body seemed to care much about free elections, and we were pursuing a policy in a government that was much tougher then than it is now in terms of civil liberties.

Mr. WOLFF. I think those people you referred to, under Mr. Eisenhower's term of office, indicated that free elections should not be held, that elections should not be held.

Mr. DU PONT. I believe that is correct.

Mr. Wolff, to get off on another subject for a moment, your particular interest in having started off the day with quotations on your behalf, I feel that it is all I can do to return the favor, and I have some quotations here about the withdrawal from Vietnam being unacceptable. It would mean rejecting the plea of the Vietnamese to help them maintain a free and independent nation.

Mr. WOLFF. That was my quote.

Mr. DU PONT. That is my point, February 10, 1965, and you are one of the people who is kind of fascinating to me because you seem to have come 180 degrees on this issue. You started out very much on the hawkish side, and I am not sure just where you are today, but somewhere other than there.

Mr. WOLFF. If you would read the full statement

Mr. DU PONT. I did.

Mr. WOLFF. You would also find in that full statement, not quoting out of context, a recommendation that we attempt to find a political solution-the only solution. I don't remember the exact quote, since I did make it back in 1965, some 6 years ago. Reading the full statement, you will find that I did recommend that a political solution was the only solution that I felt could solve the problem in Vietnam.

Mr. DU PONT. You ran through a number of things and rejected them and so forth, and the purpose of reciting it is not to quote out of context or try to confuse your words, but you seemed to have the feeling in the beginning that Vietnam was worth saving.

Mr. WOLFF. I still feel that Vietnam is worth saving, but I question the price that has to be paid for it.

Mr. DU PONT. In other words, it is your feeling that the price has been paid? What I am after is your thinking process in having changed from one to the other.

Mr. WOLFF. I feel the price has been paid and paid many times over with more than 40,000 killed and 350,000 wounded-plus $120 billion. I think we have long since passed the point where if there is fighting to be done, the Vietnamese should be able to stand on their own and do their own fighting; I think they should be the ones to be doing it and not us.

I do not reject the idea of assistance to the South Vietnamese. I have said this all along. I have supported the Nixon doctrine. I still support this in other areas of Asia, but I support the doctrine in its full intent that we are to help people who will help themselves-and I reject the idea that the Vietnamese have done very much to help themselves.

Mr. DU PONT. To ask you finally the same question I asked Mr. Rosenthal, and I think this is a very important point because there are some who not only want our withdrawal from South Vietnam to be complete militarily, but they also want an economic withdrawal, just a complete severing of the ties, and I personally happen to feel that is very wrong.

But as I asked Mr. Rosenthal, do you feel that after our combat troops are out, that we should continue military aid and economic aid to South Vietnam, regardless of what regime might be in power?

Mr. WOLFF. I think we certainly have to assess what Vietnam has received already. In 1970, in addition to all other aid, $2.3 billion worth of equipment went to Vietnam in the way of transfer of equipment. In 1971, $2.7 billion worth of equipment is to go in the way of transfer of equipment. During our full committee hearings, it was developed that we have no idea of the amount of excess or surplus equipment that has already been transferred to them-given to them over and above our regular military assistance.

I think if they get very much more, Vietnam is going to sink beneath the sea from the weight of equipment that we have given them. I think in certain aspects they probably do need a certain amount of additional military assistance. I would render this to them if they felt they needed it and put it to good use instead of selling it on the black market. I am not for cutting our ties to South Vietnam unless they do not permit the free exercise of the will of the people, and then I would definitely cut my ties.

If they do not provide the opportunity for people to determine their own future, then I would not support them.

Mr. DU PONT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Wolff, for giving us your presentation and your views.

Our next witness today will be John Dow from New York. Mr. Dow is one of those who has long been dubious of American policy in Indochina. He is the prime author of one of the many bills before this subcommittee. The bill, H.R. 8955, calls for immediate cease-fire to begin our withdrawal.

