with a continuing threat of nuclear confrontation between the developed nations, and continual struggles for power within and between the emerging nations. Both problems will often involve violence or threats of violence and will affect America's future. The present conflict in Pakistan is an example of what can be expected not only in Asiatic countries but throughout Africa, Latin America and elsewhere. We must change our role of being a world policeman, but we must not retreat to neo-isolationism. We can maintain our commitments and relationships with Europe and Israel without continuing our old policies. For example, American foreign policy may require that we share some military responsibilities in Europe and the Mediterranean but this does not require stationing 300,000 troops with their dependents in Europe. This was done on the premise that we should be prepared to fight a land war in Europe. We have already demonstrated in Hungary and Czechoslovakia that we are not going to interfere in the communist bloc. Our free world allies have demonstrated their lack of support for a policy that contemplates a large land war in Europe.

I have always disliked the labels of "hawk" and "dove," and I often tried to bring "owls" and "eagles" into the aviary, but I have found that in American political life we seem to deal in a limited number of comparisons and labels at any one time. I find that because I have advocated that the United States disengage and get out of Indochina, I have automatically been labeled a "dove." This has never meant, however, that I have been one who believed that the United States should return to isolationism. I think it is grossly unfair to label all those who oppose the Vietnam war as pacifists, isolationists, or some kind of nut.

I have always believed that the United States should be involved in the world, and yes, I accept the fact that humans do not always do the proper and right thing and sometimes the relationship between the United States and other nations may necessarily involve the use of military force.

The situation in Indochina was studied carefully by many of us for many months before we finally took the position long ago that this war was wrong for the United States from every viewpoint-moral-military-diplomatic-economic or by any other test which should be used in determining American foreign policy. I simply believe that when a policy is wrong it should be stopped and a new policy established.

MILITARY FORCE HAS BEEN MISUSED IN INDOCHINA

In May 1970 on the occasion of the Cambodian intervention, I received an excellent brief from a group of Seattle lawyers which set forth very well the circumstances under which a President in the exercise of American foreign policy has in the past been required to use military force. There were four categories, and a fifth which described improper use of military force in American foreign affairs. These were as follows:

1. Cases where there has been a formal Congressional declaration of war— for example, World War II.

2. Cases where there has been a specific Congressional resolution allowing the employment of force, although not rising to a formal declaration of war (numerous examples, such as the American-Mexican hostilities of 1914-1917, the Tonkin Gulf resolution with respect to the Vietnamese conflict, etc.).

3. Cases where there has been a broad international sanction for the action pursuant to more general treaty commitments approved by the Senate--for example Korean action under the United Nations and the Dominican Republic action sanctioned by the O.A.S.

4. Cases where. absent any of the preceding three justifications, there has been an immediate threat to the lives of American civilians or to American property (chiefly, but not exclusively, minor actions. with numerous examples going back to the early nineteenth century).

5. Cases where, absent any of the preceding four justifications, there has been a subsequent official recognition by this country that the conditions were not ones which would justify the intervention.

The continuation of the war in Vietnam and the incursions into Laos and Cambodia do not come within any Executive powers. In my opinion, the number one cause of this disaster has been the manner in which Executive power has been used since 1954 by a number of Presidents to gradually widen the Execu

tive power from conducting normal foreign policy and acting as Commanderin-Chief of the Armed Forces to, in reality, conducting a war.

Our rhetoric even reflects this. For many years we referred to Indochina first as a "French responsibility," then a "situation," then a "crisis," and finally in the last two or three years as a "war." (I might add that we once referred to it as the "Vietnam war" and now North and South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia are all involved and we call it the "Indochina war.") Any time we have spent $115 billion, suffered 53,771 casualties, and have been engaged in continuous and violent combat for over five years, we have a war. Yet we in Congress have never voted on a resolution to declare war or to declare a national emergency.

America has been torn apart because the historic American free society which has always been willing to defend and its citizens has also abhorred war as a major aspect of foreign policy. Therefore, from the time of the drafting of the Constitution, the United States has required that war be declared by Congress, or at least that Congress must declare a state of national emergency before the nation became involved in any major military action. It was never intended in the American system that the President or any other man be in a position to commit conscripted Americans to a war without Congress debating the matter and having the entire political process work so that the whole nation in effect "went to war."

