STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. SEIBERLING A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OHIO

Mr. Chairman: I welcome this opportunity to submit my views on America's military involvement in Indochina to this distinguished subcommittee.

I have cosponsored several bills being considered by this subcommittee today, including the Vietnam Disengagement Act of 1971 to achieve a total withdrawal by December 31, 1971 (HR 4103), and the proposal for proportional repatriation of American prisoners of war and American troops (H. Con Res. 212), and I want to urge the subcommittee to give favorable consideration to these proposals.

But above all, I want to express my deep disappointment that today our nation's military involvement in Vietnam continues-unchecked by any amendment or resolution of Congress, with no specific date for its end likely to be set in the near future.

At this point, after seven years of fighting in an undeclared war, I think Americans have every right to expect our nation's military involvement in Vietnam to be ended. By now our troops should be out of Southeast Asia; American prisoners should be home; this war—as far as direct American involvement is concerned-should be history. But it is not.

This war has never ceased to shock and disturb Americans. The language of the war alone is enough to disturb us-words like napalm, body count, antipersonnel bombs, free-fire zones, forced evacuation, defoliation. We have come to understand the meaning of these terms not simply in the technical sense but in the human sense. What they add up to is a policy of making war against the entire people of South Vietnam, and to some extent the people of Laos and Cambodia.

Beyond the language, there are the actual events. Over the last two years the list of tragedies resulting from this war seems endless: Mylai, Cambodia, Kent State, Laos, the Calley Trial, one tragic event after another.

If any of us, however, still have illusions about the nature and purpose of our nation's involvement in Vietnam, the revelations contained in the McNamara study ought to dispel them forever.

I am certain that this subcommittee is aware of the contents of this study which the New York Times began to publish on Sunday, June 13. It is a mammoth study, and all of it has not been reprinted, but I have seen enough to convince me what many have suspected all along: that the previous Administration deliberately misled Congress and the public. President Johnson talked peace in public while secretly he made plans to wage war.

I believe this is a serious indictment of our government, and Congress should not dismiss it as ancient history. Unfortunately, much of what is revealed in the Pentagon study still has relevance today.

I would point out, as others have, one excerpt from the accompanying article in the Times that appeared with the documents reprinted Sunday, June 13. The study conveys an impression that the war was thus considered less important for what it meant to the South Vietnamese than for what it meant to the position of the United States in the world.

Mr. McNaughton would later capsulize this perception in a memorandum to Mr. McNamara seeking to apportion American aims in South Vietnam:

70% to avoid a humiliating U.S. defeat (to our reputation as guarantor) 20% to keep SVN (and then adjacent) territory from Chinese hands 10% to permit the people of South Vietnnam to enjoy a better, freer way of life.

I am not convinced that our government's goals outlined above have changed at all in the last three years, despite the present policy of phased, gradual withdrawal. Although it has finally accepted the fact that it is not possible to win this war, the present Administration is still trying to prevent the North Vietnamese from winning.

This is why the President has withdrawn our troops so slowly. The same tragically misguided reasoning that in 1964 convinced President Johnson to escalate the war is still at work pressuring President Nixon not to withdraw completely.

The argument, reflected in Mr. McNaughton's list of aims in South Vietnam, emanates from those in the Pentagon and the Administration who insist that a defeat in Vietnam will humiliate us throughout the world.

It is incredible that our government still clings to this argument. At this point, win or lose, we stand to be humiliated for the way we have acted in Indochina.

What is being tested now is not our nation's resolve but its common sense. Our nation's continued military presence in Vietnam makes no sense. The American people now know it, and the rest of the world knows it.

Yet, the President persists in his zig-zag policy of withdrawing American men but expanding the geographical scope and the intensity of the war, and some members of Congress continue to express optimism and faith that the President is doing his best. I wish very much I could share their sense of trust. but I believe we are still being misled. Congress still is not being told in the most honest and straightforward way possible what exactly the President's intentions are in Vietnam, nor are the American people being told all the facts.

The President not only refuses to tell us when he intends to end our involvement, but he even refuses to answer more specific questions from a member of his own party. Rep. Paul McCloskey still is seeking from the Administration answers to three questions all Americans have a right to know.

(1) The number of amputee casualties in Vietnam.

(2) The number of deaths from the overuse of drugs in Vietnam.

