We assess that Baghdad has begun renewed production of mustard, sarin, GF (cyclosarin), and VX.

Although we have little specific information on Iraq's CW stockpile, Saddam probably has stocked at least 100 metric tons and possibly as much as 500 metric tons of chemical warfare agents - much of it added in the last year.

The Iraqis have experience in manufacturing chemical bombs, artillery rockets, and projectiles.

Baghdad probably is hiding small-scale agent production within legitimate
research laboratories.

Baghdad has procured covertly the types and quantities of chemicals and
equipment sufficient to allow limited CW production hidden within Iraq's
legitimate chemical industry.

B. Baghdad Has Chemical Weapons

(U) The statement that, "Baghdad has chemical... weapons," was made only in the key judgments of the NIE and not in the main text of the document. The National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Conventional Military Issues who was responsible for the chemical weapons section of the NIE, told Committee staff that the statement was intended to be a summation of assessments in the main text. The statement is broader than previous IC assessments provided to the Committee which used less definitive language in describing Iraq's CW capabilities. For example, the 2000 ICA said, "We believe that Iraq has chemical agent and stable intermediaries in bulk storage, production equipment, and filled munitions that are still militarily useful." The elimination of "we believe" from the 2002 NIE key judgments removed the indication that this was an assessment rather than a fact. Analysts from several intelligence agencies told Committee staff that in retrospect they believe that the statement, "We judge that Baghdad has chemical weapons," would have been a more accurate reflection of their views in the 2002 NIE.

(U) Because the judgment that Iraq had CW was not specifically described in the body of the NIE, no intelligence reporting was provided by the IC directly in support of that assessment. IC analysts told Committee staff, however, that the assessment was based in part on Iraq's inability to fully account for the destruction of pre-Gulf War CW and precursors, suggesting that Iraq may have retained some of those chemicals. Information from UNSCOM reports provided

to the Committee shows that Iraq's total production and holdings of CW agents could not be verified, and that Iraq could not account for over 1,500 metric tons of chemical precursors and over 550 artillery shells that had been filled with mustard CW agent. According to UNSCOM, in 1998, the mustard agent was still of the highest quality and was still militarily viable. The CIA estimated in 1998, based on UN reports of precursor chemicals for which Iraq had not been able to account, that Iraq could have had up to 200 metric tons of mustard agent.

a

The assessment was also based on

reporting from the spring and summer of 2002 which suggested that Iraq was possibly moving chemical munitions. The IC provided several reports to the Committee to support their assessment that Iraq had transported chemical munitions in 2002. The first report showed that a tanker truck, identified as decontamination vehicle was present at a small, secured ammunition storage area at the al Musayyib Barracks, a Republican Guard facility. According to the report, this vehicle had been associated with CW storage and transshipment prior to the Gulf War. The report also noted that during UN inspections at the al Musayyib Barracks in 1997, Iraqi officials attempted to stall the inspectors, which raised the IC's suspicions that sensitive materials were being stored at the facility. According to the 2002, cargo trucks arrived at the al Musayyib barracks' main depot and small storage area where the decontamination vehicle was located and appeared to come and go showed that the activity ceased by mid- 2002 and the ground in and around the storage facility had been graded. The report noted that grading is a common fire abatement measure at ammunition depots, but also could hide evidence of CW report provided on this facility showed that 2002.

the

Additional

A final

vehicle had departed the facility by

report, in

of a second facility from transshipment activity had occurred at the

2002 also showed that possible Ammunition Depot. This activity was also assessed to be possible CW transshipment because a tanker truck, which could have served as a decontamination vehicle, was present at the facility while a truck was engaged in probable transshipment activities.

) Additional

showed that Iraq had conducted munitions transshipment activity at ammunition depots and storage sites around Iraq in the spring and summer of 2002. Most of this activity was assessed to be related to conventional munitions.

While the presence of the

decontamination vehicle was assessed 2002 NIMA assessment noted that because decontamination vehicles to a

to be an indicator of the presence of CW, a July of the similarities of the

The report concluded that the

vehicle could not be discounted "as a

tipoff when assessing possible CW activity," suggesting that it may be present during non-CW activity as well.

Intelligence analysts also told Committee staff that the tanker trucks and vehicles were an indication of possible CW transshipment activity, but could also have been associated with other activities. An analyst from the DIA told Committee staff that, "Today, we don't know whether this vehicle is still associated with the CW program, but it is a specific vehicle that the chemical program used in its former program before 1991." An analyst from INR said, "The decon vehicle is used for multiple purposes, and

it can also be used as for fire safety as a water truck.

Some of the same hazards exist with conventional munitions as they do for CW munitions, so you need a fire safety truck."

The Committee was not provided with any corroborating intelligence reporting prior to publication of the NIE that indicated the transshipment activity at any of the facilities mentioned in reports was related to movement of CW.

C. We Judge That Iraq Is Expanding its Chemical Industry Primarily to Support Chemical Weapons (CW) Production

(U) The judgment in the NIE that Iraq was expanding its chemical industry primarily to support CW production was based on intelligence reports which showed construction and other activity at suspect Iraqi CW facilities, particularly the Fallujah II chlorine and phenol plants. Iraq's Fallujah II chlorine and phenol plants were designed and built as dedicated CW precursor production plants in the 1980s, but were heavily damaged during the first Gulf War. Iraq told inspectors in the 1990s that it was rebuilding the plants for civilian chlorine and phenol production. Both chlorine and phenol have CW applications, but also have legitimate civilian uses such as water treatment or pesticide and resin production. The IC judged that Iraq's civilian needs for chlorine were already adequately met through UN-authorized imports and three other chlorine plants in the country. The IC also noted in the NIE that Iraq modified the phenol plant after the departure of UN inspectors in 1998, which they assessed suggested that it was modified for illicit use.

At least

imagery reports provided to the Committee did show that the Fallujah II chlorine and phenol plants had been operational since March 2000 and that both plants had been modified after the departure of UN inspectors.

showed

at both facilities.

support elements

To show how the IC determined that Iraq's chlorine needs were adequately met without the Fallujah II chlorine plant, the IC provided the Committee with a chlorine stockpiles at Iraq's water treatment plants.

The IC also said that Iraq had three other chlorine production plants in the country that were continuing to produce chlorine. At the end of 2000, just one of the plants was producing 25 tons of chlorine per day. According to the CIA analysts, this was

more

than the

In a written burial indicates that Iraq

response to a question from Committee staff, the CIA said that was, "hiding equipment so that it could be dug up easily later," and said that even if the equipment was damaged, other reporting showed that Iraq had repaired such equipment in the past for use at this facility.

The NIE also said that Iraq was using its procurement network to try to acquire precursors for chemical agents it had made in the past. The IC provided at least thirty intelligence reports to the Committee which indicated that Iraq was trying to procure chemicals and equipment with both CW and legitimate civilian applications. Some of the reports noted specifically that the chemicals were probably for legitimate purposes.

None of the remaining reports showed that Iraq had ultimately obtained any of these chemicals or that the chemicals were intended for a weapons program.

Finally, the NIE noted that the management of the facility included individuals identified as personnel from Iraq's pre-Gulf War CW program. reports provided to the Committee indicated that in 2000 and 2001 several individuals who worked in Iraq's CW program were working at the Fallujah II facility. One of the reports noted, however, that there