(U) The assessment continues with the statement that since the 1994 NIE:

(U)... Saddam's belief is likely to have been reinforced by advances in WMD
and missile capabilities by Iran, Pakistan, India and other countries.

(U) Assessment Q - Stability of the Iraqi Regime: Significant Vulnerabilities Offset by Repression, (ICA 2002-02HC, April 2002).

(U) We judge that Iraqi military morale and battlefield cohesion are more fragile
today than in 1991. Reporting since the 11 September attacks on the United
States suggests that Saddam's regime is increasingly concerned about the
military's willingness to fight.

Assessment R- Iraq: Evaluation of Documents Provided by the Iraqi National Congress, (NIC 1770-02, 09 August 2002). The limitations of the HUMINT available to the IC were addressed again in a 2002 NIC document that evaluated a stream of HUMINT reporting from the Iraqi National Congress (INC). According to the NIC, the IC reviewed the 300 pages of documentation that the INC provided in 2002. The IC believed the INC used a variety of its own members, its clandestine agents and other contacts to prepare the materials for the U.S. However, similar to other cases in which HUMINT from various INC's HUMINT was also of limited value.

sources was deficient, the

(U) The written material provided to the [IC] by the [INC] contains little of
current intelligence value. Overall, the order of battle information throughout the
documents was generally accurate-matching existing IC holdings that are based
on all-source reporting. In some significant areas that information, although
correct, is out of date and no longer useful.... The intelligence value of almost
all the data provided by the INC is diminished by our inability to assess the origin
and authenticity of the documents....

(U)... The order of battle data provided for the Republican Guard, Iraq's most
important military service, is four years out of date. The data provided reflects
information prior to a 1998 rotation of units. There are also several errors in the
numbered brigades and the documents place several division headquarters in the
wrong locations. . . . The documents mis-identify the structure and equipment
holdings of key Republican Guard divisions. . . .

(U) Assessment S - Regional Consequences of Regime Change in Iraq, (ICA 2003-03, January 2003). Analysts considered influences at work on Iraq's most important regional neighbors. The report indicated that by early 2003 Saddam had succeeded in reestablishing a web of relationships in the region based on commercial interests and sympathy for the Iraqi people, whom regional states perceived as suffering under economic sanctions. IC analysts believed that Arabs would draw a distinction:

(U)... between a reversal of Iraqi aggression against another Arab state and a war
initiated by the United States... 12 years of sanctions against Iraq have
reinforced perceptions that Washington is anti-Arab.... Unlike in 1991, when
key Arab states including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria openly supported
military action to expel Saddam from Kuwait, none of these states is calling for or
willing to directly participate in a U.S.-led attack against Baghdad.

(U) Assessment T - Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq, (ICA 2003-04, January 2003). The IC defined the negative impact on regional stability and security from Iraq under Saddam as “a major cause of regional instability and enmity by twice launching wars of aggression against his neighbors...." Conversely, the removal of Saddam would:

(U)... offer the prospect of enhancing and stabilizing Iraq's relations with other states in the region. . . . A [new] government in Baghdad also would attempt to build on the relatively stable modus vivendi that Saddam has achieved with his neighbors over the past 10 years.

(U) Assessment U - Key Warning Concerns for 2003, (ICA 2003-05, January 2003).

(U) Saddam probably will not initiate hostilities for fear of providing Washington with justification to invade Iraq. Nevertheless, he might deal the first blow, especially if he perceives that an attack intended to end his regime is imminent.

F. Iraq's Threat to Regional Stability and Security Conclusions

(U) Conclusion 106. The Intelligence Community (IC) did not take steps to clearly characterize changes in Iraq's threat to regional stability and security, taking account of the fact that its conventional military forces steadily degraded after 1990.

(U) Conclusion 107. The quality and quantity of Human Intelligence (HUMINT) reporting on issues related to regional stability and security, particularly on the subject of regime intentions, was deficient and did not adequately support policymaker requirements.

(U) Conclusion 108. Subject to the limitations described in conclusions 106 and 107, the Intelligence Community (IC) objectively assessed a diverse body of intelligence regarding Saddam Hussein's threat to regional stability and security, producing a wide range of high quality analytical documents on various topics. The IC's judgments about Iraq's military capabilities were reasonable and balanced, based on three factors: the size and capabilities of its military forces in relation to neighboring countries; its history of aggressive behavior prior to the first Gulf War; and, its patterns of behavior between 1991 and 2003.

(U) Conclusion 109. The Intelligence Community should have produced a National Intelligence Estimate-level assessment of the overall threat posed by Iraq in the region prior to the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Such a document would have outlined – in one place and in a systematic fashion - the complete range of factors comprising Iraq's threat to regional stability and security.