gave up their jobs because they wouldn't be party to perversion of facts. Finally, we now learn that something like a fifth of our men are addicted to drugs, the worst kind of drugs. Obviously this manifests their wish to escape from a war and a situation so thoroughly degrading to a nation such as ours and to themselves as human beings.

Finally, we should review the hypocrisy and self-delusion at the highest levels in our civilian and military leadership that led us into this frightful war and seems to be keeping us in it still. For example, I allude to the myth that we are fighting Communist aggression, History will never charge those Vietnamese who came from the north into South Vietnam in the early sixties-many of them were born in the south-with committing aggression, while at the same time saying our American forces coming 10,000 miles from home were not aggressors. All the fine print in the treaties cannot obscure the common justice and fairness that history will have to recognize.

Consider our rationalizations about the Geneva Conventions, the SEATO Treaty, and other supposed commitments that have been applied as justification for our incursions in Southeast Asia. It should be noted that the repeal by Congress of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution at the end of last year specifically set aside the invocation of the SEATO Treaty as a justification of our Vietnam involvement. Moreover, the SEATO Treaty, which was itself a contradiction to the intent of the Geneva Convention, did not require us to take any specific action. It was the woeful judgment of our leadership that caused us to take the wrongful actions that we did.

While I have castigated the evil and the shabbiness of our Vietnam performance, I would never for one moment degrade the courage and sacrifice by 45,000 American dead and 200,000 wounded American boys. They were true in all respects to the task laid before them. We can only hope that their sacrifice will have taught us better, so that we do not make the same mistake again. For the problem in Vietnam is the problem of a people spurred on in the revolution of rising expectations. They cannot be crushed or defeated. The struggle and the problem is the same in scores of other underdeveloped nations. We would be well advised to take the lesson of Vietnam to heart, so that we do not elsewhere repeat our hideous mistake again.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Congressman Dow.

Congressman Dow, one thing has always interested me about the American response in Vietnam. No matter how inept or wrong spokesmen for various administrations have been in predicting military success, this sorry record is only equaled by the failure of opponents of the administrations to predict the response of the other side to any peace initiatives.

I therefore ask you, in your opinion, what should give us confidence now that no matter what we do or, if we should now have a cease-fire or a resolution to withdraw at a date certain, what confidence do we find that the other side may find it interesting enough to do something on their part. Would they finally see the light at the end of the tunnel, or would they plug up that light yet again?

Mr. Dow. Mr. Chairman, I cannot speak for other peace advocates but I don't think I myself have ever asserted that the other side would offer a counterproposal or react in any agreeable fashion to our efforts to end the war. I think the position that I represent and probably some

others, is that we have made a terrible mistake here-we have done. vast damage to Vietnam, we have injured our own economy in the most serious fashion, to say nothing of the cost and loss of life and that really we have to look at this as an error that must be corrected by ourselves.

I myself don't put much credence in negotiations. I would say that we owe it to the Vietnamese people whom we have beaten so badly, apparently so badly, and to our own people to get out under our own steam. To be frank with you, Mr. Chairman, it is a little bit shameful for me and for most of us, I think, to be watching this great Nation year after year, month after month, waiting for a tiny little group like Hanoi to drop a handkerchief or give us some sign or do something nice so that we can correct the course of our own destiny. It seems to me that this country is great enough to handle its own destiny, and when we are on the wrong path so far as we are concerned, for goodness sake let's change the path irrespective of what kind of reactions that little country over there might choose to apply.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I quite agree with you in the effect on our own country, and in what our own responsibilities are.

I asked that question because on page 2 you say, "This offers a golden opportunity to involve them in a cease-fire, and disclose the fact that Buddhist and other thinkers in Vietnam point out the lackadaisical fashion in which the war is conducted.

That, of course, was one of the primary objections to Mr. Diem. Have we not been invloved with Buddhist factions and others in Saigon that they may be neutralist enough to find a political accommodation with the other side which also has a vital interest in South Vietnam? Of course we learned that did not happen. In fact, neutralist participation in the governments following Diem did not create the balance required for national support. I just wonder whether or not we have learned any lessons at all.

