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(U) A chart in a CIA paper published one month after the NIE that was titled, Iraq: Biological Warfare Agents Pose Growing Threat to US Interests, presented another depiction of Iraq's biological agent research. The chart titled, "Status of Possible Iraqi BW Agents" showed three levels of research activity - research and development (R&D), production, and weaponization - and provided three different levels of confidence of the IC's knowledge of Iraq's work - confirmed, probable and suspected. This chart presented a more accurate depiction of the certainty and uncertainty behind the assessments of Iraq's biological agent research and made clear which agents were researched for weapons purposes. The title of the chart in the NIE, "BW Agents that Iraq has Researched" suggested that all of the agents were researched for weapons purposes, while the CIA publication more clearly indicated that the agents were "possible" BW agents.

(U) Status of Possible Iraqi BW Agents

Note: Agents are not listed in any particular order. Assessments reflect past Iraqi declarations to the UN plus intelligence assessments of Iraq's current biological weapons capabilities.

C-Confirmed

P=Probable
S=Suspected

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E. In the Absence of UN Inspectors, Iraq Probably Has Intensified and Expanded Research and Development in Support of Iraq's BW Program. Baghdad Probably Has Developed Genetically Engineered BW Agents

The NIE assessed that in the absence UN inspectors, Iraq probably had intensified and expanded research and development efforts in support of Iraq's BW program. The NIE noted that "Military reporting and intelligence indicates that Iraq's BW research and development efforts have benefitted from professional contacts between its scientists and engineers and their foreign counterparts, exploiting conferences and scientific exchanges to acquire technical knowledge and supplies." The NIE's key judgments stated that "Baghdad probably has developed genetically engineered BW agents." The NIE's discussion of this research and development focuses on research activity

testing near Iraq's Qadisiyah Reservoir.

and reported BW

1. Research Activity

The NIE stated that

in 1999 that R&D in support In the absence

of Iraq's offensive BW program was continuing of UN inspectors, Iraq probably has intensified and expanded these efforts." The NIE stated in the key judgments that "Baghdad probably has developed genetically engineered BW agents." The text of the NIE, however, said only that foreign government service reporting indicated that "biological research facilities are actively engaged in genetic engineering and biotechnology research and development," and noted that some of the facilities were suspected of involvement in Iraq's BW research and development program.

However, UNSCOM's final report, which was submitted to the UN Security Council in 1999, stated that "Iraq has a broad based research community in Universities, Medical and Agricultural Institutes, covering microbiology, biological processing, materials science, genetic engineering, pathology, biological production, munitions and weapons.

The IC also provided the Committee with eight intelligence reports to support the assessment that Iraq was engaged in genetic engineering and biotechnology research. The first was a 2002 HUMINT report that discussed information

The report provided

no additional information. The NIE noted that IPA is the parent organization for a center that was engaged in BW related work prior to the Gulf War. A second HUMINT report stated that two scientists were conducting "secret research" in the microbiology laboratory at the Saddam College of Medicine. The report said the scientists were working to genetically alter anthrax and plague to increase the bacteria's resistance to "antibiotics and environmental factors." While the work was described as "secret," the report did not draw any link to BW work. The CIA told Committee staff that, while the report did not connect this research to BW work, the CIA believes that there is no legitimate application to this work outside of a BW program. A DIA BW analyst told Committee staff that there were legitimate non-BW reasons for conducting such research. He noted, however, that such research was suspicious in a country like Iraq. CIA BW analysts told Committee staff that this research was particularly suspicious because it was "secret."

(U) A third report was from a 1997 DIA HUMINT source who said that an Iraqi postgraduate microbiology student, who the source alleged was an officer in the Iraqi Special Security Organization (SSO), was conducting research to genetically manipulate the cholera toxin. The source believed the goal was to produce an offensive BW weapon. Another report provided a research paper from the same student published in 1997 which discussed transferring the gene encoding tetanus toxin from clostridium tetani to e. coli and bacillus subtilis "in order to research the antibiotic resistant qualities of the clostridium tetani strains." The only connection between this research and BW is the source's allegation that the post-graduate microbiology student is an SSO officer. A DIA BW analyst told Committee staff, while such research could be useful to a BW program, it also has a legitimate public health application in determining what antibiotics are most effective in treating particular strains of the pathogen.

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Additional HUMINT reporting described a microbiology research paper on a variety of toxins including working on a

cholera and the work of an unnamed researcher project to discover a cholera strain immune to antibiotics. The source of the report said that the researcher was rumored to have close ties to Iraq's intelligence service and to be a member of the Ba'th party.

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The NIE also stated that "Iraq may have tested BW agents at a facility near the

Qadisiyah Reservoir in western Iraq, according to

reporting," and that "an

A 1996 HUMINT report from a former officer of the Iraqi Directorate of General Security said that 1,600 death row prisoners from Baghdad prisons were delivered to “unit 2100", near al-Haditha, which conducted chemical and biological warfare experiments on human subjects.

into Iraqi prison records revealed that prisoner transfer files

at a prison believed to be involved in the alleged incident during the time in question were missing. that prisoner transfer files "were in order and well maintained

before and after this time frame."

The NIE assessed that the reported testing location described in the HUMINT report as an "unknown location near al-Haditha" was probably a facility near the Qadisiyah reservoir.

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A DIA BW analyst noted to Committee staff that there was "really very little" to

suggest a BW role

at Qadisiyah, and noted that "Perhaps we were stretching that just a little bit." A analyst responsible for the analysis of this facility told Committee staff "You

have to remember that this was only considered a suspect facility. That's as far as we went with it. The information linking this to BW was so incredibly sketchy that this is sort of our best guess

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F. We Assess That Baghdad Also Has Increased the Effectiveness of its BW Arsenal by
Mastering the Ability to Produce Dried Agent

The NIE assessed that Iraq had increased the effectiveness of its BW arsenal by "mastering the ability to produce dried agent." The IC assessed that Iraq had both liquid and dry BW agents. As the NIE pointed out, the ability to produce dry BW agents is significant because it allows the agent to be disseminated over a much wider area than wet agent. IC analysts also told Committee staff that dry agent is much easier to handle than liquid agent and has a longer shelf life. The NIE stated that "Iraq had the capability to dry organisms in a respirable particle size prior to the Gulf War but declared that all weapons systems deployed

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