We will be pleased to hear Mr. Dow at this point.

I might say, Mr. Dow, that the Chair apologizes for keeping you waiting and thanks you for your patience. Perhaps something your colleagues have learned from you in the 5 years we have had an opportunity to know you, is that your position has been consistent. You have been one of those who has consistently pointed out we should not be in Vietnam, and we are very pleased today to listen to your thoughts.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN J. DOW, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Mr. Dow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your kind words. Since I do have a different view of the Vietnam situation from most of the others, I had hoped that more of your subcommittee would be here when I was testifying and that is why I waited and I would make an appeal to you that you might allow me to testify at the beginning tomorrow. I don't know that I want to wait all afternoon again

tomorrow.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I would say this, Mr. Dow. If you would rather do that, the Chair can assure you that you will be the first witness

tomorrow.

Mr. Dow. That will be splendid, and I am most grateful to you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you very much. We will do that tomorrow afternoon.

Our next witness is Congressman Sonny Montgomery, Democrat of Mississippi. Mr. Montgomery led a special House of Representatives study of Vietnam, and he has been to Vietnam several times. He is extremely knowledgeable of that area and on the matters of concern before the subcommittee this afternoon.

We greatly appreciate hearing your testimony, Mr. Montgomery, and we apologize for the delay.

STATEMENT OF HON. G. V. MONTGOMERY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and other members of this subcommittee.

Thank you for providing me this opportunity to present my personal views on the current situation in Indochina. Since I realize you and the subcommittee members are pressed for time due to the importance of these hearings, I will keep my remarks as brief as possible.

I am certainly no expert on Southeast Asia, but I have tried to familiarize myself with the situation in that part of the world by making five trips there for a personnal firsthand inspection during the

recess.

I feel the inspection trips-more numerous than for any other Member of Congress-have provided me with some insights that might not be available to all my colleagues.

My public position since January 1969, has been for a phased troop withdrawal. In fact, I believe I was among the first to suggest that we should reduce our forces in South Vietnam because the South Vietnamese needed to shoulder more of the responsibility. I felt then as I do now that Vietnamization is working.

I would be quick to point out that I have never favored and do not favor the announcement of a withdrawal timetable. I do not believe making public a date certain for troop withdrawal would be in the best interest of this Nation from the standpoint of securing the release of our prisoners or from the standpoint of military strategy to protect those troops which will be the last to leave.

Nor do I believe a date certain would be in the best interest of those nations of Southeast Asia who are struggling to maintain free and democratic governments through self-determination.

Mr. Chairman, the most important benefit of my trips has been the opportunity to observe the changes that have taken place since my first trip in December 1967. I have been in South Vietnam for the last four Christmasses and I would point out that being with our troops in Vietnam is of tremendous benefit.

The most encouraging change I have observed has been to see the South Vietnamese Armed Forces progress from what some would describe as a ragtag army into an efficient and trained army fighting in defense of their homeland.

We have provided the South Vietnamese the training and knowhow to repel the aggressors from North Vietnam and the Vietcong from within. Mr. Nixon's troop withdrawal program has also been helpful in that it has put pressure on the South Vietnamese to prepare

for the day that they must shoulder the entire burden of defending their country.

In essence, I believe America has done about all she can do to assist the countries of Southeast Asia from the standpoint of manpower. It is now up to the individual countries to provide the armed forces to defend their boundaries. I believe equally as firmly that we must continue to provide financial assistance to Indochina, including military equipment. This is especially true in the case of Cambodia. I might say I have been to Cambodia three times.

These people have a fierce determination to be free from Communist domination. I believe they can accomplish their goal of freedom with their own Armed Forces and with help from South Vietnam as long as we provide them needed financial assistance.

It would be a shame and a black mark on our Nation's proud history of honoring her commitments if we don't continue to provide the financial support for these nations that are trying to help themselves. We will never be able to forget or forgive ourselves for copping out at a time and place when so many Americans have given so much in good faith.