Mr. Dow. It is very clear, Mr. Chairman, at least in these New York Times revelations and several other places, they say that our top officials talking among themselves said we must avoid neutralist connections and accepting neutralist views because this only leads us down into the hands of the Communists. That is about what they said. So we have doubtless been a party, you might say, to the arm's length treatment of Buddhist thinking, neutralist thinking in South Vietnam, and it is pretty hard for us now to recapture that connection if we would like to. I sincerely hope we can.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I would hope that we could recapture that, if it ever really existed. Of course, that was the obvious and paramount thinking in the decisions to no longer support Mr. Diem. We decided to involve Buddhist thinking which was proved more resentful of the government, which was part of the positive effect with regards to the escalation of the U.S. commitment.

Mr. Broomfield.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. No questions.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Wolff.

Mr. WOLFF. I have no questions of Mr. Dow, although I'm very happy to see him here. He has opposed our participation in the war and perhaps the latest revelations that have come from the Times lend great credibility to the incredibility that existed prior to this time.

Mr. Dow. Thank you, Mr. Wolff.
Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Mailliard.
Mr. MAILLIARD. No questions.
Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. du Pont.

Mr. DU PONT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate your interest in getting us disengaged in Vietnam. I refer to H.R. 8955 which I presume you want us to report out and take action on. One of the things that concerns me here is that the legislation would seem to eliminate all U.S. military aid to all the coun tries listed. I wonder why you oppose military aid, for example.

Mr. Dow. Well, I feel myself that part of our great mistake in Vietnam was becoming involved militarily in that part of the world. Whoever possesses that part of the world is in no position to do us any damage and we are in a part of the world where, as I said in my statement, the revolution of rising expectations is occurring in every nation, and for that reason I think that we should keep out of it and let them evolve their own evolution or revolution or whatever it is they want. By our providing military aid or military presence there we tend to aline ourselves with the status quo and try to sit on the lid. That is our big trouble, we are trying to sit on a lid here all over Southeast Asia when there is a tremendous hydrostatic pressure building up from the grassroots that just puts us in competition. So why should we want to have military aid provided for those countries? It is inconceivable to me. I think it is an extension of America's role as a world policeman far beyond what is called for as a matter of our needs.

Mr. DU PONT. I can understand your inclusion of Thailand, for example, inclusion in terms of the military operations that are being conducted from the air bases in Thailand against South Vietnambut are you suggesting that we should not give military aid quite aside from the Vietnam conflict to any nation? Would this extend to nations in South America, in Europe, and in the Middle East that want our assistance to repel aggression from the outside?

Mr. Dow. Well, I think that every case is different, Mr. du Pont. One of our troubles in this foreign policy generally and in Vietnam is that we make generalizations that we intend to do this and we intend to do that. I think every case is different. Now in the case of Southeast Asia we have this situation: That we have got a ring of bases around China. Starting with our big base in Thailand we have one at Cam Ranh Bay, we have them in Taiwan, we have them in Korea, we have them in Japan, we have them in the Philippines a ring of bases around China. And it seems to me that it is inevitable that as China develops that we are going to have trouble with her because she is going to want to shake off this iron chain. To me the advantage of our having those bases is not worth the incitement of enmity in China that it creates, and if we ever have a confrontation it will not be so much because China is aggressive as because they want to shake off what they think is around their neck and amongst those chains I include the air base in Thailand.

Mr. WOLFF. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. DU PONT. Let me make one comment and I will yield.

I think that I worry about your legislation because of the broad scope, and I don't think I agree with you that military aid exclusive of the Vietnam problem should be abandoned all over the world. I

think it is very important-maybe we disagree again here-that the United States not have ad hoc foreign policy, that we have a rational thread that runs through our foreign policy to all nations.

I appreciate your comments and your testimony.

Mr. WOLFF. I thank the gentleman.

