a little bit of lack of judicial temperament-maybe some comments about certain kinds of lawyers that weren't intended. Most important, where age begins to set in and the judge is not that sharp, not that competent, where maybe he can deal with motions but not with full cases, not with complex cases.

Somebody ought to be tagged, beyond the formal procedures, with knowing that there is a moral obligation to take the initiative. In our judgment, that is the chief judge, whether it be of a district court, whether it be of the circuit. Second point.

Third point. This builds on section 101(a) of the bill that is before us over here. It just goes a little further than you have gone. We applaud what has been done in 101(a). The papers are full of what everybody knows. Drunken driving by a judge, drunk on the bench. Nobody files a complaint. It says the chief judge can proceed and initiate a complaint.

In our judgment, because of real pressures against filing complaints by individual lawyers, it would be desirable if the statute recognized that there might be such a thing as a complaint by a group. It could be anonymous in terms of the initial complainant. In many of these cases it would be that the fact that a number of people would have complained. I am not talking about any ad hoc group, but a bar association committee. If such a complaint came from such a group, a bar association committee, it is not enough that it be discretionary with the chief judge to treat it as a complaint. Our recommendation would be that the statute ought to say the judge has the obligation to treat it as a properly filed complaint. And the process continues. You don't discipline until you verify. If it comes from a group of that type, however, it should be followed through, and we think that is desirable.

The last point that I make is a combination of three little technical points with respect to the processing of complaints at the early stage. It has already been pointed out that we can expect an increase in volume by the increase in size of the Federal judicial system. The chief judge ought to be authorized to share the burdens with other colleagues on the court. If there happens to be a sudden flurry and if we are trying to notch the standards up, even in terms of judicial temperament, designate another judge to act instead of the chief judge where that is appropriate. A minor point, but there it is.

A chief judge should be authorized to do a little bit of investigating. Not to cut down on the full committee and the like, but there are occasionally little things, like a comment about a woman that wasn't intended that way, and other things of that type. The statute ought to recognize that such investigation by the chief judge will improve judicial discipline in limited cases.

Finally, an example that occurred with a judge who had a particular position in a bar association. It was with the American Bar Association, and the judge was chair of a section. There was a complaint that came to the chief judge of the circuit that that particular position was inappropriate for a Federal judge because it implied an invitation to lawyers to join it, whether it cost $25 or whatever. By the time the complaint was being dealt with the judge was no longer in that office. Yet, if you look technically the

statute, it is pretty hard to figure out a basis for disposing of the complaint without deciding a tough question.

Proposal of the task force: You can amend the statute to allow dismissal on the basis that the matter is "no longer a matter of concern." That wouldn't have it characterized as remedial action because remedial action hasn't been taken. Yet you wouldn't be obligated to proceed where the whole thing is really mooted already. These are minor matters. The only reason I mention them here is because in the judgment of the task force, and certainly in my personal judgment, the cosponsors of H.R. 1620 are moving in the right direction and are motivated by the kind of values that we all share. Every little suggestion that furthers the process of improvement, we feel free to suggest.

[The prepared joint statement of Mssrs. Levin and Mikva follows:]

JOINT STATEMENT

of

A. Leo Levin, Chairman

and

Judge Abner J. Mikva, Member

Task Force on Judicial Responsibility of the Twentieth Century Fund

June 28, 1989

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee,

We appreciate this opportunity to appear

before you and to testify on H. R. 1620 on behalf of the Task Force on Judicial Responsibility of the Twentieth Century Fund. We are particularly appreciative of the courtesy extended to us in connection with the scheduling of our appearance.

The Task Force held its first meeting a

little less than a year ago and has spent the intervening period in an effort first, to assess the present situation with respect to the operation of currently available mechanisms for enforcing judicial responsibility, particularly judicial discipline, and second, to fashion recommendations for further improvement, mindful of the enormous contribution of the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980. It is appropriate to recognize your contribution to our efforts, Mr. Chairman, and to express appreciation for your willingness to join us at a meeting of the Task Force and to share your views and concerns with us at that time.

Appended to this statement is a list of

the members of the Task Force together with appropriate recognition of the staff support we have enjoyed. Suffice it at this juncture to note that this eleven-person body includes a Member of Congress, two sitting federal judges, a state supreme court justice, a former Attorney General of the United States,

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the present and the immediate past president of the League of Women's Voters and four academicians, drawn from three different disciplines. We are both members of the Task Force and one of us serves as its chair. While the Task Force has not as yet

completed its final report, its work has advanced to the stage where we can share the substance of the following recommendations with you, confident that they command virtually unanimous support among the members of the Task Force.

The spirit that has motivated the Task Force, it bears some emphasis at the outset, is the same which appears to lie behind H.R. 1620: are there improvements that can be made in our present system of judicial discipline? We did not expect, and we did not find a crisis in need of emergency measures. The place of the federal judiciary in our system of government, and the genrally high standards of those who have chosen to serve within it, in terms of character, integrity and temperament as well as ability, is well known. But we believe that there is room for improvement and our report is directed to that end.

We recommend that a federal judicial

discipline oversight committee be established, to be appointed by or under the authority of the Judicial Conference of the United States, and to include among its members not only judges, but lawyers and non-lawyers as well. The committee would be empowered to examine the records of all complaints filed in each of the federal courts in which disciplinary complaints are filed, all

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material developed in connection with each, including the disposition of each of complaint. The oversight committee thus created would be charged with making an annual report to the Judicial Conference of the United States and to the appropriate Congressional committees concerning the state of enforcement of the legislation governing judicial discipline in the federal system.

In our view, this committee may be expected to serve two major purposes. First, if it were to conclude that the Act was indeed working well, that the chief judges and the circuit councils were, as is to be expected, fulfilling their statutory obligations conscientiously, this would contribute to a public sense of confidence in the system. It would do much to dispel any lingering doubts as to whether judges can be entrusted to discipline judges. If per contra, the committee should conclude that there was need for

imnprovement in any regard,

of the governing statute

perhaps because of the provisions

that, too, would be of great value.

We hasten to add, as the Task Force itself made explicit, that we have uncovered no evidence that would lead us to believe or even to suspect that chief judges are sweeping complaints under the rug, or otherewise failing in the discharge of their duties. On the contrary, the evidence is quite the other way. Yet, thera seems to be significant advantage in what might be viewed as something akin to an audit, and we have come to recognize audits