A state of declared war in a free society starts a series of events which allows a society to remain free and yet able to cope with the military and social consequences of the war. If the matter has been debated by Congress and is agreed upon, or becomes a political issue which is debated and a majority decision is made that the nation should be involved in war, the Executive is then given wider appropriate war powers by the Constitution. the Congress puts into effect laws such as wage and price controls, rationing, excess profits taxes and general as opposed to selective conscription; and everyone (not just young draftees and some industries) is at war. It also means that government powers involving espionage, treason and other drastic changes from peacetime life are made clear, and issues such as the printing of the Pentagon Papers fall into proper constitutional categories.

Our relationships with potential allies and potential enemies then become very clearcut. It also means that the national debate about the war has occurred at the beginning of any military action, and not in a series of street demonstrations and accusations and counter-accusations after the war is already in progress. We are now experiencing the tragedy of a prolonged Executive war. and we should not repeat it.

I know many will say that it is no longer possible to have a declaration of war or a declaration of national emergency when we face a world in which there is a nuclear balance of terror. I might also have believed that at one time, but the experience of the last five years indicates that even with a nuclear balance of terror it is still possible that there can be wars of varying size, with the large nuclear powers deciding not to destroy the world with a nuclear exchange. In such cases war declarations are still valid and our treaties and commitments must be redrawn to reflect this. We can have war without holocaust, and so the argument that we are facing a potential holocaust so no one needs a foreign policy is not always true. We therefore must determine here and now for the 1970's what America's role in world affairs should be. The Congress must share this responsibility with the President.

FACING NEO-ISOLATIONISM

I do not support a policy of isolationism. I believe, however, that for a period of time the ability of any President to use military forces as they have been used in Indochina will be severely limited by public opinion and by the effect that a bad period of history has on the philosophy of men in public office. For a philosophical generation (a new group of political leaders) everyone will compare every action to Vietnam. We will cringe from any foreign involvement. The horrors of this conflict will also restrict the available armed forces of the United States because the refusal by the Executive and military to allow draft reforms in 1967 will probably mean an end to draft calls and maybe of the entire system in the near future.

THE NEW AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

American foreign policy in the decade of 1970 will start with a withdrawal of American participation in many parts of the world. Afterwards there will be a chance to move to a more sensible, realistic foreign policy. I think all of us should start working now toward the creation of such a new posture in foreign affairs. This should mean active involvement by the United States in the world community and a continued role in the day-to-day changes that occur within and between nations as they go through the upheaval that marks the emerging nations. It does not mean we can or will always determine the result.

UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY

I believe in national security and that we should have proper military forces to protect us. However, this does not require a 2.6 million man standing army stationed all over the world. We have misdirected our efforts and spent immense amounts of money to maintain this huge standing army. A much smaller force of career soldiers is better. The world of the 1970's will probably involve maintaining nuclear deterrents between the major powers, by agreements hopefully, and if not, then by continued matching of deterrent forces. A reduced level should be an attainable goal. It will also mean the existence of only those forces necessary to carry out proper foreign policy Executive functions. I also favor a rotating trained reserve for a national emergency or protection of the nation because I believe the citizen-soldier concept is important. I hope we will develop a universal national service system. This does not mean a continuation of the 2% war military policy concept which prevailed in the 1960's. That policy developed by the military was based on the United States military philosophy that the United States to keep the peace must be prepared to fight a land war in Europe and a land war in Asia simultaneously and still have enough strength to aid in the suppression of a military outbreak in Latin America or elsewhere. These are outmoded military concepts. We cannot expect to impose our will on the world. If we look to our national security in these new terms and end the Vietnam war, we can expect a diversion of funds from the present swollen military budgets to begin to make funds available to meet our urgent domestic needs.

CONCLUSION

The present controversy swirling around us regarding the manner in which we became involved in Vietnam should not be allowed to become a matter of trying to fix blame on a particular individual, political party, group of advisors, of generals, or on anyone else. It should be used by this Committee and by the nonExecutive branches of our government to chart a course to insure that we never again in our free society forget that all three branches of government and the people must legitimately support our foreign policy, with full access to the information and issues involved. Of course, there is an occasional need for secrecy in terms of vital matters of national security, particularly when they involve the lives of men fighting battles in far-off lands. But if we are to remain a free and open society, the flow of information to the people and any controversy which may result must be met in the original stages of the development of policy and not after the policy has been formed.

