(U) In October 1997, the DIA published a defense intelligence assessment, Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs: Progress, Problems, and Potential Vulnerabilities which stated that, "UNSCOM has had limited success in locating proscribed items and Iraq is assessed to have retained a broad range of CW-related items, including a residual agent and precursor stockpile estimated at 10 to 100 tons." The DIA assessed that Iraq could restart limited agent production quickly, probably within a few weeks of a decision to do so and said "mustard, sarin, and VX are likely to be the focus of the renewed production efforts, although sarin and especially VX will require longer to start up significant production quantities."

(U) On December 14, 2001, the DIA published another document, Iraq: Chemical Warfare Program Handbook, which stated that, "Iraq is assessed to hold 100 metric tons of chemical agents or less in bulk storage and filled munitions. The nature and condition of this remaining stockpile are unknown. Mustard agent is the most likely component of the stockpile. We believe that Iraq also holds production equipment and chemical precursors." The assessment noted that the DIA, "cannot confirm whether Iraq is currently producing chemical agents, or whether Baghdad has decided to re-establish a large-scale CW production capability," but noted that, "We cannot dismiss the possibility that small-scale production has taken place. The agents mustard, sarin, cyclosarin (GF) and VX will most likely be the focus of Iraq's reconstitution efforts."

(U) In September 2002, the DIA published a defense contingency product, Iraq - Key WMD Facilities An Operational Support Study which said, "There is no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons, or where Iraq has - or will establish its chemical warfare agent production facilities. Unusual munitions transfer activity in mid-2002 suggests that Iraq is distributing CW munitions in preparation for an anticipated US attack." The assessment said that "Iraq likely has resumed some chemical and biological agent production, but we lack conclusive proof due to Iraq's effective national-level denial and deception (D&D) effort." The assessment added, “Although we lack any direct information, Iraq probably possesses CW agent in chemical munitions, possibly including artillery rockets, artillery shells, aerial bombs, and ballistic missile warheads. Baghdad also probably possesses bulk chemical stockpiles, primarily containing precursors, but that also could consist of some mustard agent or stabilized VX.”

(U) As early as August 1996, the CIA published a report which noted that Iraq retained chemical agents and munitions. The CIA intelligence report, Iraq's Remaining WMD Capabilities, said that "Iraq is continuing to conceal a small stockpile of chemical agents, munitions, precursors, production material and equipment."

(U) In August 1998, the CIA published an intelligence report, Iraq's Chemical Warfare Program: Status and Prospects (NPC 98-10005C), which noted that "Baghdad retains a clandestine stockpile of chemical munitions and agents. Although UNSCOM initiatives have significantly reduced Iraq's CW stockpiles and infrastructure, Iraq will be poised to restart limited CW production after the departure of UNSCOM." The CIA assessed that, "Iraq could begin limited CW agent production within weeks after UN sanctions are lifted and intrusive inspections cease: Baghdad retains key elements of its CW program including personnel, production data, and hidden stocks of production equipment and precursor chemicals."

(U) On January 3, 2002, the CIA produced a Publish When Ready (PWR010302-06) which said, "Baghdad retains the ability to strike opponents in the region with chemical and biological agents, including delivery by missiles."

On April 18, 2002, the CIA published an assessment, Iraq: Chemical Warfare Program Profiting From Equipment and Chemical Transfers, which stated, "Over the past three years, Iraq may have obtained chemicals that would allow it to produce chemical warfare (CW) agents - most likely the blister agent sulfur mustard, and the nerve agents sarin and cyclosarin - quickly on a small scale, according to our analysis of intelligence

Iraq is seeking the equipment and chemicals needed to produce covertly CW precursors and agents within its chemical industry, despite the sanctions and control regimes that are aimed at preventing such transfers.

INR published an intelligence brief on November 5, 2001, which said that Iraq appeared to have resumed operations at a production building suspected by the IC of supporting CW precursor production. INR also said in an 2002, assessment that Iraq may have

conducted CW-filling activity at the al Musayyib site, a suspect CW storage site.

said, nonetheless, it believed that the activity may have involved suspect CBW-related munitions transshipment.

(U) None of the pre-NIE assessments provided to the Committee by any of the intelligence agencies said that Iraq "has begun renewed production of mustard, sarin, GF (cyclosarin), and VX." Most of the assessments were published prior to the IC obtaining the intelligence on the spring and summer 2002 transshipment activity that the IC assessed was related to chemical weapons and was a major factor in their judgment that Iraq had chemical weapons.

L. Chemical Conclusions

(U) Conclusion 58. The statement in the key judgments of the October 2002 Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction National Intelligence Estimate that "Baghdad has... chemical weapons" overstated both what was known about Iraq's chemical weapons holdings and what intelligence analysts judged about Iraq's chemical weapons holdings.

(U) Conclusion 59. The judgment in the October 2002 Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction National Intelligence Estimate that Iraq was expanding its chemical industry primarily to support chemical weapons production overstated both what was known about expansion of Iraq's chemical industry and what intelligence analysts judged about expansion of Iraq's chemical industry.

O Conclusion 60. It was not clearly explained in the National Intelligence Estimate that the basis for several of the Intelligence Community's assessments about Iraq's chemical weapons capabilities and activities were not based directly on intelligence reporting of those capabilities and activities, but were based on layers of analysis regarding

(U) Conclusion 61. The Intelligence Community's assessment that "Saddam probably has stocked at least 100 metric tons and possibly as much as 500 metric tons of chemical weapons agents -- much of it added in the last year," was an analytical judgment and not based on intelligence reporting that indicated the existence of an Iraqi chemical weapons stockpile of this size.