Events have made more and more clear the importance and the close relationship between the programs of military and of economic aid, particularly as they affect the European member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In his message transmitting the Budget for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1952, the President stated that:

In general, our assistance programs will continue to take two forms--provision of military equipment and provision of economic assistance. But the balance between these two forms of aid will shift very sharply, and will differ according to the strategic, political, and economic situation in each free world area requiring assistance.

In a later message, transmitted to Congress on May 24, 1951, the President recommended a newly designated mutual security program for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1952, consisting of:

(1) Military assistance to other free nations in the amount of $6,250,000,000.

(2) Economic assistance to other free nations in the amount of $2,250,000,000, primarily to support expanded defense efforts abroad.

REORGANIZATION AS A CONTINUING PROCESS

In the 5 years from August 1945 to August 1950, the emphasis in the administrative affairs of the government shifted from an extraordinarily rapid demobilization to an equally rapid mobilization, just as it had shifted from mobilization to demobilization during the previous 5 years. In many respects the situation has come full circle since 1940.

The impressive and continuing nature of the changes is indicated in summary form by the section titles of the present chapter. They make it clear that reorganization is indeed a continuing process and that under present conditions, the foreign affairs programs and agencies of the government are among those most subject to change.

As often as not, the individual changes give the impression of being merely a response to particular developments that have required some specific adjustment. It is only when the cumulative effects are reviewed that it becomes apparent how much the entire process is one of broad evolution in the structure of government to adapt it to the changing requirements of the world situation.

In the case of each specific change, there is likely to be a balance of pressures between short and long-range considerations. The shortrange considerations are seldom overlooked, because they are the factors most likely to press for immediate attention. The long-range considerations may be temporarily disregarded, but their influence is persistent and continuing in its effect.

Two kinds of long-range considerations are of special pertinence and importance for major problems of governmental organization. One is reflected in the general evolution of the world situation; it was discussed in chapter I. The other arises from the nature of the American government and its special characteristics. Considerations of this sort are given attention in chapter III which follows.

CHAPTER III

KEY ELEMENTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE DOCTRINE FOR MAJOR GOVERNMENTAL UNITS

In recent years each of the major units of the Government has been the subject of much discussion and analysis as to its functions, responsibilities, and place in the scheme of government as a whole. Such discussion is crystallized from time to time in concepts that tend to be accepted as authoritative by those charged with making major administrative decisions.

The importance of the concepts that are so accepted is very real. They underlie the thinking of experienced legislators in the development of legislative provisions on administrative matters. They are taken for granted in the central offices of the government where the texts of executive orders and administrative directives are drafted. They are referred to as basic in the discussions that occur among administrative officials as the work of the Government goes forward. The fact that such concepts as to the organization, jurisdiction, and interrelations of major units may become established and widely accepted does not necessarily demonstrate that any one concept is the only workable or possible concept in a particular case. Alternatives are usually available, at least in theory, and are often cited in the struggle for agency preferment. But when a particular solution has been proved workable and has been generally accepted, the affairs of government are immensely facilitated.

On the other hand, when there is fundamental cleavage of opinion within the government on major points of administrative doctrine, the effect is to retard greatly the speed and efficiency with which the governmental mechanism can be adjusted to new requirements. Jurisdictional bickerings impede concentration on substantive issues. Uneasy compromises are the rule and questions of authority are constantly reopened.

As previously noted, almost the entire Government has become involved in the administration of foreign affairs. This seems likely to continue to be the case. But the situation is far from stabilized as to where the various responsibilities shall rest, the relationships between major governmental units, and the general pattern of organization. Many fundamental issues of administration currently arise in their most acute form in connection with foreign affairs and overseas operations.

The purpose of the present chapter is to examine briefly certain key elements of administrative doctrine with respect to the President. the Congress, and the various executive departments and agencies. The questions are explored mainly from the point of view of the governmental practitioners. Problems of administrative theory are brought into focus only to the extent that they have become matters of concern in practice; no attempt is made here to summarize the voluminous professional literature in the field of public administration. The key elements of administrative doctrine obviously cannot be treated completely in any brief compass, but the present discussion is intended to provide a broad background against which to examine the major problems of agency jurisdiction and organization that are taken up later in the report.

THE PRESIDENCY

The President stands in the central position in the conduct of foreign relations because of his multiple functions as the head of the Nation, as the Chief Executive, and as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. His constitutional prerogatives have been repeatedly affirmed by the courts and in most respects can be taken as settled. The field of foreign affairs is distinguished from other phases of government in the extent to which it has been set apart constitutionally in a special executive category.

What is unsettled administratively as concerns the President lies mainly in three areas: (1) His relations to the Congress, (2) his relations to the heads of executive agencies, including the Secretary of State, and (3) his relations to his staff agencies in the Executive Office of the President. In each of the three areas the uncertainty relates mainly to what is wise or practical rather than to what is legal or constitutional.

In the case of Congress, the problem from the President's point of view is mainly one of how to obtain advice, consent, and assurances of support to the extent necessary without prejudicing unduly his own freedom of action. The problem has assumed new forms as the necessity increases for Presidential action in the field of foreign affairs that may later require specific congressional cooperation in the form of legislation and appropriations. It has therefore been necessary to experiment with new patterns of advance planning and consultation between the executive and legislative branches, but no pattern of cooperation between the President and the Congress on foreign affairs which would be completely satisfactory to each of them has so far been found because of the natural desire of each to maintain the freedom of action inherent in the separation of powers.

In the case of the heads of executive agencies, the President's problem is largely one of where to look for advice, where to delegate