(U) Conclusion 42. The Director of Central Intelligence was not aware of the views of all intelligence agencies on the aluminum tubes prior to September 2002 and, as a result, could only have passed the Central Intelligence Agency's view along to the President until that time.

(U) Conclusion 43. Intelligence provided to the Committee did show that Iraq was trying to procure magnets, high-speed balancing machines and machine tools, but this intelligence did not suggest that the materials were intended to be used in a nuclear program.

(U) Conclusion 44. The statement in the National Intelligence Estimate that "a large number of personnel for the new [magnet] production facility, worked in Iraq's pre-Gulf War centrifuge program," was incorrect.

(U) Conclusion 45. The statement in the National Intelligence Estimate that the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission was "expanding the infrastructure - research laboratories, production facilities, and procurement networks - to produce nuclear weapons," is not supported by the intelligence provided to the Committee.

(U) Conclusion 46. The intelligence provided to the Committee which showed that Iraq had kept its cadre of nuclear weapons personnel trained and in positions that could keep their skills intact for eventual use in a reconstituted nuclear program was compelling, but this intelligence did not show that there was a recent increase in activity that would have been indicative of recent or impending reconstitution of Iraq's nuclear program as was suggested in the National Intelligence Estimate.

(U) Conclusion 47. Intelligence information provided to the Committee did show that Saddam Hussein met with Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission personnel and that some security improvements were taking place, but none of the reporting indicated the IAEC was engaged in nuclear weapons related work.

IV. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ANALYSIS OF IRAQ'S
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM

A. Background

(U) Prior to the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq's Continuing Programs of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the Intelligence Community (IC) prepared several coordinated papers that contained assessments of Iraq's biological weapons (BW) program. Prior to the departure of inspectors in 1998, IC assessments focused largely on the United Nations Special Commission's (UNSCOM) findings in Iraq, outstanding compliance issues, and the IC's assessment of the difficulties UNSCOM would face as it attempted to gain full Iraqi compliance with United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions requiring its disarmament.

(U) In February 1999, the Intelligence Community reported in Iraq: WMD and Delivery Capabilities After Operation Desert Fox, that Iraq probably retained the personnel, documentation, and much of the critical equipment necessary to continue and advance its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and delivery programs. Iraq possessed biological agent20 stockpiles that could be, or already were, weaponized and ready for use, but the paper did not state definitively that Iraq had biological weapons. The size of those agent stockpiles was said to be uncertain and subject to debate, and the location, nature, and condition of the stockpiles was also unknown. Iraq's production of biological weapons was assessed to be largely dormant, but the IC observed that Iraq could begin BW agent production within days of a decision to do so.

A July 1999 National Intelligence Council (NIC) Memorandum titled Iraq: Post-Desert Fox Activities and Estimated Status of WMD Programs noted that in the wake of Operation Desert Fox, the "loss of United Nations (UN) inspectors on the ground and of airborne imagery from the UNSCOM U-2 flights make it difficult to determine whether activity detected at known dual-use21 sites is related to WMD production." It went on to note that Iraq may have already resumed some BW production but the IC had no reliable intelligence to indicate this, and assessed that in the absence of UN inspectors Iraq would expand its BW activities. A month

20BW agent is a dangerous biological pathogen. The agent must still be disseminated or distributed effectively in a weapon or some other type of delivery mechanism to effect the intended target.

21The term dual-use, in a BW context, refers to technology that is useful both for biological warfare and legitimate biotechnical, agricultural and public health needs. An example would be a fermenter that is useful for both making vaccines and biological warfare agents.