were The most important al-Qaida detainees that commented on interaction with Iraq after the January 2003 publication of Iraqi Support for Terrorism, also commented on the relationship between Iraq and al-Qaida. His comments tracked with other detainees' comments, and they are included here for additional corroboration. The CIA provided four reports detailing the debriefings of Abu Zubaydah, a captured senior coordinator for al-Qaida responsible for training and recruiting. Abu Zubaydah said that he was not aware of a relationship between Iraq and al-Qaida. He also said, however, that any relationship would be highly compartmented and went on to name al-Qaida members who he thought had good contacts with the Iraqis. For instance, Abu Zubaydah indicated that he had heard that an important al-Qaida associate, Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, and others had good relationships with Iraqi Intelligence. During the debriefings, Abu Zubaydah offered his opinion that it would be extremely unlikely for bin Ladin to have agreed to ally with Iraq, due to his desire to keep the organization on track with its mission and maintain its operational independence. In Iraqi Support for Terrorism, Abu Zubaydah's information is reflected as: Abu Zubaydah opined that it would have been "extremely unlikely" for bin Laden to have agreed to "ally" with Iraq, (U) For purposes of comparison, Committee staff requested information from the CIA on Khalid Shaikh Muhammad's (KSM) comments on an Iraq-al-Qaida relationship. The CIA provided a one page response to the staff's request that stated that Khalid Shaikh Muhammad, the planner of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States, also maintained that he was unaware of any collaborative relationship between al-Qaida and the former Iraqi regime, citing ideological disagreements as an impediment to closer ties. In addition, he was unable to corroborate reports that al-Qaida associate Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi had traveled to Iraq to obtain medical treatment for injuries sustained in Afghanistan. (U) The CIA assessed that KSM probably is accurately describing his understanding of the relationship. Most reporting indicates that KSM did not join al-Qaida until the late 1990s and did not enter the top echelon of its decision-making leadership until after the September 11, 2001 attacks. Prior to September 2001, he was an important operational planner but had a limited role in the administration of al-Qaida. He therefore may not have been privy to many activities pursued by other parts of the group, which could include contacts with Iraq. M. Contacts Between the Iraqi Regime and al-Qaida Iraqi Support for Terrorism contained the following summary judgments regarding Iraq's contacts with al-Qaida: Saddam Husayn and Usama Bin Ladin are far from being natural partners, yet We have reporting from reliable clandestine and press sources that direct meetings between senior Iraqi representatives and top al-Qaida operatives These statements were based on clandestine intelligence and press reporting, which the CIA provided to the Committee. In addition to the meetings noted in the assessment, the CIA also provided additional reporting on several other meetings between Iraqi and al-Qaida officials during the same period. The CIA assessed these reports of additional meetings as less credible in Iraqi Support for Terrorism. Contacts between Iraq and al-Qaida were an important factor in determining whether Iraq would have cooperated, assisted, or directed al-Qaida in any terrorist operation against U.S. interests. However, the intelligence reporting used to create the finished papers often came from foreign government services whose reliability was questioned by the CIA. For instance, some of the contacts between the Iraqi regime and al-Qaida were reported to the CIA by foreign government services or groups opposed to the Iraqi government. The raw intelligence reporting from the CIA detailed the questionable nature of reporting by countries or groups that clearly opposed the Iraqi regime. For example, the first three of the meetings cited in Iraqi Support for Terrorism came from one raw intelligence report and are listed below with the source of the reporting noted in bold and in brackets: The January 2003 version of Iraqi Support for Terrorism did not include the sources in the bracketed, bold text. The September 2002 version of Iraqi Support for Terrorism, with a limited distribution, did, however, include information about the reporting from a foreign government service. Therefore, the reader of the January 2003 version did not know that the source of this information came from a government that could have been trying to influence the U.S. Government. A direct meeting is explained in Iraqi Support for Terrorism as, "Hijazi joined the IIS chief on a visit to Khartoum in 1995, according to reporting." 42 Information on another direct meeting came from an Italian newspaper article that was translated by the CIA as: Saddam Husayn and Usama bin Ladin have sealed a pact. Faruk Hidjazi, The article contains direct quotes from Faruk Hijazi, but does not specify the source of the information. Iraqi Support for Terrorism stated this information as "[a] press report from 1998 alleges Hijazi [Faruk Hidjazi in the article] visited Sudan to meet bin Ladin as early as June 1994" Information on two other direct meetings comes from an FBI interrogation of Wali Khan, an al-Qaida associate. Abu Hajir, himself, was subsequently taken into custody and Iraqi Support for Terrorism stated, "in his debriefings, Abu Hajir has not yet claimed any past or continuing ties to Iraqi intelligence or mentioned returning to Iraq since he left in the late 1980s and repudiated his Iraqi citizenship." When asked about follow-up on this intelligence, the CIA answered, "The only reporting we have linking Abu Hajir to Iraq comes from Wali Khan |