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III. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ANALYSIS OF IRAQ'S NUCLEAR

A. Background

PROGRAM

(U) Prior to the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, the Intelligence Community (IC) prepared several Community papers on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, and, more specifically, Iraq's nuclear weapons program. In October 1998, the IC published a National Intelligence Council (NIC) Memorandum, Current Iraqi WMD Capabilities. In December 2000, the IC published an Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA), Iraq: Steadily Pursuing WMD Capabilities (ICA 2000-007HCX). The assessment was prepared at the request of the National Security Council (NSC) for a broad update on Iraqi efforts to rebuild WMD and delivery system programs in the absence of weapons inspectors, as well as a review of what remains of the WMD arsenal and outstanding disarmament issues that were the focus of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM).

(U) On Iraq's nuclear program, the IC also produced a Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) report in October 1997, Reconstitution of Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program: An Update (JAEIC 97-004) and a JAEIC report in June 1999, Reconstitution of Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program: Post Desert Fox (JAEIC 99-003.)

(U) All of the assessments in these Community papers on Iraq's nuclear program were consistent in assessing that:

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and UNSCOM had destroyed portions of, and neutralized the remainder of Iraq's nuclear infrastructure but that Iraq retained the foundation for future nuclear reconstitution.

Iraq continued low-level clandestine theoretical research and training of personnel, and was attempting to procure dual-use technologies and materials that could be used to reconstitute its nuclear program.

If Iraq acquired a significant quantity of fissile material through foreign assistance, it could have a crude nuclear weapon within a year.

It would take five to seven years for Iraq - with foreign assistance - to produce enough weapons-grade fissile material for a nuclear weapon.

Iraq did not appear to have reconstituted its nuclear weapons program.

(U) In December 2001, the IC produced an National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015. In the Iraq section of the NIE, the IC noted, "Recent Iraqi procurements, however, suggest possible preparation for a renewed uranium enrichment program." Possible preparations for a renewed uranium enrichment program represented a slight shift in the IC's assessment, but the assessment remained consistent with previous IC position that "Iraq did not appear to have reconstituted its nuclear weapons program." This judgment did not change until the 2002 NIE on Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, when, for the first time, the IC assessed that "Baghdad began reconstituting its nuclear program shortly after the departure of UNSCOM inspectors in December 1998." Viewing this as a possibly significant shift, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence staff focused their work on the analysis of Iraq's nuclear program in the 2002 NIE and the analysis from individual agencies leading up to that judgment in the period following the 2000 ICA.

B. Nuclear Reconstitution

(U) The assessment that Iraq began reconstituting its nuclear program shortly after inspectors left in 1998 was based on the longstanding IC view that, in the 1990s, because of sanctions and United Nations (UN) inspections, Saddam Hussein had reorganized his nuclear program to recommence work once sanctions were lifted. After inspectors left Iraq, intelligence analysts became concerned that Iraq might use the opportunity to restart its nuclear program. In the 2002 NIE, the IC judged that Saddam Hussein had most likely shifted his strategy from waiting for sanctions to end to waiting for inspections to end. IC analysts told Committee staff the assessment was an analytical judgment based on Hussein's clearly established desire to acquire nuclear weapons and the fact that Hussein probably realized that sanctions were not going to be lifted soon. The IC did not have direct intelligence reporting to show that Saddam Hussein had decided to shift his strategy from waiting for sanctions to end to waiting for inspections to end.

(U) At the time of the 2002 NIE, the IC continued to hold its longstanding view that once reconstitution had begun, it would take five to seven years, with foreign assistance, for Iraq to produce enough weapons-grade fissile material for a nuclear weapon. Although the NIE said that

reconstitution had begun shortly after inspectors departed Iraq in 1998, the NIE concluded that Iraq probably would not be able to make a weapon until 2007 to 2009, nine to eleven years after the IC assessed that reconstitution had begun. The National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Strategic and Nuclear Programs told Committee staff that although most IC analysts believed that Iraq had started reconstitution "efforts" in 1999 by starting to put the nuclear program back together, they did not assess that full reconstitution, in which the "five to seven year clock" would start running, had occurred at that point. He said the IC assessed that, "The five to seven year clock started in 2002 - in other words, the time of the Estimate."

(U) The reasons the IC believed that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program were described in the key judgments, and in more detail in the body of the NIE. The key judgments said:

Most agencies believe that Saddam's personal interest in and Iraq's aggressive attempts to
obtain high-strength aluminum tubes for centrifuge rotors - as well as Iraq's attempts to
acquire magnets, high-speed balancing machines, and machine tools - provide
compelling evidence that Saddam is reconstituting a uranium enrichment effort for
Baghdad's nuclear weapons program. (The Department of Energy [DOE] agrees that
reconstitution of the nuclear program is underway but assesses that the tubes probably are
not part of the program.)

