many sensitive issues which are properly handled by negotiations with the enemy. Any resolutions, therefore, should be so worded as not to rock the boat and to keep those considerations in mind.

We should avoid any resolutions which might be interpreted by the enemy in the wrong way, which might cause the Communists to misjudge our will and our purpose. Above all, we should avoid doing anything which might be inconsistent with the objectives of our negotiators in Paris.

While I question the value or the propriety of the Congress attempting to fix a date certain for our withdrawal from Vietnam, if such a course is followed I feel it to be imperative that we impose corresponding conditions upon the North Vietnamese who are the only aggressors involved in the conflict. A unilateral proposal to be out of Vietnam by a day certain, without imposing a similar conditions upon the enemy, would play into their hands and would amount to an act of capitulation and surrender on our part.

In other words, if the Communists should change their intransigent attitude and decide, in good faith, to end the fighting and settle the issues, we have already made it clear our government will meet them more than half way. They know that. If they really want to end the war, then why should they not be willing to agree to get out themselves? It is just that simple.

Any resolution we approve should, of course, include a positive requirement for a release of all prisoners of war. Such an approach could be expected to bolster, not compromise, the objectives of our negotiators in Paris.

With respect to the fate of our prisoners, we can ill afford to forever give up any bargaining advantage we now have.

THE POW ISSUE

As we proceed with withdrawal plans and negotiations, the paramount overriding problem relates to release of the prisoners. In that connection, the Communists have made it crystal clear that an announcement of a day certain for our pullout would, at the most, only cause them to "discuss" the POW issue.

The enemy has blown hot and cold on this line. On the one hand, they use American visitors in Paris to feed soft line propaganda for U.S. home consumption, and on the other they change their tune when talking on the record at the peace table. That fact has been repeatedly documented.

Coming from the Communists, a promise to "discuss" the repatriation of prisoners does not, of course, mean anything. Only two weeks ago their chief negotiator in Paris made it clear that in addition to the day certain requirement they would also demand compliance with two new conditions-that we cut off all military and economic aid to South Vietnam, after our troops are out. What does this mean? It means they will impose conditions which would enable them to take over the South before-by their own pronouncement— they will stop shooting and before they will "discuss" prisoners.

COMMUNIST DECEPTION

Let us not be deceived by Communist double-talk. "The voice is Jacob's voice, but the hands are the hands of Esau." It will be recalled that when our planes were bombing the supply lines in the north, Hanoi insisted that a negotiated settlement would come about if and when that bombing was stopped. They made a world issue of it. Bombing was made the one stumbling block. Remember that? Well, their bluff was called. Bombing in North Vietnam was stopped, and the world awaited an immediate settlement. What happened? Nothing. For three long years they have refused to negotiate anything.

UNITY IS THE ANSWER

While I have felt from the beginning we had no business over there unless we were there to win a military victory-which undoubtedly could have been achieved long ago had the military been permitted to determine the strategy and choose the targets-our government is now committed to mass withdrawal, coinciding with a Vietnamization program. I think that plan should have united support from the Congress and the American people. Lack of unity in this country has served to prolong that war.

While I was in Paris recently I attended a briefing conducted by one of our chief negotiators. He said the noise that comes from war protesters in this

country tends to bolster Communist intransigence, and obviously makes a negotiated settlement more difficult.

As I see it, this is no time for us to engage in gestures of appeasement and piecemeal legislation along the same line. The enemy has been bled white during that war. An estimated 750,088 Communists have been killed, according to the most recent report. Our losses of more than 45,000 are unacceptably high. It has indeed been a tragic involvement. The South has lost 131,285.

The ARVNS are today admittedly much stronger than they have ever been. They may or may not be equal to the challenge, once we are out. That remains seen. Under these circumstances it is understandable why the Communists are so desperately anxious that we pull out under conditions which would enable them, despite their plight, to take over. Therein lies our chief bargaining advantage.

Mr. Chairman, there is nothing we can do in the Congress that cannot be done, and much better, by negotiating in Paris. A proper and meaningful approach would be for the Congress to adopt a resounding resolution, giving solid support to our Paris negotiators and their objectives. That would provide the best hope for the release of our prisoners. Remember this: Unity in this country is what the Communists are most afraid of.