I just read from a statement of the permanent mission in Thailand to the United Nations, the release issued on May 7, 1970. "Thailand did not ask the United States to send its Armed Forces to be on our territory."

This should be part of the record, the fact that Thailand did not request the assistance of the United States but we requested them to accept our forces.

Mr. DU PONT. Would the gentleman yield in turn?

Mr. WOLFF. Yes.

Mr. DU PONT. Mr. Wolff, I think what you say is correct but I think it puts a gloss on the situation that is not quite accurate. In regard to bases in Thailand for operations in Vietnam, large air bases, I think you are correct. But Thailand has requested other military support under the MAP program consistently and we supply it.

Mr. WOLFF. I agree with the gentleman so far as I support the assistance to Thailand. However, just for the purpose of the record I felt it was important to indicate, I think, that this is a statement made directly by the Times issue and it indicates, I think, that although they ask the question, assistance in the form of military procurement as sistance, they did not request any people be sent there.

Mr. GALLAGHER. You may respond to that, Mr. Dow, although I am not sure it has anything to do with your testimony.

Mr. Dow. In a sense I think it reinforces the point I was making and I thank my colleague from New York for those kind words. I think that any military bases that we have in that part of the world are a liability, they are like a thorn in the Asiatic body politic that will continue to fester until they are cleaned out, and it seems to me an utter futility for us to be involved in that part of the world in a military

way.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Have you not left out one base in Pakistan, a dandy little military presence which has contributed so much to humanity? Thank you.

Mr. Dow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GALLAGHER. Just a minute, sir.

Mr. HALPERN. Mr. Chairman, unfortunately I could not be here to listen to the witness that gave testimony so I am not in a position to question the points he raised. However, I do want to compliment my very able and distinguished colleague from New York on his testimony and I am sure he made very valuable contributions to the dialog. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Dow. Thank you. Mr. Halpern. I realize that you have sentiments perhaps not exactly like mine in detail but you are known as one who has raised serious questions about the war which I believe is helping us to speedily arrive at a peace, and I want to thank you for your part in that effort.

Mr. HALPERN. Thank you.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Dow; we appreciate it.

Our next witness is a colleague on the Foreign Affairs Committee, Congressman John Buchanan, a Republican of Alabama. Congressman Buchanan has been an eloquent spokesman for his constituents since he came to the Congress in 1964 and has been a valued member of our committee.

You are regarded very highly by us all. I understand you have no prepared statement, Mr. Buchanan, so if you will give your testimony. STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN BUCHANAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ALABAMA

Mr. BUCHANAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I certainly hope that the performance lives up to your very gracious billing.

Since I have no prepared statement, for which I apologize to the subcommittee, I would appreciate your permission to revise and extend my remarks.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Yes.

Mr. BUCHANAN. First, Mr. Chairman, I would commend you and the members of the subcommittee for your pursuit of this subject, the holding of these hearings and your consideration of the resolutions which are before you. It was my privilege to serve on your subcommittee for some 4 years and, as a member of the full committee, it has been my privilege to listen concerning Southeast Asia, to make a couple of trips to Vietnam, to come in contact with many officials of that country in both the legislative and executive branches, and I appreciate very much this opportunity to make an input into your hearing.

Mr. Chairman, there appear to be a good many people who take it for granted at this point in history that the involvement of the United States in Vietnam and perhaps even Southeast Asia is immoral and wrong. Much has been made of a poll which allegedly shows that some 73 percent of all Americans now consider our involvement in Vietnam militarily to be a mistake.

That same poll reveals some other things which have not been emphasized and which modify somewhat even what that poll showed to be the American attitude. But there was a poll taken at the same time which I would ask permission to be included in the record at this point, a Princeton poll. I have in my hand a news report concerning it and the report itself which showed somewhat different attitudes on the part of the American people than those revealed by the Gallop poll, to which much reference has been made in connection with the American people's attitude on this subject.

This poll shows 72 percent of the people "support President Nixon in his plan to end the war in Southeast Asia" and some other things. I would ask unanimous consent to include this poll in the record at this point.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Without objection.

(The poll follows:)