In closing, I would point out that I am discouraged about the release of Americans held as prisoners of war. I have met with the North Vietnamese three times in Vientiane, Laos, to discuss the release of our POW's and haven't had any success.

I quite frankly don't believe the Hanoi government has decided on the fate of our captured Americans. I am sure the North Vietnamese are going to use them as a trump card. We should not allow ourselves to be misled by so-called commitments by the North Vietnamese until we see some affirmative action to release the prisoners.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Mr. Montgomery. You say you do not favor a withdrawal timetable. Would you state some of your reasons, why you find this objectionable and not in our national interest?

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I think it would be of more interest and well being for the enemy to announce a timetable. I also stated in my testimony that it would not be in the best interest of our allies, the Cambodians, the Laotians, and the South Vietnamese, to make any type of timetable statement.

I guess the main reason is that there is no reason to have a timetable. President Nixon has committed himself to the American people to bring the American troops home. I was there on the first of January and other than some American troops near the DMZ, we just don't have many ground combat troops over there now, Mr. Chairman, we are bringing them out.

I still think we are going to have to give the South Vietnamese financial aid, military equipment, technical advice, and some air support for the next 12 months. Other than that the South Vietnamese should be able to make it.

If they can't make it with that, they can't ever make it. Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Montgomery, some of our colleagues feel that a date certain for withdrawal would stimulate the South Vietnamese Government to accelerate its part and its responsibility in Vietnamization. How do you view that?

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I don't know if you can instill that in any people. They have to want freedom.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I am not talking solely about freedom. What I am talking about is if we should announce a withdrawal date the proponents feel that will serve notice on the Saigon government that they must accept total responsibility when that fixed date rives. Therefore, this would accelerate their conditioning to accept this, which would allow us to leave Vietnam.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I don't think it is necessary to put a time certain as far as the South Vietnamese are concerned. We have given them the know-how, we have given them the equipment, and other than a few more helicopter pilots being trained, they should be completely trained within 6 months.

I don't think a date certain would have any effect on the South Vietnamese. I think they are just going to have to buckle down and get with it. They have enough training to make it.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Based on your own personal observations, is it your contention as a supporter of Vietnamization that the government now in power shows the will to continue the struggle against the Vietcong after our forces have been withdrawn?

Mr. MONTGOMERY. If the South Vietnamese will have the will?
Mr. GALLAGHER. Yes.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, I think that is the big question, whether the South Vietnamese will tough it out and make it. I think they can make it, with what we have given them. I would say they have a 65/35 chance of making it.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Mr. Montgomery.

Mr. du Pont?

Mr. DU PONT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just one question, Mr. Montgomery. Some of our colleagues have from time to time met with the North Vietnamese in Paris and had informal "negotiating" sessions with them. Some of those gentlemen are of the opinion that they are getting the correct North Vietnamese position whereas our official negotiators are receiving some different kind of information.

In your contact with the negotiators that you mentioned in your testimony, have you had the feeling that you are getting in any way a different feeling than what you gather our negotiators are getting?

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I met with the Chargé d'Affaires in Vientiane, Laos. He really wasn't a netogiator. He was given permission to see me, which rather surprised me. In the past, I guess you could say I have been rather hawkish on the war. But I did talk to him.

He did give me some information that we did not have. He gave me the information that pictures would be released in the near future showing Americans playing basketball, participating in sports, and as you recall, these pictures were released.

Other than that, I don't think I gathered much more. I made three specific requests, and I will renew my requests with the North Vietnamese when I return in August. I don't even know whether they will see me this time or not. I requested that they give me complete information on the Americans held in Hanoi. I wish all 1,600 of them are alive, but I really have a feeling less than 500 of the Americans are still alive.

I requested the complete information on what they could tell us on the men listed as missing in action. I requested to go to Hanoi myself