At the church, where the Ducphong power structure was having a social hour before lunch, Col. Yem found the first sign of another political force at work. National Assemblyman Nguyen Dac Dan, who recently won the attention of the Saigon press by brandishing a hand grenade during a legislative debate, was comfortably seated in the midst of a group of dignitaries and chatting up a storm. Dan, who wears a mustache like Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky's, said he was campaigning both for the vice president and for himself.

Though he was elected to the assembly from Baxuyen Province in the Mekong Delta, Dan has decided to run in Phuoclong (there are no residency requirements for Assembly candidates) in an effort to oust the aging pro-government speakerof the lower house, Nguyen Ba Luang.

Luong, 69, was also present, sitting in a corner and looking rather miffed. "You know why Dan wants to run here, don't you?," Col. Yem asked a reporter later. "Everyone hated him so much in Baxuyen he couldn't win there again, so he came up here where nobody knows him."

Despite this confrontation of conflicting political forces, the splendid lunch laid on by the church proceeded smoothly, with Yem in the place of honorcracking jokes that made the priests giggle.

Midway through the last course, a helicopter passed overhead and landed in the churchyard.

"That must be my chopper," said Smith, the U.S. adviser, frowning and looking at his watch.

But it wasn't his chopper. Into the church strode two dapper young Vietnamese Air Force pilots. They would be glad to have some food and a can of beer, they said when the priests offered them refreshment, but then they had to pick up Assemblyman Dan and take him to his next appointment.

Col. Yem looked at Dan, who smiled back. Luong was nowhere to be seen. "How is it you get a helicopter whenever you want one?" a reporter asked Dan. "I have a friend in the air force," he said.

Interestingly, no one said a word about the Vietnamese election law that forbids any candidate for the assembly to campaign before mid August, and bars all compaigning for presidential contenders until early September.

Who is to say what this little incident illustrates? Perhaps that the Vietnamese are beginning to enjoy, or at least to practice, the new system of politics that was imposed on them four years ago.

To say any more would be to venture out on thin ice; even to say that, in Phuoclong Province at least, presidential sentiment seems divided between Thieu and Ky would be rash.

A Vietnamese-speaking reporter asked the South Vietnamese soldier who chauffeured an American official's car in the provincial capital who he thought would win the election.

"Well, don't tell (the official)," he said, "but 80 per cent of us in my militia unit are going to vote for Gen. Duong Van (Big) Minh. We think he's the one who will bring peace."

Mr. WOLFF. I very much appreciate this opportunity to testify in support of House Concurrent Resolutions 192 and 193, identical resolutions I authored to provide for the appointment of a study team to observe the presidential election in Vietnam in October 1971; 48 of my colleagues, including three other members of this subcommittee, are cosponsors of the resolutions.

Whether or not one supports our involvement in Southeast Asia, one of the avowed purposes of that involvement has always been to provide the people of Vietnam with basic freedoms, including the freedom to choose their leaders in open elections. The forthcoming elections should provide a fair test of that freedom, and I feel that the Members of Congress and the American people are entitled to know whether free elections are an actuality in Vietnam. The importance of these elections is written in the blood of the 40,000 Americans who have given their lives for a supposedly free Vietnam, and in the more than $100 billion we have expended on this war.

Prior to the last presidential election in Vietnam, in September 1967, I proposed that Members of the Congress be appointed to go to Vietnam to observe the election. Ultimately President Johnson accepted my suggestion and appointed an observation team, but he did so at the last minute.

Because of this there was not time for adequate study by the team members during the preelection period; and because all the appointments to the team were made by the President, many people felt the team was not balanced in outlook. I myself, therefore, went to Vietnam in 1967 as an independent observer. On the basis of that experience I propose that we begin now to prepare for a nonpartisan American observation team to be present prior to and during the 1971 elections.

Under the terms of my resolution the study team to go to Vietnam would consist of 15 members-four members of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, appointed by the Speaker; four members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, appointed by the President of the Senate; and seven other public officials and/or private citizens, appointed by the President.

In view of the recommendations of many interested parties, I now propose that the resolution be amended to reduce the number of presidential appointees to four, in order to provide more balanced representation and to require that the appointees of the Speaker, the President of the Senate and the President, respectively, be representative of varying viewpoints.

I do not feel that the Congress and the American people would support our sending a commission to Vietnam to whitewash the elections or to gather evidence to support any preconceived view. If an American observation team is to be effective in fostering the atmosphere necessary for free elections, that team must be bipartisan both in terms of politics and in terms of the team members' positions on our policy in Vietnam.

Under House Concurrent Resolution 192 the study team would be present in Vietnam for the week preceding the election and as long thereafter as necessary to complete its investigations. To insure adequate briefing and background information for the team members when they arrive in Vietnam, I suggest that staff members leave for Vietnam as quickly as possible. Judging from my own experience, this provision of a staff for the observation team is vitally important, for I found my lack of staff a great handicap in 1967.

