was no indication that these individuals were conducting chemical warfare research at the facility.

(U) None of the intelligence reporting provided to the Committee showed that Iraq was expanding its chemical infrastructure "primarily" to support CW production. Although the word "primarily" was in the draft NIE which all analysts had the opportunity to review and coordinate, IC analysts told Committee staff during interviews that they do not believe the assessment that the expansion was "primarily" intended to support a CW program accurately represented their views. When asked whether in retrospect there was anything analysts regretted including in the NIE, a CIA analyst told Committee staff "There's a line in there about how Iraq's chemical industry was rebuilt primarily to support the CW program, and we don't think it was 'primarily.' We think that the program was benefitting from it, but we don't think that's why they were rebuilding the industry." In a written response to a question from Committee staff, the DIA said that it had proposed deleting the word "primarily" from the NIE text at the NIE coordination meeting because "It was difficult to distinguish how much of the chemical industry was supporting CW programs versus various non-chemical warfare programs." Non-chemical warfare programs include both civilian chemical programs and conventional weapons programs. The DIA told the Committee that the disagreement on whether to exclude the word "primarily" was not of sufficient importance to warrant a footnote to the NIE. An INR analyst told Committee staff that he had "no specific recollection" from the NIE coordination meeting about this specific passage, but noted that "In general, INR judged that Iraq could use elements of its dual-use infrastructure to support a CW capability, but that we had little specific intelligence to judge that Iraq was producing chemical warfare agents in 2002."

D. We Assess That Baghdad Has Begun Renewed Production of Mustard, Sarin, GF (Cyclosarin), and VX

The IC provided the Committee with seven intelligence reports which said Iraq had renewed production of chemical agents.

according to an IC response to a question from Committee staff “Analysts in 2002 evaluating these reports did not consider them highly reliable." There were no reports to corroborate the reporting that CW production had begun. Intelligence analysts told Committee staff that their assessment that Iraq, "had begun renewed production of mustard, sarin, GF and VX," was not based on this reporting, but was an analytical judgment based largely on reports of transshipment activity at al Musayyib discussed previously in this report. A CIA analyst told Committee staff that reports, the IC assessed that Iraq was capable of producing CW, but could

prior to

not determine whether Iraq had produced such weapons. The analyst said that the IC assessed that if Iraq had been moving chemical munitions, it must have produced the agents with which to fill those munitions. The specific references to the chemical agents mustard, sarin, GF and VX were based on information about which agents Iraq had produced in the past and an analytical judgment about which agents Iraq was still capable of producing.

E. Although We Have Little Specific Information on Iraq's CW Stockpile, Saddam Probably Has Stocked at Least 100 Metric Tons and Possibly as Much as 500 Metric Tons of CW Agents - Much of it Added in the Last Year

(U) The NIE assessment of Iraq's stocks of CW was outlined in a footnote in the report. It said,

Conservative estimates of Iraqi CW precursor stocks and production capacity,
combined with Iraqi motivations and military requirements, suggest the stockpile
is composed of at least 100 tons. We believe the Iraqis are capable of producing
significantly larger quantities of CW agent in some scenarios; the 500-ton upper-
end estimate takes into account practical bounds, such as Iraq's limited delivery
options, and approximates Iraq's stocks at the time of Operation Desert Storm.

The IC did not provide the Committee with any intelligence documentation which showed that Iraq had stockpiled between 100 and 500 metric tons of chemical agents, other than reports which showed that Iraq did not adequately account for its pre-Gulf War stocks of chemical precursors and stocks. Previous intelligence assessments said that Iraq had a probable stockpile of 100 metric tons or less, based on estimates of CW and precursors for which Iraq had not been able to adequately account.

An intelligence analyst from the CIA told Committee staff that CIA analysts had estimated 500 metric tons as the upper end of the range for the CW stockpile

The IC increased the stockpile estimate and assessed that much of that 500 metric ton stockpile had been "added in the last year" largely because of the discovery of the suspected CW transshipment activity at al Musayyib in the spring of 2002 discussed previously in this report. The IC assessed that if Iraq had been moving chemical weapons in the spring of 2002, it must have recently produced those weapons, causing the

Community to raise the stockpile estimate. There was no direct intelligence reporting of an increase in weapons stocks that caused the IC to raise the stockpile estimate.

