an unofficial, informal source of conversations with the North Vietnamese would give us anything but misleading and very much propaganda-oriented material. I had a discussion with Mr. Rosenthal yesterday concerning this topic, and I think that as long as it is going to follow Mr. Halpern's comments in the record, I just would like to disassociate myself from any belief that negotiation can go on between senior partners, junior partners, and middle partners at the same time. Mr. Robison, I have been looking at your resolution and actually I think you are to be complimented for it. I think it comes very close to the mark. One particular item disturbs me. On page 3 in line 12, the last of the resolved clauses, that it is the further sense of Congress that all U.S. Armed Forces be withdrawn from Indochina. Now we get back again to the question of Thailand, of what the definition of Indochina is. I am very much in agreement with you that we must remove our military forces from fighting in South Vietnam, including personnel that we have in Thailand. But what of military personnel in Thailand that might be doing things other than flying Vietnam missions? I would hope you might state what your thoughts are. Mr. ROBISON. May I address myself to that again. My thought was to encompass only former French Indochina, which would not include. Thailand. Mr. DU PONT. That would be Laos, Cambodia, and the two Vietnams. Mr. ROBISON. Yes. Mr. DU PONT. I think that clarification would help considerably. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. I again apologize for leaving in the middle of your presentation. Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Robison. Mr. ROBISON. Thank you, Mr Chairman Mr. GALLAGHER. Our next witness is Hon. Spark M. Matsunaga, one of the most energetic and effective Members of the House of Representatives, a member of the Committee on Rules. Mr. Matsunaga is a Democrat of Hawaii and will testify in favor of H.R. 4102, the Vietnam Disengagement Act. I am sure the subcommittee will hear a valuable statement. We apologize for the lateness of the hour, Mr. Matsunaga, but it has been unavoidable. It has been with a great deal of interest that this subcommittee has followed your efforts to bring this war to a conclusion. Please proceed. STATEMENT OF HON. SPARK M. MATSUNAGA, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF HAWAII Mr. MATSUNAGA. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I first would like to commend you for holding these hearings on the proposed Vietnam Disengagement Act and other pending legislation relating to the war in Vietnam. I am happy to learn that great interest has been shown by the Members of the Congress. These hearings may well be the most important hearings held by any committee in the 92d Congress. They are directed, as I understand it, at finding the best and quickest way to end our involvement in the war in Vietnam, and certainly there is no more urgent matter than that before the American people today. Our participation in that conflict is now in the beginning of its second decade, making it the longest war in our Nation's history. Without question, it is also the most tragic and most unwanted war. The human costs alone are almost beyond comprehension. We have heard the shameful statistics before, but we cannot allow their repetition to dull our sensitivities. More than 50,000 American lives have been lost; total American casualties number more than a quarter million. About 1,600 American soldiers have been captured by the enemy or are missing in action. South Vietnam counts 130,000 lives lost in combat, and more than a million combined civilian and military casualties. Our Defense Department sets North Vietnamese combat deaths at 742,000, or a total almost equal to the entire population of my home State of Hawaii. Costs in money are also enormous. In this country alone, over $100 billion have been diverted from urgent domestic needs to conduct the war that everybody wants terminated. And the highest cost may, in the end, be the tearing apart of the fabric of American society. From 12,000 miles away, this conflict in a remote area of the world is setting parent against child, old against young, frustrated citizens against established institutions. The time has come to say, "Enough." In so doing, we will, in effect, be catching up with the American people. Five months ago, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. 73 percent-almost three in four of those surveyed-told pollsters they favored congressional initiatives to end the Indochina War by December 31, 1971. That is precisely the goal of the Vietnam Disengagement Act. That bill would set a deadline of December 31, 1971, for the withdrawal of all American ground, air and naval forces from Indochina. Beyond that date, funds would remain available only for (1) arranging the return of prisoners: (2) providing for asylum or other means of assuring the safety of South Vietnamese who might be endangered by our withdrawal: and (3) offering such assistance to the Republic of Vietnam as the Congress approves. All of us, undoubtedly, want to see the termination of American involvement in this seemingly interminable war. But many Members of Congress, including members of this very subcommittee, may have serious reservations about setting a definite date for complete U.S. pullout, just as the President has. Generally, these reservations are based on two reasons: First, that we would be surrendering our bargaining position for the early release of our prisoners of war: Second, that we would, by withdrawing at the end of this year, be forsaking South Vietnam in its struggle against Communist aggressors. Let me address myself first to the prisoner-of-war question. It is undeniable that the Government of North Vietnam has consistently flouted the covenants of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, despite the fact that it agreed in 1957 to abide by those covenants, and we have no guarantee that it will abide by its declared intentions. But it is the sad truth that Hanoi has repeatedly announced that it will not even begin to negotiate for the release of American prisoners of war until we have set a definite date for the withdrawal of all American forces from South Vietnam. Unfortunately, our prisoners have become pawns in a chess game of war and politics. President Nixon refuses to set a date certain until Hanoi makes a commitment to release our prisoners; Hanoi refuses to make such a commitment until a date certain is set for withdrawal of all American troops. Like the question of the "chicken or the egg" we find ourselves without a solution. If, as the administration now seems to be planning, we are going to leave 50,000 residual American troops in Vietnam to insure the return of our prisoners of war, we can expect the North Vietnamese to continue to hold them. Inasmuch as we are at a complete stalemate on this issue, we have nothing really to lose by taking the bold initiative