(3) The number of Laotian villages destroyed by Air Force bombings.

The Administration, it seems, fears that the revelation of such figures would put added pressure on the President to withdraw more quickly-something the President would not have to fear if a total withdrawal was his first priority in Vietnam.

However, this is not his first priority; nor is the release of American prisoners his first priority. The Administration has used the Ameircan POW's politically as a smokescreen to conceal the fact that it has other reasons for staying in Vietnam besides insuring their release.

Clearly the Administration wants above all to maintain some hold politically on the government of South Vietnam. Indeed it would rather accept the risks involved in continuing American involvement than risk seeing the Saigon regime fall and be replaced by a government less dependent on American support.

If insuring the release of all American prisoners was really so important to the Administration, it would pursue a policy much different than it is now following. Senator Mike Mansfield, former Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford and others have suggested reasonable options to current policy. Their suggestions would much more likely lead to release of American POWs and a safe return of our troops. They have suggested, and I agree, that the American government should inform the North Vietnamese that on a certain date we will withdraw all our troops in return for a release of all American prisoners.

I do not suggest that this would happen all at once. It could take place over several months during which, on dates determined beforehand, we would withdraw some troops and they would release some prisoners.

This policy makes sense to me, much more sense than our current policy of propping up the corrupt Thieu regime in Saigon and continuing our military presence in South Vietnam.

Finally, this committee has the authority to recommend legislation that would help the President end this war, that would enable him to overcome the pressures that his predecessor was not capable of overcoming.

I, for one, do not minimize those pressures even now when our policy of partial withdrawal appears irreversible and when more than 200,000 troops have returned home. I would remind my colleagues that three years after the President said he had a plan to end the war a quarter of a million Americans still remain in Vietnam; our forces continue to be killed and maimed; B-52s continue to devastate the countryside; thousands of civilians continue to die and to suffer terribly as a result of American military actions.

Perhaps the greatest irony of all is that we still hear talk from the Administration of achieving peace with honor. Indeed under the cloak of "peace with honor," the President apparently intends to keep at least some American ground forces in Vietnam indefinitely; he certainly intends to keep American air forces in operation there.

I would suggest respectfully that after all that has happened in the last seven years the only honorable option we have left in Southeast Asia is to help stop the killing, to help end the war, in short, to leave-and leave now.

STATEMENT OF HON. DICK SHOUP, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MONTANA

Mr. Chairman, I am Dick Shoup, United States Representative of the first district of Montana.

The events of the last week, particularly the publication by leading newspapers of classified documents on the origins of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, have once again generated intense criticism of President Nixon's Vietnam policy. I will not dwell on these documents except to say that they do not, in my opinion, reflect adversely on President Nixon's Vietnamization policy, which I support. Since President Nixon took office, the United States has successfully implemented a policy of ordered troop withdrawal coupled with the upgrading of South Vietnamese military capabilities. While one may be able to criticize some elements of his policy, no one, I believe, can deny that the situation in South Vietnam today is far better than it was in January 1969. The level of violence has decreased appreciably, and successful pacification has brought a high level of security to nearly every hamlet in the country. The Vietcong, while still a major political force in the war, is no longer a major military factor. South Vietnam is beginning to experience a revival of economic activity that has so long been suppressed by the war.

All this has occurred while American forces have withdrawn at a steady rate from the war. From a level of more than 540,000 in June 1969, U.S. troop strength has declined to a little over 240,000 today. President Nixon has kept every promise he has made concerning troop withdrawals, and Secretary Laird stated last March that future withdrawals would continue at the current rate if not higher. From the past record on troop withdrawals, there is no basis to doubt the Secretary.

I urge the Congress to continue to support the President's policy. I would be the first to urge and vote for a deadline for total troop withdrawal if the President had reneged on his troop withdrawal promises or if South Vietnam were still in the chaotic situation of 1968. But South Vietnam. I believe, now has a reasonable chance of maintaining its independence if the President is allowed to carry through his Vietnamization program to its completion.

Congressional imposition of a withdrawal deadline six months or nine months from now would place the immense burden of this war totally upon South Vietnam. The Vietnamization program would have to be scrapped. Hasty and uncertain measures would have to be undertaken in place of it. The Government and people of South Vietnam would confront, alone and all at once, the completion of the enormous tasks of creating a stable society, promoting economic and social reform. fighting an internal guerrilla war, and defending their nation from invasion on three frontiers. Vietnamization has enabled South Vietnam to make significant strides toward successfully coping with these problems. Allow ing the President to complete his program will ensure that South Vietnam has the best possible chance to finish the job.

