or with a delegation to talk to a representative group of prisoners of war and have the opportunity to look at the prison camps. And lastly, I requested that some Americans be released to my custody, especially those that might be sick or wounded. This request seemed to interest them more than any other things I asked. They assured me several times that the Americans were getting as fine a medical treatment as you could anywhere. Of course, as somebody said earlier today, part of it may be truthful and part of it is not. Mr. DU PONT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Wolff? Mr. WOLFF. I just want to say that I know our colleague has been to Vietnam a great number of times. I would say that the concern that he has evidenced for the prisoners of war is a very noble one. I would say as well, a great many of the families of prisoners of war have come forth with the recommendation however, that we do set a date certain to test the sincerity of our enemy. I think it is about time we called the bluff of the North Vietnamese and I believe that a date certain would at least give us the opportunity, as has been indicated, putting the monkey on their back. Mr. MONTGOMERY. The only thing that concerns me or one of the things that concerns me about a date certain is that actually the North Vietnamese have always said they will discuss POW's if a timetable is announced and not that they would release the POW's. Plus really, we can't withdraw all American military might out of South Vietnam. That would include the Marine guards at our Embassy. It just does not make sense. Mr. WOLFF. What do we have to lose by offering the date. If they do not respond, move the date to some other time or withdraw the offer. Mr. MONTGOMERY. What you are saying is we take out all military personnel and anbody that has a social security or military serial number could not go to South Vietnam, is that what you are saying? Mr. WOLFF. No, I am saying that we set a date for the withdrawal of our military forces from Vietnam and if the North Vietnamese do not respond by returning our prisoners, then we withdraw the offer. I am asking you what would be wrong in doing something like that, I think that we are jeopardizing the lives of these men who are now captive of the North, the VC, the Cambodians and the Laotians. I don't think that we should jeopardize the lives of these young men. Mr. MONTGOMERY. What you are saying is then they are not going to agree to this. The only thing they are going to agree to is that we see that President Thieu is completely run out of the Government. Mr. WOLFF. Why? Mr. MONTGOMERY. That is what they are going to come back and say. They have already said it once. What you are saying is that no military man, American, can ever go back to South Vietnam. That is what you are saying. Mr. WOLFF. I am saying that we withdraw our troops. The President has said this. The President has stated that our policy is for the ultimate withdrawal of all of our men. I am saying that you are jeopardizing the lives and the safety of the men wasting away in prison camps. We are jeopardizing their lives by failing to put on the record that we will even attempt to get them back by setting a date for the withdrawal of all of our people. Mr. MONTGOMERY. As I said, in my testimony, the North Vietnamese are looking for a trump card. They have not made up their minds, in my opinion, and certainly I am entitled to my opinion as everyone else is in this peculiar situation. In my opinion, they haven't even decided what they are going to do with the Americans, they hold captive. Mr. GALLAGHER. The Chair would like to say that we have a roll call coming up. If you could, please finish your statement, Mr. Montgomery. Mr. MONTGOMERY. I don't care anything about them either. It seems if you announce a date certain you line up with the North Vietnamese more by doing what they want to do. Let's get tough with them. Let's get rough with them. This is what I would like to do. I would like to set a date and not tell them what we will do. That is what we ought to do. We ought to set a date and say, "We will make up our minds, we will give you to October 13, and if you haven't released these Americans then we will let you know what we will do. Mr. WOLFF. That is all we are saying. Mr. MONTGOMERY. No; you are saying you are bringing all the Americans out of there. Mr. WOLFF. You have said you don't want to line up with the North Vietnamese, I want to line up with the prisoners of war and with the MIA's and I think that is where we should be lining up. Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Montgomery, we thank you very much for giving us your thoughts reflecting the experience you have had in Vietnam. I know of no one who has made a greater more personal sacrifice of his time than you have in this terribly agonizing question. The subcommittee stands adjourned until tomorrow at 2 o'clock. (Whereupon, at 5:10 p.m. the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at 2 p.m., Wednesday, June 23, 1971.) LEGISLATION ON THE INDOCHINA WAR WEDNESDAY, JUNE 23, 1971 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2 p.m., in Room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Cornelius E. Gallagher (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Mr. GALLAGHER. The subcommittee will be in order. I want to welcome you here this afternoon as the subcommittee continues its hearings into bills and resolutions relating to the war in Indochina. These hearings received a measure of fresh relevance by the action of the Senate yesterday in passing the first amendment for the withdrawal of all forces from Indochina, subject only to the prior release of all U.S. prisoners of war. The fact that that historic event occurred on the same day as the House of Representatives opend its first full-scale investigation into the Indochina war shows, in my judgment, that the Congress of the United States can no longer be regarded as a silent partner in foreign policy. This, of course, does not mean that our subcommittee intends to vote out a withdrawal resolution tomorrow. I personally learned much from the testimony of my colleagues yesterday and, as I said in my opening statement then, we do want to hear all views about American policy in that troubled and tragic region of the world and take action on the matters before us. The subcommittee's first witness today to begin our second session in the subcommittee's consideration on the approximately 70 bills and resolutions relating to the war in Indochina is Congressman John Dow. Mr. Dow is a Democrat of New York. Mr. Dow has long been critical of American policy toward Vietnam and is the author of H.R. 8955 which calls for an immediate cease-fire. I want to apologize for delaying you yesterday, Congressman Dow. We are delighted to have you with us. You have been consistent in your opposition to the war in the past and we welcome you to the subcommittee this afternoon. Please proceed. STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN DOW, A REPRESENTATIVE IN Mr. Dow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very grateful for your postponement of my testimony until this time and I should like to say that you don't owe me any apology whatsoever. 65-972-71-4 I think it is wonderful that you are having these hearings and I want to be among the first to make my humble contribution. It is very heartening for those of us who took the early stand in opposition to the American involvement in Vietnam to enjoy this landmark opportunity of appearing before your distinguished Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. Let me draw your attention to the bill, H.R. 8955, which I and 11 consponsors have introduced. So far as I know, this is the only bill now before the House which calls for an immediate cease-fire-that is, within 48 hours-to be followed by an expeditious withdrawal of American forces from all of Southeast Asia. Allow me to say a word about the advantage of establishing a ceasefire in advance of a withdrawal of troops. This course is one that is advocated by neutralist groups in Vietnam, such as the Unified Buddhist Church. Recent disclosures by the New York Times show very clearly that American leadership has held a consistently dim view of neutralist thinking in Vietnam. Since, however, most other thinking about Vietnam has proved to be illusory, perhaps now is a good time to examine neutralist views a little more closely. As they see it, the special merit of a cease-fire as a prelude to withdrawal is the fact that it might be arranged to involve the Saigon regime as well as our own, and hopefully the Vietcong and North Vietnamese. Buddhist and other thinkers in Vietnam point out that the Saigon forces are fighting in a lackadaisical fashion because of their disenchantment with their role as a cat's-paw for the United States. This offers a golden opportunity to involve them in a ceasefire. A cease-fire would leave all Vietnamese factions more nearly under the influence of public opinion in South Vietnam. Everyone knows that public opinion generally in South Vietnam desires an end to the fighting. I cannot let an occasion such as this go by without reiterating the atrocious evils of America's involvement in Vietnam and also its shabby quality which is manifest in so many ways. One of the evils I refer to is the free-fire zones which are an admitted feature of our military policy. I cannot believe that any other nation in modern times has openly admitted and executed a policy of firing artillery at will into a populated countryside. Our bombing from 60,000 feet has caused uncounted deaths of men, women and children who are not combatants. Our use of napalm fire, with burning too hideous to contemplate, must be condemned, especially when it is carried out by the representatives of a sophisticated civilization against innocent people who have barely emerged from a tribal society. The use of defoliants, too, burning not military stores but the granary crops of the civilian population, is still another violation of usage under the laws of war. Then there are the minor shabbinesses that disgust those of us who believe in the nobility of American tradition. We note the conviction. of military officials for corruption at the PX stores. Also, we note the report-and General Ridgway has mentioned this matter-the officers in Vietnam have a 50 percent ratio for earning valor medals. whereas the lowly draftees in the jungle show a medal ratio of only 10 percent. We hear of soldiers broadcasting the military news, who |