of setting December 31, 1971, as that date certain. The President has also indicated that the return of our prisoners is not the only consideration. He believes that we cannot "bug out" on Saigon until it has established a viable government. I submit, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, that South Vietnam now has as viable a government as it can ever have. The fact is that South Vietnam today has more than a million men in its regular armed forces and another half million in militia-type forces one man in five is formally under arms. We have been told in recent months about substantial South Vietnamese military successes in Cambodia and Laos. One our our top civilian advisers in Vietnam, John Vann, noted in a national news magazine interview last month that Saigon has extended its control of the countryside to the point where many Vietnamese believe the war to be all but over. Mr. Vann concluded, "If the South Vietnamese don't succeed from here on out, it cannot be blamed on the lack of U.S. support." If anything, setting a definite date for the total withdrawal of our troops will have a healthy effect on Saigon's fighting capability. It would serve notice on that Government's leaders that the United States is not about to leave its combat forces in Vietnam forever, and that they had better undertake fully the responsibility for their own defense. Setting December 31, 1971, as the date for total pullout of U.S. Armed Forces from Indochina, therefore, will have several positive effects: The door will be opened for the return of our prisoners of war; The Saigon government will be forced to assume, once and for all, the full responsibility of its own defense; We can put to rest the terrible divisiveness which has started to sour American life. For these reasons, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I urge your approval of H.R. 4102, the Vietnam Disengagement Act. Thank you for your kind attention. Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you very much, Congressman Matsunaga. Congressman, you represent the area of the United States which is closest to the fighting in Indochina. I recall one of the major arguments advanced during the escalation period went something like this: "To avoid fighting on the beaches of Hawaii, we have to stop the Communists in Vietnam. Did your constituents ever find great merit to that argument! Mr. MATSUNAGA. For a while, Mr. Chairman, I will state that because of the closeness of our State to Vietnam, perhaps more than in any other State the people of Hawaii were hawkish in effect. As a matter of fact, the first troops to go to Vietnam were from Hawaii and as a consequence Hawaii has suffered the greatest percentage per capita of casualties of all States of the Union and it leads the second State by quite a wide margin. But things have changed since the initial stages of the war. I for one perhaps reflect the attitude of my own constituency. I at one time was a dove contrary to the popular position in Hawaii at that time. I opposed the bombing of North Vietnam, I opposed the intercession in Vietnam. Despite the fact that the President was of the same political party as myself, I was one of the thorns in the President's side. Then I did take a trip to South Vietnam in 1965, spent about 6 weeks in that area, and came back with a conclusion that the President was doing the only thing that he could do under the circumstances and I began to support the President's policies. But then I always had deep reservations within myself and I have concluded that to begin with the entire thing was wrong, that we should not have been in there in the first place, and today I have reverted to my original position of opposing the war. I find it is true in Hawaii, as it is throughout the Nation, that 75 percent or more of the people are in favor of withdrawing our troops by the end of this year. Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you very much, Congressman Matsunaga. We do have a vote coming on and I am just wondering whether it might be possible for you to come back. Mr. MATSUNAGA. Mr. Chairman, I am really delayed for another appointment at this time. I was expecting to go on at 3 o'clock, but as I can see there is great interest in this question. Unless there is a fast question, I could submit it in writing. Mr. DU PONT. There are no fast questions. Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you very much, Congressman. Mr. HALPERN. I would like to commend our very interesting witness on his very good testimony, and I associate myself with the views you expressed. Mr. MATSUNAGA. I thank the gentleman from New York. Mr. MURPHY. I agree with that statement. Mr. MATSUNAGA. I thank the gentleman from Illinois. Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you for your excellent contributions. Mr. GALLAGHER. The subcommittee will be adjourned until 2 p.m. tomorrow. (Whereupon, at 4:07 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at 2 p.m., Thursday, June 24, 1971.) LEGISLATION ON THE INDOCHINA WAR THURSDAY, JUNE 24, 1971 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met at 2:20 p.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Cornelius E. Gallagher (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Mr. GALLAGHER. The subcommittee will come to order. I want to welcome you to the subcommittee as we continue our investigation of the approximately 70 bills and resolutions which have been referred thus far to the subcommittee. The first 2 days of our hearings have provided us with a valid opportunity to discuss the many ramifications of legislative initiatives in the area and I anticipate that a public education process which is so vitally a role for congressional hearings will also be felt by the members of our subcommittee. I know this certainly is true as regards the chairman. Our first witness this afternoon is Congressman Robert Leggett, Democrat from California. Mr. Leggett is a member of the Armed Services Committee here in the House, and has achieved an enviable record of effective service, and certainly has long been concerned with the problem before us today. We welcome you here today, Mr. Leggett. Please proceed. STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT L. LEGGETT, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA Mr. LEGGETT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and the other members of the subcommittee for taking the time to review the policy questions surrounding American disengagement from Southeast Asia, and particularly Vietnam. We have come a long way from 548,000 men down to 225,000. We shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival of liberty. These phrases after 45,000 dead Americans, 300,000-plus injured and hundreds of billions of dollars in war expenditures and future veterans benefit obligation now ring rather hollow. The government that we have been almost paranoid about defending has only a modest amount of liberty, of freedom, and of democracy. |