(U) Conclusion 115. The rationale used by the Central Intelligence Agency for deciding what information to share with the United Nations was inherently subjective, inconsistently applied, and not well-documented.

(U) Conclusion 116. The multiple Intelligence Community Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) site lists lack coherency.

(U) Conclusion 117. The information the Central Intelligence Agency provided to Senator Levin in reply to his letters on the sharing of intelligence information with the United Nations was, in some cases, unresponsive, incomplete and inconsistent.

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APPENDIX A

We provide specific comments below, in the form of a scorecard. We flag the draft's strengths as well as weaknesses. This scorecard is pegged to analytic merit, not persuasive power. On a range from one to five starts (asterisks), five denotes a smoking

gun in terms of UNSCR 687-prohibited weapon systems. One star denotes a claim we do not consider strong, but which is plausible. A bifurcated score (e.g., “***/WEAK) indicates that parts of the discussion are strong, other parts weak.

Introduction

-- Page 1-2. ***** Discussion of historical, outstanding issues and Iraq's track record
of noncompliance, deception, and denial. There is further discussion at the beginning of
the biological, chemical, nuclear, and missile sections. These discussions might be
expanded.

Iraq Deception and Denial

-- 4-5. ***/WEAK. Intercepted conversation of

re hiding vehicle from inspectors. Weak re

Virtually conclusive re hiding prohibited vehicle, presumably involving OFF violation. But it demonstrates Iraq's continuing proclivity to hide proscribed equipment from inspectors--reinforcing our concerns about hidden WMD.

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6-7. * Information on Higher Committee: Generally valid, eve though we don't take the source's every claim as Gospel, and the insider's information is very general.

-- 7, last bullet. * Information from senior official in

Okay.

-- 8, first bullet. *** Orders to hide correspondence with OMI: Highly compelling, even though the high-level orders apparently cover sensitive materials not exclusive to WMD. -- 8, second bullet. WEAK. Qusay order to remove prohibited items from palaces.

-- 8, third bullet. *** Multiple humint reports of hiding prohibited items in various homes. Compelling, even though some reports appear based on rumor and/or circular reporting, and the hidden items presumably include sensitive non-WMD documents as well as WMD items.

-- 8, last bullet. WEAK. Sensitive files being driven around in cars, in apparent shell game. Plausibility open to question.

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