If Congress imposes a withdrawal deadline, there is no doubt in my mind that after U.S. troops are gone, North and South Vietnam would then come to grips in a climactic military struggle. I strongly disagree with those who argue that a deadline would force South Vietnam to negotiate with North Vietnam and induce North Vietnam to negotiate by displaying our good faith. The Communists have refused every South Vietnam offer to merely talk in private and exchange views away from the glare of publicity. Their basic gives ample reminder of how the Communists collect their blood debts.

The prisoner of war issue is, of course, the most tragic aspect of the Vietnam situation. It is unfortunate that it had become tangled up in the military and political issues of the war. Nevertheless, it is: and I will comment on it in that context. The Administration and its critics are in basic disagreement over North Vietnam's terms for the release of their American prisoners. The critics contend that if the United States sets a deadline for the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Vietnam, North Vietnam and the NLF will move rapidly to release American prisoners. The critics cite Communist statements in Paris to visiting U.S. Congressmen that there will be no problem in speedily negotiating a release of the prisoners once the United States announces a deadline. The Communists have pointed out to these visitors that North Vietnam quickly released French prisoners of war following the 1954 Geneva settlement.

The Administration contends that once the United States sets a deadline, North Vietnam will demand more concessions in the subsequent negotiations on prisoner release. Crosby Noyes cited a White House study paper in his column in the May

18 Washington Star, which concludes that "more than a troop withdrawal deadline is required in order to free the prisoners of war." According to Noyes, the study goes on to say:

While the Communists are ready to discuss if the United States sets a deadline, they indicate that the war will have to end-presumably on their terms-before the prisoners will actually be freed.

The study continues:

This would involve not only a deadline, but also the establishment of a provisional coalition government (in Saigon) and probably also the cessation of all U.S. military aid to South Vietnam and the payment of war reparations. In any case, the Communists side can be expected to extract the highest possible price for a prisoner release.

The critics and the Administration have a legitimate disagreement, given the vagueness of the Communist position. Consider Washington Post reporter Chalmers Roberts' recent interview with North Vietnam's chief Paris negotiator Xuan Thuy. Roberts asked Xuan Thuy point blank whether "as a condition for prisoner release there must be no such continuing military and economic aid?” Xuan Thuy, according to Roberts, "avoided a direct answer" and referred to the Communist peace proposal of September 1970. Subsequently Roberts and his employer, the Washington Post, gave decidedly different interpretations to Xuan Thuy's answer, The Post stated in a June 11 editorial:

Furthermore, since it appears that Hanoi is prepared under certain conditions to let Thieu stay in office and to have Thieu receive American military and economic aid, then it means Mr. Nixon could set a withdrawal date without doing what he has always said he will never do— bug out on Thieu.

Roberts drew a quite different conclusion in his article of June 10:

But the core of the Hanoi's position became much clearer when the question got around to the political issues. When came out was that Hanoi wants movement here, not just on troop withdrawal, and that Hanoi will try hard to win some political concessions from Washington in any package involving troop withdrawal and prisoner release. Roberts went on to say:

Hence it was evident from Thuy's responses that he wants a deal that will not only send home all American forces having anything to do with prosecution of the war, but will also leave the Saigon regime totally on its own. That means no U.S. military and economic aid to Saigon to sustain it in the struggle with the Communists and other opponents in the South after the American pullout.

As of now, no one can be absolutely certain which side is correctly interpreting the Communist position. Because of this, it is very wrong for the critics to argue, as some have done, that the President's position has no conceivable validity. Indeed, there are strong arguments to support his case. Words that mean one thing to Americans may mean something very different to the North Vietnamese. Communist proposals at Paris have been phrased so that they could have varied meanings, depending on one's overall viewpoint. Recent North Vietnamese statements to visiting American Congressmen are obviously intended to put the Communist position in the best light without firmly committing Hanoi and the NLF to release American prisoners.

