(U) Conclusion 56. The statement in the key judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate that "Baghdad probably has developed genetically engineered biological weapons agents," overstated both the intelligence reporting and analysts' assessments of Iraq's development of genetically engineered biological agents. (U) Conclusion 57. The assessment in the National Intelligence Estimate that "Iraq has... dry biological weapons (BW) agents in its arsenal" is not supported by the intelligence information provided to the Committee. V. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ANALYSIS OF IRAQ'S CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) PROGRAM A. Background (U) The October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) provided the most comprehensive Intelligence Community (IC) assessment of Iraq's chemical weapons (CW) programs since United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) weapons inspectors departed Iraq in 1998. Prior to the departure of inspectors, IC assessments focused largely on UNSCOM's findings in Iraq, outstanding compliance issues, and the IC's assessment of the difficulties UNSCOM would face as it attempted to gain full Iraqi compliance with United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions requiring its disarmament. (U) For example, The National Intelligence Council (NIC) produced a NIC memorandum, Iraq: Outstanding WMD and Missile Issues in September 1998 and produced a follow-on memorandum of the same title in November 1998 which comprehensively addressed UNSCOM's assessments of Iraq's outstanding compliance issues. The papers noted that the Intelligence Community generally agrees with the assessments made by UNSCOM and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) about Iraq's remaining WMD efforts and capabilities. Regarding CW, the IC assessed that: Gaps and inconsistencies in Iraqi declarations to UNSCOM strongly suggest that Iraq retains stockpiles of chemical munitions and agents. Iraq also had the residual technical expertise, facilities, and production equipment to quickly restart production at declared sites if UNSCOM is again barred from conducting inspections and on-site monitoring. (U) In February 1999, soon after UNSCOM inspectors departed Iraq, several intelligence agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA),25 the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the U.S. Central Command produced a joint intelligence report, Iraq: WMD and Delivery Capabilities After Operation Desert Fox. This assessment focused on the effectiveness of air strikes during Operation Desert 25 NIMA has recently been renamed the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) Fox in destroying Iraq's WMD facilities and programs, but was not a comprehensive assessment of Iraq's WMD capabilities. The report noted: During Operation Desert Fox, few of Iraq's chemical warfare facilities were targeted or damaged and the operation probably had very little impact on Iraq's ability to reconstitute its chemical warfare programs. We believe that Iraq possesses chemical agent stockpiles that can be, or already are, weaponized and ready for use. The size, location, nature and condition of those stockpiles is unknown. We assess Iraq's production of chemical weapons to be largely dormant: however, Baghdad has the infrastructure necessary to support offensive programs. Without an effective monitoring presence, Iraq could probably resume its CW program immediately, if it has not already done so. In December 2000, the IC published an Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA), Iraq: Steadily Pursuing WMD Capabilities (ICA 2000-007HCX). The ICA was prepared at the request of the National Security Council (NSC) for a broad update on Iraqi efforts to rebuild WMD and delivery system programs, as well as a review of what remained of the WMD arsenal and of outstanding disarmament issues that were the focus of UNSCOM. This assessment was the first comprehensive IC product on all aspects of Iraq's WMD capabilities since United Nations (UN) inspectors departed Iraq. Regarding Iraq's CW programs the assessment stated: We judge that Iraq's expansion of its chemical industry is intended to support CW We have seen no indication since the Gulf War that Iraq has engaged in large-scale Iraq has increased procurement of sensitive equipment and chemicals, some of which we believe will be used to reconstitute a CW production capability. We believe that Iraq has chemical agent and stable intermediaries in bulk storage, We assess the size of the CW agent stockpile to be 100 tons or less. We are uncertain about the extent and condition of Iraq's stockpile, although we believe mustard agent – and to a lesser degree G-agents Sarin and VX - and related munitions probably are key components. a range of intelligence reports, suggests that a small portion of Iraq's prewar stockpile of filled munitions remains. Iraq also retains the capability to produce many types of weapons that could be filled with chemical agents. The issue of shelf life is critical to assessments of the current stockpile of Iraqi chemical agents. Mustard is the only agent that would have survived for a significant period after the Gulf War. Our main judgments about what remains of Iraq's original WMD programs, agents stockpiles, and delivery systems have changed little: Iraq retains stockpiles of chemical agents and munitions. (U) In December 2001, the IC produced an NIE on Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015. A section of the estimate on Iraq's missile payload options noted that Iraq had, "tested chemical warheads for Scud-variant missiles before the Gulf war," and assessed that "Iraq is rebuilding a CW production capability, probably focusing on mustard, sarin, GF, and VX.” The NIE added, "We estimate Iraq holds up to 100 metric tons of chemical agent, although the nature and condition of the agent is unknown. Reporting suggests Iraq might retain at least six Scud-variant missiles equipped with chemical warheads." These assessments were generally consistent with previous IC assessments of Iraq's chemical weapon capabilities. (U) The IC next addressed the issue of Iraq's WMD in the October 2002 NIE, Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction. The judgments in the estimate pertaining to Iraq's CW program were consistent with the 2000 ICA in assessing that: Iraq's expansion of its civilian chemical infrastructure was intended to support CW Baghdad has procured covertly the types and quantities of chemicals and equipment Iraq had experience in manufacturing CW bombs, artillery rockets, and projectiles. Iraq probably had a chemical weapons stockpile and CW bulk fills. (U) In the 2002 NIE, however, the IC made new statements about Iraq's CW program, shifting some judgments in significant respects and eliminating some of the uncertainties regarding Iraq's chemical programs that had been expressed in previous assessments. The 2002 NIE said that, "Baghdad has chemical... weapons" and "we assess that Baghdad has begun renewed production of mustard, sarin, GF (cyclosarin), and VX." As in previous assessments, the IC continued to note that there was little specific information on Iraq's CW stockpile, but it increased its assessment of its size, noting that, "Although we have little specific information on Iraq's CW stockpile, Saddam probably has stocked at least 100 metric tons and possibly as much as 500 metric tons of CW agents - much of it added in the last year." (U) Because the 2002 NIE encompassed all of the intelligence in the previous assessments and because of the notable shifts in assessment between that estimate and all previous assessments of Iraq's CW programs, the Committee focused its review on the intelligence supporting the NIE and the assessments that led the IC to conclude that Iraq had chemical weapons. The Committee examined all of the intelligence provided by the IC underlying each of the assessments made in the NIE and focused particular attention on those assessments which changed between the 2000 ICA and 2002 NIE. Committee staff interviewed analysts from each all-source analysis agency involved in the chemical section of the NIE including CIA, DIA, and the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) to hear each agency's views of Iraq's chemical program and to understand how and why each analyst's assessments of the intelligence evolved over time. (U) All intelligence agencies agreed with the assessments in the CW section of the NIE and there were no dissents or footnotes in this section. The discussion below outlines the intelligence supporting the assessments in the CW section of the NIE. Those assessments included: We judge that Iraq is expanding its chemical industry primarily to support |