STATEMENT BY HON. JOSEPH E. KARTH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MINNESOTA

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to present my views on the IndoChina war before your subcommittee. Briefly, I will review some of my involvement in this question and some of the issues that stand before us today. Of primary concern to me is the question of executive primacy and the need for Congress to re-assert its rightful and constitutional role in determining foreign policy. We must be certain not to have any more Vietnams.

When I began my fight against the conduct of the war in 1966, I sometimes felt as if I was shouting into the darkness, although there always has been a body of anti-war feeling in my district. In February of 1967 on the St. Thomas College campus in my district, I delivered my first major address against the war. It was reported in the Minneapolis Star following my speech that it "marked the first major policy split between the Democratic Congress and the administration of President Lyndon Johnson." While at the time I was in the minority, I am today encouraged by what I see happening in Congress.

Specifically, I am encouraged by the number of Congressmen who have now changed their position in respect to our action in Indo-China. And I am impressed by the new awareness by Congress of its role in determining our country's foreign policy.

But what of our present problem?

We are told that the war is being wound down, yet that is difficult to believe in the light of our two most recent invasions and the revelations concerning our deep involvement in Laos-both on the ground and in the air.

Mr. Chairman, it appears that the administration has discovered what it believes to be a new and indeed unique way to withdraw from Southeast Asia. Rather than the traditional route east over the Pacific Ocean, this administration seems determined to get us out of that area by heading west through Asia. At the rate we have invaded Cambodia and Laos. I drew up my own withdrawal timetable, and based upon my estimates the last of our troops might well embark for the United States via the Suez Canal sometime around 1979.

And then there is the terrifying use of the word "only" by the administration in an attempt to convince the people that the war is being wound down. In recent weeks we have read the administration's latest casualty figures that state "only" 19 were killed in Vietnam. Tell the mother or father of any one of those 19 dead that he is one of "only." Over 45,000 Americans have been killed and 300,000 wounded. If it is a consensus that we erred in becoming involved we should get out as quickly as possible, but certainly no later than New Year's Day, 1972. That war is not worth one more American life from either an enemy bullet, or from the slow death of drug addiction.

But, Mr. Chairman, there is no reason to believe that unless pressure is continued upon the present Administration by Congress specifically and the public in general that this agonizing disengagement will not drag on. I say that the

Johnson administration was wrong, this administration is wrong, and the majority of the people now agree.

Several key issues enter into any serious discussion of our involvement in Southeast Asia. We have the question of Vietnamization versus negotiation. This administration has apparently given up any hope for a negotiated settlement through the Paris peace talks. Only a week ago the Secretary of Defense suggested that the peace cannot be obtained in public meetings or on the floor of the House or the Senate. The Secretary is wrong-it is precisely because of the failure of the Administration to set a deadline at the Paris talks that we have had to seek peace in Indo-China through other means-primarily legislation.

But this attitude by the Administration is not surprising. Since its election it has been trying to tell us to shut up because everything is all right over there. Well, it isn't and we won't be quiet.

Meanwhile, as the negotiations are neglected, Vietnamization is stepped up. Mr. Chairman, I originally supported the concept of Vietnamization so long as it was coordinated with serious negotiation in Paris. But simply to Vietnamize the war without any real prospects for peace would result in Asians killing Asians, with American pilots dropping the bombs. We must work for a withdrawal deadline to end the killing and the suffering in that wretched part of the world— a withdrawal timetable would speed the negotiations. And we cannot claim to have withdrawn from Vietnam until we stop killing people there-changing our role from bullets on the ground to bombs from the air does not reduce our responsibility.

Some bring up the point of Red Chinese expansion as a reason for our continued role in Southeast Asia. Yet, we too are contributing to expansion of the war. Previously Cambodia and Laos were staging areas, now they too are battlefields. I hold no trust of the Red Chinese leaders, don't misunderstand, but they are a country that has been wracked with its own civil and domestic strife in recent years. And we have seen that the Red Chinese threat of several years ago in India was in part provoked by India's leaders trying to prove that they weren't "soft." Frankly, I suspect that's our reason for being in Vietnam. How far can we expand the war in Southeast Asia before the Red Chinese are provokedcertainly not indefinitely as we learned in Korea. On the other hand both the North and the South Vietnamese are fiercely nationalistic people, and theoretically, at least the North is fighting in an effort to unify the country. If we continue applying severe military pressure upon North Vietnam we will in effect drive that country to seek more and more aid from its Red Chinese and Soviet Communist allies and neighbors. We cannot and should not look at the events in isolation.