In addition, there have already been indications that questionable political practices-including misuse of U.S.-financed surveys, the linking of peace candidates with Communists, and limitations on the number of candidates-are already occurring in the campaign. I believe that the American people have a right to learn of these occurrences directly and not just through occasional press reports. If our observation team is to be aware of these practices and monitor the elections effectively, the persons appointed to serve as staff members must go to Vietnam and begin to lay the groundwork now.

Following their return to the United States, the study team authorized by my resolution would make a report on the conduct of the election to the Congress and the American people as soon as possible. For purposes of their observation and report, the team members would

be authorized to look into all facets of the election, including but not limited to-the degree of citizen participation, procedures for determining candidates' and voters' eligiblity, procedures for preventing election irregularities and insuring the secrecy of balloting, the role of the media, procedures for investigating election irregularities, and validation procedures.

As the members of the subcommittee know, Senator Stevenson and several other members of the other body have also introduced a resolution providing for congressional observation of the Vietnamese elections. While that resolution differs from mine in some particulars, I do not feel that there would be any problem in working out the differences during a House-Senate conference following passage of the two resolutions.

It is vital that the Congress and the American people have representatives on hand to observe the Vietnamese elections, as we did in 1967. If our observation team is to achieve its purpose of being more effective than the 1967 official team, and more effective than were my own individual efforts, the team members and staff should be appointed and begin briefings soon. I therefore hope there will be early action on this resolution, and that those responsible for appointing the team members will do so at an early date. Both the Congress and the American people deserve a more thorough job of observation and reporting than was possible in 1967.

I would like to emphasize my feeling that the observation team must be dissociated from the American Embassy in Saigon and from administration policy. It would be short-sighted to commit the United States to the election of any particular candidate. It would also be contradictory to our stated commitment to free elections.

The purpose of any observation team observing the Vietnamese elections, whether that team is international or American in composition, must be to encourage the free operation of the will of the Vietnamese people, and not to perpetuate any regime or promote any candidate.

I would, therefore, hope that the administration will cease its support of the Thieu-Ky regime and join us in our efforts to foster truly free elections in Vietnam.

A fairly recent development has been the passage by the Vietnam National Assembly of an electoral bill requiring each presidential candidate to be nominated by at least 40 of the 197 National Assemblymen or 100 of the country's 554 provincial and city counselors. It is possible that as a result of this law there will be only one candidate on the ballot in October. In that case, the people of Vietnam will clearly not be offered a free choice. If that is the case, the Government of South Vietnam will be following closely the recent example of the Communists to the North, and we may find that we have united Vietnam much more quickly, and much more closely, than we anticipated-but under the umbrella of tyranny instead of the freedom we have been fighting to defend.

If the new Vietnamese election law is pursued to its logical end and there is only one candidate this fall, then I recommend that we not send a commission to observe an election having a foregone conclusion. But I hope that the Congress will pass the resolution I have introduced and begin now to make preparations to send an observa

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tion team. This is exactly the kind of pressure that must be applied to persuade the Vietnamese Government to offer the people a truly free choice in a fair election.

We must work to assure that free choice which is demanded by the loss of 40,000 young Americans who have died to provide freedom and more than 300,000 of our people maimed in Indochina.

I offer for the record a letter from Gen. Edward G. Lansdale, retired as major general of the U.S. Air Force, 1963. He is retired now, he spent 1963 in South Vietnam. He also spent 1954-56 as a special assistant to Ambassador Lodge for pacification purposes.

I read the opening paragraphs of General Lansdale's letter:

Dear Congressman Wolff: Thank you for your letter of May 6, the copy of your resolution, H. Con. Res. 192, proposing that a U.S. study team observe and analyze the October 1971 election in South Viet Nam, and your invitation that I comment. The commenting will be a genuine pleasure.

First of all, congratulations to you and to the Congressmen who joined you in sponsoring the resolution! It is heartening to know that there are Americans who remain alert to the basic issue at stake in South Viet Nam and who recognize the real significance of what the 1971 elections will mean to everyone involved in the struggle. The measurement you propose of how our fundamental purpose is being fulfilled in protecting the right of the Vietnamese to have a free choice in determining their future, will have far more reality to it than do other counts of enemy dead or the numbers and decibel ratings of demonstrations in the streets of the United States. Such clear thinking deserves a cheer. You have mine!

I would like to offer the letter for the record.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Without objection it will be inserted.

(The letter follows:)

Hon. LESTER L. WOLFF,

Congress of the United States,

House of Representatives,

Washington, D.C.

ALEXANDRIA, VA., MAY 10, 1971.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN WOLFF: Thank you for your letter of 6 May, the copy of your resolution, H. Con. Res. 192, proposing that a U.S. study team observe and analyze the October 1971 election in South Viet Nam, and your invitation that I comment. The commenting will be a genuine pleasure.

