As with the other intelligence disciplines, there was a coordinated effort within the IC to improve imagery collection against the WMD target. The CCDC study found that

that imagery assets were in high demand for the Iraq WMD target and for support to military operations. This required imagery assets to be tasked more efficiently and effectively.

The CCDC study made several recommendations aimed at overcoming the

challenges of competing priorities

The recommendations included:

airborne missions

over the entire

Northern and Southern no-fly zones;

(U) Increase the use of commercial imagery to supplement imagery from U.S. intelligence collection satellites;

The IC also developed MASINT collection strategies to target Iraq's WMD program. The CCDC study found that there was negligible use of MASINT sensors against Iraqi WMD,

The NICB said that the IC implemented several recommendations to improve

MASINT collection,

The NICB told Committee staff that from June 2000

to January 2003 these collection efforts resulted in over 200 chemical-related reports, over 60 biological reports, and over 800 nuclear-related reports, which, the NICB said contained both positive and negative information on activity related to WMD. When asked by Committee staff which of these reports contained positive hits, the vice deputy director for MASINT and Technical Collection at DIA said that were

of the reports were available to analysts via INTELINK.

E. Impact of Increased Collection on Analysis

Representatives from each collection discipline reported to Committee staff that collection increased significantly in their areas after the recommendations of the CCDC were implemented. Committee staff asked the collectors how they work with the all-source analysts to make sure that when they see a large increase in collection, that they understand that the increase is a result of an increase in collection, not necessarily an increase in activity by the Iraqis. An analyst who worked on the Iraq WMD CCDC study told Committee staff that WMD analysts regularly participated in NICB meetings on all WMD collection issues. This analyst noted that "there was a constant feedback mechanism available throughout this period from certainly 2001 through the present that enabled [analysts] to get a gauge of whether this was a collection bias or if it was new collection or if it was a scale-up in activities." This same analyst also noted that "in some places, [the IC] was collecting ... in other cases [the that had been under way for quite

IC] was collecting for the

some time... and frequently the reporting would show that."

Comments from analysts to Committee staff, however, suggest that some Iraq WMD analysts did not believe that collection had increased significantly as a result of the improved effort against Iraq's WMD. A CIA BW analyst told Committee staff, "we increased our collection efforts, but that did not necessarily equate to increased collection. We tried very hard to focus them to collect on areas we thought were most important, but it did not necessarily translate into us getting more collection." Two analysts from CIA's office of Near East and South Asia Analysis (NESA),

told Committee staff that they did not notice an increase in collection as a result of the CCDC.

While some analysts did not believe that collection had increased, several analysts pointed to intelligence reporting obtained by the IC after late 2000 (and after the IC began implementing the CCDC study recommendations) as having played a significant role in their assessments that Iraq had increased its WMD activities.

Imagery reports from 2002 onib were key to chemical analysts assessments that Iraq had and was producing chemical weapons (CW). In addition, intelligence assessments on all of Iraq's suspect WMD programs - nuclear, chemical, biological, and delivery programs, pointed to increased procurement activity after 2000 as part of the judgment that Iraq had increased WMD activity.

F. Collection Directives

Committee staff reviewed the IC's national HUMINT collection directives (NHCDs) covering Iraq's WMD programs published in the years preceding Operation Iraqi Freedom. The NHCD's are the IC's primary guidance to its HUMINT collectors around the world on how to prioritize and guide HUMINT collection efforts. The NHCDs provide lists of questions and information requirements, categorized by subject, to be explored with sources that have the appropriate knowledge and access to information. The NHCD's are reviewed by appropriate analysts in the IC to ensure that their analytic questions and requirements are being met. All of the questions and requirements in the NHCDs on Iraq's WMD programs were written with the clear presumption that Iraq had active WMD programs, and focused on collecting information about issues such as the extent of Iraq's WMD activities,

None of the NHCDs reviewed by Committee staff contained any questions or requirements that suggested that collection be focused on determining whether Iraq had weapons of mass destruction or active WMD programs.

G. CIA HUMINT Compartmentation

(U) IC officials provided Committee staff with reporting from a number of sensitive CIA HUMINT sources who reported on Iraq's WMD programs before Operation Iraqi Freedom. The reporting from these sources was restricted to a limited list of recipients within the IC, or was handled in special access programs (SAP). SAPS limit distribution to a small group of IC personnel who have been formally granted access to the intelligence based on their need to know the information being reported. When the IC provided these reports to the Committee, they told