Conclusion 51. The Central Intelligence Agency withheld important information concerning both CURVE BALL's reliability and reporting from many Intelligence Community analysts with a need to know the information. Conclusion 52. The Defense Human Intelligence Service, which had primary responsibility for handling the Intelligence Community's interaction with CURVE BALL's debriefers, demonstrated serious lapses in handling such an important source. (U) Conclusion 53. The statement in the key judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate that "Chances are even that smallpox is part of Iraq's offensive biological weapons program" is not supported by the intelligence provided to the Committee. (U) Conclusion 54. The assessments in the National Intelligence Estimate concerning Iraq's capability to produce and weaponize biological weapons agents are, for the most part, supported by the intelligence provided to the Committee, but the NIE did not explain that the research discussed could have been very limited in nature, been abandoned years ago, or represented legitimate activity. |