inconsistencies with that scenario, while the theory that the tubes were being used for rockets was completely consistent with the evidence in Iraq.

2. Procurement Attempts for Magnets, High-Speed Balancing Machines and Machine Tools

(U) Intelligence information provided to the Committee shows that Iraq was trying to procure magnets, balancing machines, and machine tools, all materials that have potential applications in a nuclear program. These materials, however, are all dual use and none of the intelligence provided said that the materials were intended for a nuclear end user.

According to the NIE, the manager of one of the Iraqi companies negotiating the magnet procurement, along with a large number of personnel for the new production facility, worked in Iraq's pre-Gulf War centrifuge program.

information indicated the magnets to be produced at the facility were intended for the al Rashid directorate, which was coordinating the Ababil-100 missile project and was directly responsible for the missile's solid propellant engine.

The Committee was not provided with any information to show that a large number of personnel for the new magnet production facility worked in Iraq's pre-Gulf War centrifuge program as stated in the NIE. According to the intelligence provided to the Committee, 40-50 percent of the PhDs and

senior engineers there worked in Iraqi's pre-Gulf War nuclear program, but in the electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) program, not the centrifuge program. The Committee

found it reasonable to assess that these individuals worked in al-Tahadi because of their experience with magnets.

(U) In an interview, the NIO for Strategic and Nuclear Programs and CIA analysts told Committee staff the reference to the centrifuge officials working at al-Tahadi was a mistake and it was, in fact, former EMIS officials. The NIO and the CIA analysts agreed that the officials were probably working at al-Tahadi because of their magnet expertise and agreed that there was no direct connection to an Iraqi centrifuge program, although they noted that Iraq potentially could use the magnets in support of a renewed centrifuge effort.

The NIE also assessed that a front company, trying to procure high-speed balancing machines that can be used in centrifuge balancing work, was involved in trying to procure 7075-T6 aluminum tubes.

When questioned by Committee staff, CIA analysts noted that procurement companies are often involved in a variety of unrelated procurement efforts and the procurement efforts to obtain balancing machines and to obtain aluminum tubes, may be

totally unrelated.

(U) The Committee was not provided with any other information to show that equipment procurements were related to a nuclear program.

3. Iraq's Efforts to Re-Establish and Enhance Its Cadre of Weapons Personnel as well as Activities at Several Suspect Nuclear Sites

(U) The following points were offered in the NIE in support of the key judgment that Iraq's efforts to re-establish and enhance its cadre of weapons personnel and activity at several suspect nuclear sites further indicated that nuclear reconstitution was underway.

a.

b.

The IAEC is expanding the infrastructure: research laboratories, production facilities, and procurement networks, to produce nuclear weapons.

C.

Renewed regular contact between Saddam and the IAEC, as well as enhanced security, suggests the IAEC is again the focal point of Saddam's nuclear program.

a. The Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission is Expanding the Infrastructure - Research Laboratories, Production Facilities, and Procurement Networks - to Produce Nuclear Weapons

DA

HUMINT report provided to the Committee showed that in April 2002 Iraq completed construction of a new building for the IAEC. The report said the building was an alternative to the existing IAEC offices and was built for the "operation room" of the IAEC. The report noted also that the IAEC planned to open a new high-level polytechnic school that would offer PhDs in all branches of nuclear energy at another location. The Committee was not provided with any other intelligence to show that research laboratories, production facilities, and procurement networks were expanded.

(U) In an interview with the NIO and CIA analysts, Committee staff asked if there was any additional information to support such an assessment. The CIA analyst said there was nothing additional to show that Iraq was expanding research laboratories, production facilities, or procurement networks.

b. Many of Iraq's Nuclear Scientists Recently Have Been Reassigned to the LAEC

The information provided to the Committee shows that nuclear scientists worked for the IAEC, but does not show that these scientists were recently reassigned to the IAEC as stated in the NIE. According to the intelligence provided,

several personnel changes in the IAEC indicated the changes were the result of a decision from the President's office to replace government managers who had been in their positions for five years. This suggests that many of these individuals had been located within the IAEC since at least 1996, five years before the reported personnel changes and, also suggests that transfers within the IAEC were not related to specific interest in that program, but were due to a government wide directive to change management. The Committee requested additional

intelligence to support the assessment that many scientists had recently been reassigned to the IAEC, but the additional documents provided did not show recent reassignments.

Some of the reports provided by the IC that were intended to show that scientists had been reassigned to the IAEC, actually suggested that no work was being done on the nuclear program. In one report from September 2001, an IAEC employee complained that the Iraqi nuclear program had been stalled since the Gulf War.

Reporting from a foreign government service indicated that “As of

late 1999, several groups from Iraq's nuclear establishment remained intact, although the majority of key nuclear scientists, but not engineers or technicians, either had retired, died, or left Iraq." The report also noted that "As of late 1999, it was unlikely that any nuclear weapons work was taking place." Other reporting indicated that employees of Iraq's pre-Gulf War program maintained a loose professional alliance through their work in engineering and design centers within Iraq's Military Industrialization Commission,

(U) In an interview with the NIO and CIA analysts, Committee staff asked if there was any additional information to support the assessment that "Many of Iraq's nuclear scientists recently have been reassigned to the IAEC." The CIA analyst told Committee staff that he could not find any additional information to support the assessment that scientists had recently been reassigned to the IAEC.

c. Renewed Regular Contact Between Saddam and the IAEC, as Well as Enhanced Security, Suggests the IAEC is Again the Focal Point of Saddam's Nuclear Program

Several open source and other intelligence reports show that Saddam Hussein did meet with IAEC officials and praised their work. Saddam met and praised the work of other military, industry and private sector personnel at some of these meetings as well, however. It is also unclear whether the IAEC officials who Saddam praised were actually engaged in nuclear work.

One report shows that, in a televised speech, the Iraqi leader praised engineers from the Atomic Energy Agency, Ministry of Industry and Minerals, Oil Ministry and the private sector who were engaged in pharmaceutical research. Saddam Hussein praised the work of the

creative mujahidin in the pharmaceutical industry and their work on producing medicines. It is this report which the NIE references in saying that "Saddam told the IAEC its responsibilities have been doubled because they "owe" it to their past relationship with him." This report does not, however, reference nuclear work and does not say that Saddam told the IAEC its responsibilities have been doubled. The translation of Saddam's speech said,

The Atomic Energy Agency should come up with two things or
two items at a time when others come up with one thing. This is
because its personnel are basically Iraqis and because they owe this
to me, at least between me and them. Although you are all Iraqis
and we cannot discriminate between you, but because of the old
relationship between me and them, your responsibility is doubled.

Because of the difficulty in determining what Saddam Hussein meant in this speech, the Committee asked for a re-translation. The CIA was unable to provide a new translation

A second report provided to the Committee dated September 2001 on this subject shows that Saddam Hussein did promise to present new plans to facilitate the IAEC's work, as described in the NIE.

Several intelligence reports also point to increased security efforts at the IAEC.

The report mentioned that Iraqi

intelligence officials would travel with any IAEC official who traveled abroad. The report also indicated that the IAEC had launched an operation to evacuate files, computers, and other materials because of a "crisis" with the UN. The information in this report dated from February to May 1998, when UN inspections were ongoing in Iraq.