Consider, again, the Xuan Thuy interview. Xuan Thuy referred to the NLF's eight point proposal of September 1970 in answer to Roberts' question concerning prisoner release and U.S. military and economic aid to South Vietnam. On June 10 North Vietnamese press spokesman Nguyen Thanh Lee referred to the first point of this proposal. In reading point number one, I find that it begins by demanding : The U.S. Government must put an end to its war of aggression in Vietnam, stop the policy of "Vietnamization" of the war, totally withdraw from South Vietnam, troops, military personnel, weapons, and war materials of the United States as well as troops, military personnel, weapons, and war materials of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp, without posing any condition whatsoever, and dismantle all U.S. military bases in South Vietnam.

If the Communists apply this definition to "troop withdrawal" in relation to the POW issue, then it is clear that they in fact expect the United States to

end all forms of involvement in Vietnam, including military and economic assistance, as a price for prisoner release. The White House study, according to Crosby Noyes, quotes Nguyen Thanh Le as saying at a Paris tea party on April 21 that:

I would like to add that with regard to the question of American prisoners of war, I think that if the United States put forward a deadline for the total withdrawal of its troops and ends the war of aggression, I believe . . . that . . . there will be no difficulties just as towards the French in the past.

This statement, if correct, would also support the White House; for the Communists have in the past included all forms of U.S. involvement in Vietnam under the label of "war of aggression." Once again, one must be acutely aware of the true Communist meaning of such phrases as war of aggression, coalition government, and troop withdrawal.

In the past, the Communists have held out other false hopes to the American people. In looking at North Vietnamese and NLF statements before the November 1968 bombing halt, one finds the Communists offering all sorts of expectations of an early peace if the United States stopped the bombing. For example, on September 18, 1968, Xuan Thuy told the 22nd negotiating session at Paris that a bomb halt was "a first step opening the way to move toward a peaceful solution on the basis of respect for the fundamental rights of the Vietnamese people." On October 22, 1968, the NLF press agency reiterated Hanoi's demand for a total and unconditional suspension of the air attacks and stated: "Only when the United States complies with that demand can the Paris talks make headway."

Xuan Thuy declared two days later that if the United States stopped the bombing "there will be new prospects." On October 27, Radio Hanoi asserted: The United States must do this as the required first step to create conditions leading to a correct settlement of the Vietnam War. Xuan Thuy sweetened the bait a little more when he told the 28th negotiating session on October 30 that an end to the bombing "would enable the early discusion of other questions of interest to both parties so as to gradually find out a just political settlement of the Vietnam problem." Note that in return for a substantive American concession, Xuan Thuy promised discussions. And on November 2, after President Johnson's announcement, Xuan Thuy said that the goal of the conference was "to discuss a solution to the problems of peace in Vietnam.”

Since then, the American people have learned the phoniness of Communist promises of new prospects and discussions. The scenario at Paris since October 1968 has continued to be Communist demands for American concessions in return for veiled promises of peace, while at the same time North Vietnam and the NLF tirelessly repeat their six year old demands for a total U.S. withdrawal and an NLF-dominated coalition government. Can it be any wonder then, that some people genuinely doubt North Vietnam's honesty when it, once again, offers "discussions" on the prisoner of war question in return for a U.S. withdrawal under a deadline.

North Vietnam's record on prisoner release after the Geneva Agreement of 1954 does not totally support the prevailing notion of Communist sincerity today, despite what the critics say. Bernard Fall tells us in his book Street Without Joy that out of 36,979 French Union soldiers listed as missing, North Vietnam returned only 10,754. Hanoi has never accounted for the remaining 26,000, except to claim that some of the Vietnamese prisoners joined the Vietminh. Moreover, in December, in December 1954, Eastern European exile groups in Western Europe claimed that the Vietminh had not returned 1,000 French Foreign legionnaire prisoners of Eastern European origin but had instead forcibly shipped them back to their Communist homelands in East Europe. According to the Congressional Research Service, the French Embassy in Washington has in. formed CRS that the charge is at least partially true. So once again, we have evidence of Hanoi's past perfidy.

It has been proposed by Clark Clifford and others that the United States set a deadline for total troop withdrawal but condition it on the release of American prisoners; in other words, test Hanoi and the NLF. In response to this, I would point out what I consider to be a very possible scenario should the United States adopt this strategy. The United States sets a deadline. The Communists demand additional concessions in the discussions that follow, including an end to all forms of U.S. involvement in Vietnam-meaning a halt to all military and economic assistance to South Vietnam. Some elements among the American