The recent episode of the "Pentagon Papers" demonstrates the need for review of the present status of classification of materials and basic definitions of "espionage" and other laws designed to protect necessary secrets. We have fallen into the error of allowing the Executive free reign in what can be defined as "secret" or "classified" public documents. This has led to a system where certain information is "leaked" or other information is suppressed, not for vital reasons of national security but because of an attitude of making nearly everything secret or classified. When everything is made secret or classified, then, of course, nothing becomes secret or classified because the number of people ncessarily involved in transmitting, storing and handling a huge amount of material makes it impossible to guarantee secrecy. Certainly information which can involve the lives of our men in battle can and should be placed in a top secret category, and there are certain diplomatic exchanges which cannot take place unless secrecy is maintained because of the other party's insistence upon it. It should, however, be our policy to declassify information as rapidly as possible after an emergency has passed, and the use of "top secret" should be limited to a very few functions. This will always be a difficult system to operate, and it is very different from

the manner in which most other governments operate, and in particular both the traditional European and Oriental closed form of governments. Ours has always been a different society which has drawn its strength from popular support of the people, and long-range policy is determined by an informed citizenry which periodically makes its will known through the electoral process. When the electoral process is subverted through lack of information, or the failure of both the men and the system to respond to major national issues, then we will repeat the errors of the traditional governments of Europe and the Orient.

It is with the hope that we have a reawakening of the traditional American system of free and open debate and an honest, realistic revival of the check and balance system that I present my testimony before this Committee on both the substance of the Vietnam conflict, and, more importantly, on the system which I hope this Committee and the entire House of Representatives will use in dealing with the major problems in American foreign policy in the future.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH P. ADDABBO, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Mr. Chairman, I welcome this opportunity to present my views on the Indochina War to you and the distinguished Members of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs.

My position on the Vietnam war and our involvement in Indochina has been known for some time. As a member of the House Appropriations Committee. I have voiced concern over the expansion of the war, the extent of our role in Southeast Asia, and my support for a Vietnamization policy which should end our troop commitment by December of 1971.

It is said that the move to end the war by December 1971 gives solace to the enemy. This cannot give any more aid or comfort than the President's Vietnamization policy or the President's announcement of continued pullouts. I believe that after 10 years after all our dead and wounded-after dropping over 4 million tons of bombs, twice as much as we dropped during World War II, including Korea-after 40 percent of our troops starting to use drugs, it is time to let the South Vietnamese know that they must take over the responsibilities in the field.

The South Vietnamese did not start drafting their 18 year olds until we gave them an ultimatum so once again I believe we must give them an ultimatuma definite date beyond which the United States will not continue to provide troops in Vietnam.

We are not running out--this is the third year of the Vietnamization program. The South Vietnamese have been fighting in Cambodia and Laos and they have told us that they will get out of Cambodia when they wish. South Vietnam has had an election and they will have another in September. If they cannot go it by December, they will never be able to defend themselves.

In 1968 the President told the American people that he had a plan to end the war. That plan had to be withdrawal of all American forces for in reality the Vietnamization program was started by President Johnson when he ordered the training of the South Vietnam Army to defend itself under the pacification program. By calling for complete withdrawal by December 31, 1971, we are supporting the policy of Vietnamization but calling for its completion in 1971 instead of 1972, a presidential election year.

The President has pledged to end the war. He has told us that all U.S. troops will be withdrawn from Southeast Asia. I say let that be our policy and let it be achieved by the end of this year.

STATEMENT OF HON. O. CLARK FISHER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS

Mr. Chairman, I welcome this opportunity to testify regarding the war in Indochina. As we contemplate withdrawal, with all the attendant problems, keeping in mind the plight of our prisoners of war, we know there is no magic solution. This being an international matter, we must of necessity depend upon the President and Executive branch to lead the way.

It is most appropriate, as I see it, that members of Congress exercise restraint in proposing specific withdrawal dates and including other details about the