C. Terrorism Collection Conclusions

(U) Conclusion 99. Despite four decades of intelligence reporting on Iraq, there was little useful intelligence collected that helped analysts determine the Iraqi regime's possible links to al-Qaida.

Conclusion 100. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) did not have a focused human intelligence (HUMINT) collection strategy targeting Iraq's links to terrorism until 2002. The CIA had no sources on the ground in Iraq reporting specifically

on terrorism. The lack of an official

U.S. presence in the country curtailed the Intelligence Community's HUMINT collection capabilities.

XIV. PRESSURE ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ANALYSTS

REGARDING IRAQ'S LINKS TO TERRORISM

(U) An essential component of the Committee's review of the intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities has been examining the objectivity and independence of the judgments reached by the Intelligence Community (IC) and whether any influence was brought to bear on IC analysts to shape their assessments to support policy objectives.

(U) On June 11, 2003, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) Chairman Pat Roberts held a press conference with Senator John Warner, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, and Representative Porter Goss, Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Chairman Roberts announced that the Committee had been conducting a thorough and bipartisan review of intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs and ties to terrorists, and made a public call for officials to come forward and contact the Committee if they had information about intelligence analysts having been pressured to alter their assessments. Following the press conference, Chairman Roberts reissued this call in a press release which said,

I am concerned by the number of anonymous officials that have been speaking to
the press alleging that they were pressured by Administration officials to skew
their analysis, a most serious charge and allegation that must be cleared up. I can
tell you the Committee has yet to hear from any intelligence official expressing
such concerns. If any officials believe, however, that they have been pressured to
alter their assessment, they have an obligation and I encourage them to contact the
Committee for confidential discussions.

(U) Chairman Roberts issued this call a third time at a closed Committee hearing on June 19, 2003 at which senior representatives of the Intelligence Community were present. Chairman Roberts asked,

Did any of you ever feel pressure or influence to make your judgment in the 2002
National Intelligence Estimate or any other intelligence product conform to the
policies of this or previous Administrations? The second part of that is, has any
analyst come to you or expressed to you that he or she felt pressure to alter any
assessment of intelligence? And finally, if you did feel pressure or were informed

that someone else felt pressure, were any intelligence assessments changed as a
result of that pressure? (emphasis added)

(U) Chairman Roberts issued the same call for analysts or officials to come forward to the Committee at least six more times in the summer of 2003.

(U) In addition to these calls, throughout the Committee's review, Committee staff asked whether any analysts had been pressured to change their analysis or assessments and about how they had developed their assessments. Committee staff also made efforts to contact individuals mentioned in press articles or who, through other means, had come to the Committee's attention as possibly having information about analysts who had been pressured.

(U) The Committee was not presented with any evidence that intelligence analysts changed their judgments as a result of political pressure, altered or produced intelligence products to conform with Administration policy, or that anyone even attempted to coerce, influence or pressure analysts to do so. When asked whether analysts were pressured in any way to alter their assessments or make their judgments conform with Administration policies, not a single analyst answered yes. Most analysts simply answered, "no" or "never," but some provided more extensive responses. Some of their responses are below:

The Deputy Director of the Office of Terrorism Analysis (OTA) in the Director of Central Intelligence's (DCI) Counterterrorist Center (CTC) commented that "I think there was intense pressure in the prewar period, and I felt the pressure was on the trade craft side to ensure we got this one right. We couldn't afford not to get it right. We had questions intensively about this connection, that connection, this report, that report. How does this all work together? And rarely do you work in an intelligence environment, especially in an environment where everything you write has a potential to lead to conflict where American people are killed... the pressure was intense. It's as intense as I ever saw it. My sense of that intensity was that we were under pressure to get it right, not to make a mistake, not to miss something, not to mischaracterize something."

An OTA analyst responsible for Iraq and terrorism stated, "... the most pressure I felt was put upon myself to ensure that every single product that I produced could be backed up in a hearing just like this... we knew that the stakes were high and that this story would be examined later."

A Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) analyst responsible for Iraq Political Leadership stated, "I never felt pressure from outside to change my views on Iraq. I think the lion's share of the pressure that I felt - and I'm talking personally as an analyst and as a leader