First of all, congratulations to you and to the Congressmen who joined you in sponsoring the resolution! It is heartening to know that there are Americans who remain alert to the basic issue at stake in South Viet Nam and who recognize the real significance of what the 1971 elections will mean to everyone involved in the struggle. The measurement you propose, of how our fundamental purpose is being fulfilled in protecting the right of the Vietnamese to have a free choice in determining their future, will have far more reality to it than do other measurements being used in the war, such as body counts of enemy dead or the numbers and decibel ratings of demonstrations in the streets of the United States. Such clear thinking deserves a cheer. You have mine!

There are several elements pertinent to U.S. interest in the Vietnamese elections which weren't mentioned in your introductory remarks or the resolution. I call them to your attention for serious consideration, not only in the wording of the resolution but also in the implementation by the U.S. study team. These elements are: enemy attempts by military and terrorist forces to disrupt the electoral process, the extent of non-partisan encouragement and help by the United States in assuring a free election, the importance of Lower House and village elections as well as the October Presidential race, an awareness of the newness of electoral procedures to Vietnamese who will stake their lives, fortunes. and sacred honor on the outcome, and an acknowledgement that other nations have joined with us in South Viet Nam for the same purpose as we.

Enemy disruption. Your resolution notes that the avowed purpose of United States involvement in Viet Nam is to provide the people with freedom of choice. That means that we Americans are willing to place our trust in the decisions of the Vietnamese, made via secret balloting in this year's elections in their

country. Our trust in the people is the opposite of the practices of the Communist enemy in Viet Nam. Since this conflict between trust and distrust of the Vietnamese people is taking place on a battleground, it can be expected that the Communists will make use of military force and terror to disrupt and discredit an electoral procedure which permits the citizenry to freely create a government of, by, and for the people.

In saying that the Communist enemy distrusts the people, I am not resorting to idle rhetoric. Elections were held in Communist North Viet Nam on 11 April 1971 for membership in Hanoi's National Assembly. It was the first election held in North Viet Nam since 1964, the year the leaders in Hanoi decided to send North Vietnamese troops into South Viet Nam. Unlike elections known to us or to other free people, including the South Vietnamese, the people of North Viet Nam were given no real choice.

Out of some 500 candidates for the 450 seats in Hanoi's Assembly, all but 4 or 5 candidates were hand-picked Communist Party members, subject to the iron discipline of that Party. Thus, to begin with, the "people's choice" actually was made by an elite behind closed doors in Hanoi. Even so, this elite took no chances with the people. According to the reports of observers. North Vietnamese voters were confronted by police and other officials at the polling places, handed ballots by the police, who then observed which ballot each voter cast. In a police state, with its savage reprisals against individuals, this open procedure made the electorate merely a rubber stamp. Surely such patent rigging of an election is plain and current evidence of distrust of the people by an elite which is attempting a conquest of South Viet Nam.

The Communist Leadership of the National Liberation Front in South Viet Nam claims to speak for "the people". Yet, they are self-appointed spokesmen, not even bothering with any pretense of elections. It seems logical to conclude that these Southern leaders also fear to put their trust in being chosen by the people through a secret ballot, particularly since they have lesser means to enforce their will.

So, given the presence in South Viet Nam of an enemy opposed to letting the people have a free choice, any honest observation and reporting of an election there must pay due attention to that enemy's disruptive actions. Your proposed U.S. study team should be charged with getting the facts about Communist attempts at disruption-the propaganda campaigns to discredit the elections, the acts of terror to spoil the proceedings-and exposing them fully in subsequent reporting. Such exposure will help put the Vietnamese elections into truer perspective.

I emphasize this need to give proper heed to the enemy mostly because I realize that we Americans are all too human. We take the easy route of gathering information readily available to us from our friends among the Vietnamese, including the scandals they tell about each other. It is harder work finding out about Communist coercion, since some of it is done so secretively. However, if we recognize the importance of the 1971 elections in South Viet Nam to the future of that country and to U.S. involvement there, then it is worth putting in extra work to add facts about enemy actions to give a properly balanced report of what happens when the Vietnamese practice self-determination.

U.S. role. Although I am among those who believe strongly that the United States should show no favoritism for individual candidates or political groups in South Viet Nam, I am equally a strong believer that the United States should openly encourage and help the free electoral process there. Given our primary purposes for being in South Viet Nam, it would be mean folly if we were to remain mute and unhelpful at the very moment that the Vietnamees were putting into practice one of our most cherished precepts.

There are American civilians and military men stationed in every district of every province in South Viet Nam. Each has some influence with the Vietnamese locally. Thus, the U.S. Mission in Viet Nam should instruct all Americans in contact with the Vietnamese to promote the concept of a free election and to furnish available U.S. help to that end-on a non-partisan basis. It is very much in the best interests of the United States that Vietnamese citizens get a full exposure to the issues at stake and have ample opportunity to make their decisions at the polls, secretly, safety. When we see some fruition in Viet Nam of our principled beliefs, then we will start finding some meaning in the sacrifices we have made there. Our national conscience needs this.

It also is very much in the best interests of South Viet Nam that this be done. Whomever is elected is going to need to know, for sure, that he carries the honest