(U) An INR CW analyst told Committee staff that he believed the 500 metric tons upper assessment was calculated "very poorly." He said he was dubious of the stockpile estimates, but said he did not footnote the NIE because the 100 metric tons lower estimate was a reasonable and longstanding IC assessment based on Iraq's accounting discrepancies and because the 500 metric tons upper limit was discussed in the NIE as "up to" 500 tons which he believed was plausible. The DIA concurred with the language in the NIE regarding the size of Iraq's CW stockpile because it believed the language, "was sufficiently caveated to indicate DIA's uncertainty in the size of the stockpile."

(U) The fact that the IC lacked specific information about Iraq's CW stockpile was noted in the body of the NIE, and the IC explained in a footnote how it arrived at the assessment that Iraq had stocked "possibly as much as 500 MT of CW agent." The key judgments of the NIE did not alert the reader to these explanatory notes.

F. Iraq Had Experience in Manufacturing CW Bombs, Artillery Rockets, and Projectiles

The IC provided the Committee with

which noted that Iraq had produced CW bombs, artillery rockets, and

The report noted that Iraq had produced 250-gauge aerial bombs, 130-mm artillery shells, al-Hussein (Scud-variant) warheads,

warheads for 122-mm artillery rockets. In addition, Iraq declared that it

expended thousands of these munitions in the 1980s.

The IC noted in the NIE that its knowledge of Iraq's small-scale agent production hidden within legitimate research laboratories rested on "limited intelligence reporting on suspicious activity at only a few research centers." The NIE said one of the facilities, the al-Basel Research Center which Iraq had declared as part of its pre-Gulf War CW program, "may be collaborating on CW-related tasks" with a suspected chemical facility, Habbaniyah II (another name for Fallujah II).

H. Baghdad Has Procured Covertly the Types and Quantities of Chemicals and Equipment Sufficient to Allow Limited CW Production Hidden Within Iraq's Legitimate Chemical Industry

The IC assessed in the NIE that Iraq's procurement of CW precursors, technology, and specialized equipment cannot be definitely linked to Iraq's CW program, but "Iraq's procurements have contributed to the rebuilding of dual-use facilities that probably are adding to Iraq's overall CW agent capability." The IC provided at least seven

reports to the Committee which showed that Iraq had attempted to procure various chemicals that had potential applications in CW production. These chemicals, however, all had legitimate civilian uses.

indicated that Iraq had actually "procured" a chemical substance as noted in the NIE. The other reports showed only that Iraq had attempted to procure the chemicals. Although the original draft language of the NIE which all analysts had the opportunity to review and coordinate said "procured," analysts from several intelligence agencies told Committee staff that, in retrospect, "Iraq sought various chemicals..." or "Iraq tried to obtain various chemicals. . ." would have been more accurate statements.

I. Chemical Weapons Defensive Posture and Procurements

The NIE also included a discussion of Iraq's attempts to procure nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defensive equipment, including NBC reconnaissance vehicles, chemical detection tubes, a decontamination shower, Geiger counters, and atropine auto-injectors - a nerve agent antidote. The NIE noted that, "Iraqi troops could use NBC equipment defensively against a WMD attack or as a preventative measure during an offensive attack. If Iraq used a nonpersistent agent such as sarin, its troops would need protection in case the agent blew back on them..." The reports provided to the Committee did not reference whether the equipment was intended to be used defensively for an anticipated WMD attack on Iraq or during an offensive Iraqi attack using WMD. One of the reports did indicate that Iraq had obtained some of the defensive gear

J. Explaining Uncertainties

(U) The NIE provided a "text box" that listed the IC's "confidence levels for selected key judgements in this estimate." The NIE's key judgements were broken down into three categories of high, moderate and low confidence. Assessments related to Iraq's CW capabilities listed under the "High Confidence" heading were:

"Iraq is continuing, and in some areas expanding, its chemical, biological, nuclear and missile programs contrary to UN resolutions."

"We are not detecting portions of these weapons programs."

"Iraq possesses proscribed chemical and biological weapons and missiles."

(U) There were no assessments of Iraq's CW capabilities listed under the "Moderate Confidence" or "Low Confidence" headings.

K. Intelligence Agencies' Analysis of Iraq's Chemical Weapons (CW) Prior to Publication of the NIE

(U) Analysis from individual intelligence agencies on Iraq's CW program was consistent among agencies and largely consistent with the NIE and other IC products discussed earlier in this report. The following are examples of assessments from the DIA, CIA and INR.