We have seen before that continued bombing stiffens resistance, yet we persist in the belief that we can force the enemy to capitulate at the bargaining table through military pressure. This policy has failed in the past and is failing now. Then there are those who predict a bloodbath if we leave South Vietnam. That is a surprising fear since a bloodbath has already been inflicted there with saturation bombing, search and destroy missions, and free-fire zones. Under international supervision there could be no Communist-led bloodbath. But unless we work for a negotiated peace we run the risk of a Communist victory over the longhaul. And without negotiations and international supervision we do indeed run a bloodbath risk. That makes our withdrawal and serious negotiations all the more compelling since the "anti-bloodbath" agreement would be a subject of negotiations along with prisoners release for a definite withdrawal timetable. The question of war crimes which haunts the American people should be resolved by a United Nations investigation into war crimes committed by both sides in this conflict. Self-flagellation in the name of our own crimes does little to solve the real war crime issue. I see no answer to this question without international cooperation.

Finally the question of the prisoners of war. Historically peace negotiations begin seriously only after the fighting stops. The prisoner of war issue will certainly not be solved by ill-conceived grandstanding commando raids, not by a refusal to negotiate in Paris. I have said to the people of my district that we must not allow the prisoner of war issue to become a political issue, but the attitude of the Administration has made it just that.

Mr. Chairman, in the light of these considerations and others, I recommend the following:

1. I urge an immediate cease-fire in the entire theater of operations including Laos and Cambodia based upon mutual holding actions.

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2. We must set a withdrawal date and stick to it if meaningful negotiations and a return of the prisoners is accomplished. I favor an immediate withdrawal, but under the circumstances, I would support a withdrawal timetable that would have our troops, all our troops, out by the end of 1971. I have cosponsored and supported legislation to that effect.

3. We must negotiate firmly and fairly in Paris recognizing that continued military pressure has not and will not force the enemy into concession or submission any more than it would the U.S.

4. We must seek international cooperation in helping to end this war through the United Nations.

5. We must guard against future Vietnams by re-asserting the constitutional partnership of the executive and the legislative branches of our government. 6. Finally we at home must continue to raise our voices inside and outside of the Congress for peace.

Mr. Chairman, before I conclude my remarks, I would like to inform this subcommittee of the feelings of the people of my district and state concerning this war. My own polls at the district level show a nearly three-fourths majority against the war. In contrast my 1967 poll showed only 20% of my district opposed the war. In addition, the state legislature has passed a resolution directing the state attorney general to explore the constitutionality of Minnesota draftees being sent to an undeclared war. The Governor of Minnesota, Wendell Anderson, has endorsed a "Dump the War" rally in Minnesota. Also, the Ramsey County Board of Commissioners has passed a resolution asking the House and the Senate to cut off the war's funds until such time as the President acts to set a date for the withdrawal of all United States combat forces from that area.

Mr. Chairman, these are not isolated incidents, but the deep concern for peace expressed by the people in my district and the elected officials of my state.

We have heard the President say he does not want to preside over the first defeat in our country's history. Historically he is wrong on that point, but regardless, he may find himself going down in history as the President who prolonged and widened a war that very few at home could justify now that the facts are becoming increasingly well known.

I am not concerned with the President's future story in the history books. I am concerned about bringing peace to Indo-China, a peace it seems that Congress must lead the way to finding.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROMANO L. MAZZOLI, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF KENTUCKY

Ten years ago this year, the first American soldier lost his life in a little-known Southeast Asian country called Vietnam. Now, a full decade later, Americans look back on a great national sacrifice: 50,000 of our finest young men have died, over 300,000 have been wounded; and thousands of broken families and shattered lives offer mute testimony to the high price we have paid for this war.

