critics begin demanding that the United States make these additional concessions or else withdraw our troops under the deadline. They might argue that such additional steps were necessary to secure a prisoner release. I do not wish to impugn the motives of the critics, but this scenario appears to me a distinct possibility. True, critics such as the Washington Post and columnist Joseph Kraft contend that the critics would never advocate leaving South Vietnam completely in the lurch by cutting off all aid. The Post, for example, stated in a June 11 editorial that: It is simply false to charge that the critics would do nothing at all to help South Vietnam after we have disengaged militarily from the Thieu regime. But knowing that in South Vietnam the United States has created a governmental and military machine that cannot conceivable operate without American aid, they are prepared to countenance that aid. In looking at the Post's statement, we should remember that this newspaper switched its positions before-from strong supporter of Administration policy in 1968 to strong opponent in 1969. Who is to say that it won't happen again. Moreover, the Post doesn't speak for all of the critics. Many leading critics in Congress, have not committed themselves on the issue of continued military and economic aid to Saigon after American troops are withdrawn. The critics have leveled such vicious attacks at the Saigon government that I have serious doubts whether they will support military and economic assistance to South Vietnam in the long run. Let us remember, too, that the major slogan of the April 24 anti-war demonstration in Washington was "Out Now"-not "Out When the Prisoners Are Released." If the President sets a deadline or if Congress imposes one on him, the demand to meet it might become so intense that the prisoner issue will be disregarded. In looking at the history of criticism of both the Johnson and Nixon Administration's policies, I am struck by a thread that runs through all of it. The critics have contended time and time again that by making a concession, the United States would induce North Vietnam to take a more reasonable and conciliatory negotiating position. They asked for a bomb halt on this basis. The bombing was suspended. They next said that the Allied refusal to negotiate with the NLF was a major roadblock to a settlement of the war. The Allies agreed to negotiate with the Front. Demands for a cease-fire proposal arose among the critics in 1970. President Nixon proposed one last October 7. And now they argue that total troop withdrawal under a fixed deadline will produce reasonableness on Hanoi's part. Perhaps they are correct this time, but history does not make me optimistic. Some critics contend that prisoners of war are not returned until the end of the conflict; therefore we should end our involvement by setting a deadline. Nothing could be further from the truth. Prisoners of war have been exchanged during wartime on many occasions. According to a Congressional Research Service study, prisoner exchanges during World War I began in 1916 and included the exchange of 160,000 French, British and German troops in May 1918. The same report states that during World War II, Britain, the United States, and Germany reached an agreement in 1943 to exchange disabled prisoners. Under it, 13,500 Allied POW's and 21,000 Germans were exchanged before the end of the war. In 1953, several months before the Korean armistice, the United Nations and the Communists reached agreement on Operation "Little Switch"; and during April and May 1953, 6,670 Communists were exchanged for 684 members of the U. N. forces, including 149 Americans. Thus, it is North Vietnam's attitude and not prior wartime practice, which prevents the exchange of prisoners. If Congress imposes a troop withdrawal deadline on President Nixon and North Vietnam responds by demanding the additional concessions, which I have discussed, the United States will have foolishly thrown away another trump card in the negotiations. We will then be left with the dilemma of either ending all support to South Vietnam or seeing our men remain in their tragic captivity. Let there be no mistake that acceptance of a North Vietnam demand to end all forms of aid to South Vietnam, while Hanoi continues to receive about $1 billion annually from the Soviet Union and China, would be nothing less than total capitulation. This has been North Vietnam's ultimate demand from the beginning and, unfortunately, Hanoi may get it unless the United States remains steadfast in its insistence that North Vietnam give a flat and firm commitment to release American prisoners in exchange for a troop withdrawal. By refusing to impose a deadline on the President from slipping into this cruel dilemma. It will also enable him to complete the Vietnamization program and end U.S. involvement honorably. I urge the House to adopt this course. STATEMENT OF HON. AL ULLMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OREGON Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I want to thank you for the opportunity you have given me to express my views for the record in regard to the Indochina War and the role of the United States as a combatant in that struggle. I also feel the committee should know that the general tenor of my remarks is not something resulting from any sudden realization that more than 50,000 Americans have died in that war, or in conciliation for any demonstrators whose anti-war zeal has carried them beyond the pale of lawful dissent, or as a recent realization that thousands of prisoners of war are languishing in foreign prison camps. What I intend to say is something I have considered and reconsidered for a long time, and in any case the war has clung to our backs relentlessly for so long that it is hardly possible any more for anyone to react in the white heat of sudden anger. I first expressed my disapproval of the war publicly in 1967. Since that time I have continued to voice and act out my opposition to the war in ways I felt were consonant with my position and my responsibilities to the country and to the people of Oregon. As recently as last week I voted for the amendment proposed by our colleagues, Mr. Whalen and Mr. Nedzi, to limit through the military procurement bill the expenditure of any new funds to support that war after January 1. The very fact this committee has convened to hear testimony on the war is, of course, evidence that others have also been and are now as concerned with the issues I have attempted to define and clarify in my own mind. It would, in the context of these hearings, be possible to open for debate some abstract questions of U.S. foreign policy. It would be within the committee's scope to discuss what's known as the Nixon Doctrine, or to debate the propensity with which the U.S. government has supported numerous foreign governments of all kinds merely because they appear to be anti-communist. These issues apply now and will continue to apply to Asian and Pacific affairs. But, I submit, there are two issues with which this committee should primarily concern itself. The first is the extent to which Congress has abdicated its responsibilities and rights under the constitution to declare war and to appropriate funds to conduct warfare. Congress has, in fact, waived its rights and responsibilities by conscious decisions. There is no better example of that than last week's debate on the House floor. Never before in the history of our government has it been necessary to ask Members of Congress to oppose funding an undeclared war in not one but four countries. Members of Congress like to blame their inability to grasp the essence of the Indochina issue by calling the war a "President's war". No doubt, it is a president's war. Other issues aside, the recent stories in the New York Times, taken from a report this committee has yet to see, only serve to underscore that concept. But calling this a "president's war" does not abnegate the responsibilities of Congress. In fact, it only illustrates how completely Congress has capitulated in its constitutional mandate. Furthermore, until Congress faces its responsibilities nad enacts appropriate legislation, this war will remain in the domain of the executive. That brings me to the second-and overriding-issue I feel this committee should concentrate on: how Congress can end U.S. involvement in the war. We have discharged our commitments to South Vietnam beyond what was expected of us. Now it is time to get out, and obviously the only way we will get American troops out of Vietnam is not to keep or send them there. Withdrawing our troops will provide us a truly credible vehicle through which to demand the return of our prisoners of war. Continuing to maintain troops in Vietnam only prolongs the agony of our prisoners of war and provides an opportunity for more to be captured. Very simply, if Congress continues to abstain from concrete action, the war will remain a president's war, subject to pressures on the administration and the vagaries of the battlefield. These are not things calculated to effect a prompt and negotiable withdrawal, nor will they relieve the economic and moral agony the war has imposed on our country. It is my hope, therefore, that this subcommittee will report out promptly legislation designed to end our involvement in Vietnam on a specific and nottoo-distant date. Congress did not start this war. But Congress can end this war, and by doing so it can also restate clearly the constitutional mandate it has so long and so patently ignored. Thank you. |