We look back on hundreds of billions of dollars of our precious national resources drained off in a remote place-resources sorely needed here at home to clean our air and water, rebuild our cities, educate our children, and restore prosperity to our war-weary economy.

We have seen thousands of injured and crippled veterans return to this country only to find that they sometimes do not receive the best care their country can provide the kind of care they deserve.

We are shocked to find thousands of young American soldiers falling into the trap of heroin addiction in Vietnam as they wait out the endless weeks and months for the day they can come home to their loved ones again.

And we wait helplessly from halfway around the world as hundreds of American pilots and soldiers languish in captivity in North Vietnamese prisoner of war camps.

Our nation has not begrudged these sacrifices. We have throughout our history given willingly where sacrifice has been called for. But now it is time for a reckoning, for an accounting. It is now time to say “we have given enough”. We have endured the longest and most trying war in our history, and endured it honorably-now it is time to draw back and heal our wounds.

It would be wrong to trace all of our society's ills to the Vietnam war. But it is true that the war is the root of the raging inflation that has eaten away at

paychecks for the last five years. It is true that an effort to control this war-fueled inflation has thrown tens of thousands of working Americans into unemployment lines. And it is true that the war has widened gaps between white and black, old and young, and rich and poor.

Just to set a date ending our participation in this war will not bring us together. It will not by itslef assure proper care for injured or drug-addicted veterans. Nor will this measure alone bring home our prisoners of war. But it is a necessary first step to all of these.

For these reasons, I supported on the floor of the House the Nedzi-Whalen amendment to the Defense Authorization Bill, which would have prohibited the use of material procured under the authorization of the Military Procurement Act after December 31, 1971. The amendment provided for the safety of American troops during withdrawal and opened the door for new negotiations on prisoners of war. If the time were shown to be inadequate, the amendment allowed for consultation between the President and Congress on additional time for withdrawal.

With these safeguards, I believe it is possible to withdraw all American troops safely and honorably from Vietnam by December 31, 1971. This is a goal to which I pledged by effort last year and one toward which I have worked this year. I supported the December 31 deadline earlier in the year in the House Democratic caucus, and I voted for a Senate amendment to the draft bill which would have made withdrawal of U.S. troops within nine months U.S. policy. I will continue my efforts toward this goal until the last American soldier is brought home.

STATEMENT BY HON. PARREN J. MITCHELL A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MARYLAND

It is reason for encouragement as well as dismay that so many Member of Congress are testifying on the war in Indochina before the Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. This is a heartening event in that it demonstrates yet again the overwhelming opposition to this senseless conflict on the part of both this Nation's citizenry and their elected representatives in this Congress.

At the same time we must be discouraged by the futility of such an outpouring of opinion against the destruction and violence here and in Indochina which has consumed the lives of thousands of Asians and Americans. It is an expression of disgust that has been largely ignored by those who are capable of putting an end to this military folly and who have compounded their error by seeking to prevent the American people from learning the true nature of the decisions which have resulted in the horrid course of events.

Beyond the nature of the disclosures concerning the executive branch decisions that have led us to the situation that we face today, the controversy surrounding the publication of the Pentagon study on Vietnam demonstrates that many Americans have lost their faith in the Government which purportedly represents them and that the Government is fearful of letting the people know what it has done in the past is still doing today. It is our responsibility to restore the faith of the American people in our Government.

We cannot speak piously of a system of laws and then blithely disregard those limitations upon excessive governmental authority when it suits us. We cannot expect our young citizens to keep their actions within the law if we fail to do so ourselves.

Those who argue that the revelations in the Pentagon papers should come as no surprise to the American people are correct. We have long been aware of the Government's misleading of the public in the inflated body counts which included dead animals as well as the enemy. The pride taken in the week's "kill" also demonstrates the coldness and indifference towards the destruction we are inflicting in Indochina which has come to characterize and to plague the American psyche.

The Pentagon papers have also revealed that the CIA told the present administration in 1969 that the Domino theory was not applicable to the situation in Indochina. Yet the President still speaks of a Communist threat to the stability of the entire subcontinent. If the President should change his line of argument in defense of our continued support of the discredited Thieu-Ky regime, that will not be anything new either. We have already heard far to many different justifications for our support of various regimes and for our involvement in