Iraq's efforts to re-establish and enhance its cadre of weapons personnel as well as activities at several suspect nuclear sites further indicate that reconstitution is underway.

(U) Although the DOE's Office of Intelligence and the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) both assessed that the aluminum tubes Iraq was seeking were probably not intended for a nuclear program, only INR disagreed with the assessment that Iraq had begun reconstituting its nuclear program. In addition to a text box explaining INR's alternative view in the body of the NIE, INR also published a text box in the key judgments explaining its analysis on reconstitution:

The Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research (INR) believes that
Saddam continues to want nuclear weapons and that available evidence indicates
that Baghdad is pursuing at least a limited effort to maintain and acquire nuclear
weapons-related capabilities. The activities we have detected do not, however,
add up to a compelling case that Iraq is currently pursuing what INR would
consider to be an integrated and comprehensive approach to acquire nuclear

weapons. Iraq may be doing so, but INR considers the available evidence
inadequate to support such a judgment. Lacking persuasive evidence that
Baghdad had launched a coherent effort to reconstitute its nuclear program, INR is
unwilling to speculate that such an effort began soon after the departure of UN
inspectors or to project a timeline for the completion of activities it does not now
see happening. As a result, INR is unable to predict when Iraq could acquire a
nuclear device or weapon.

(U) Committee staff interviewed analysts from every all-source intelligence agency involved in the nuclear section of the NIE including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC), the DOE, and INR to hear each agency's argument on nuclear reconstitution and the aluminum tubes. Committee staff also interviewed experts at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to learn about their work to investigate Iraq's nuclear program.

(U) The following sections recount the Committee's examination of the intelligence supporting the six reasons the IC assessed Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program as outlined in the NIE: Iraq's procurement of 1) aluminum tubes, 2) magnets, 3) high-speed balancing machines, and 4) machine tools, and Iraq's 5) efforts to re-establish and enhance it's cadre of weapons personnel, and 6) activity at several suspect nuclear sites. The report focuses first on the intense debate in the IC about the intended use of aluminum tubes Iraq was attempting to procure in late 2000 to 2002 and then addresses the other reasons outlined in the NIE that contributed to the assessment that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program. The Committee's examination of the intelligence did not stop with the NIE, however. Information that became available to the IC through IAEA inspections prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom is included because analysts could have updated or altered their assessments based on that information if they believed the information warranted a change.

1. Aluminum Tubes

Most agencies assess that Iraq's aggressive pursuit of high-
strength aluminum tubes provides compelling evidence that
Saddam is attempting to reconstitute a uranium enrichment effort
for Baghdad's nuclear weapons program. (DOE agrees that
reconstitution of the nuclear program is underway but assesses
that the tubes probably are not part of the program.) (October
2002 NIE)

(U) In 2001, the IC became aware that Iraq was attempting to procure 60,000 highstrength aluminum tubes manufactured from 7075-T6 aluminum, with an outer diameter of 81 mm, and inner diameter of 74.4 mm, a wall thickness of 3.3 mm and a length of 900 mm. The tubes were to be anodized using chromic acid and were to be shipped, wrapped in wax paper and separated from each other. Seven-thousand series aluminum alloy is extremely hard and strong and when formed into a tube of more than 75 mm in diameter, is a controlled item under the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Annex III of UNSCR 687 and 707 which Iraq is prohibited from importing because it could have nuclear applications.

Soon after receiving the initial intelligence report, the CIA assessed that the tubes were probably intended for an Iraqi uranium enrichment centrifuge program.10 Although coordinated with other WINPAC analysts, the CIA's initial analysis was based largely on the work of a centrifuge analyst in the Director of Central Intelligence's (DCI) Center for Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation and Arms Control (WINPAC). This analyst had

The CIA published its first assessment on the aluminum tubes on April 10, 200111, noting that they "have little use other than for a uranium enrichment program." (Senior Executive Intelligence Brief [SEIB] 01-083CHX) The assessment did not provide any details outlining why the CIA assessed that the tubes were probably intended for a centrifuge program, but noted, "using aluminum tubes in a centrifuge effort would be inefficient and a step backward from the specialty steel machines Iraq was poised to mass-produce at the onset of the Gulf War. Iraq successfully used outdated enrichment technologies, such as its electromagnetic isotope separation effort, before the war."

(U) One day after the CIA published its assessment, the DOE published their own analysis of the aluminum tube procurement. The DOE paper provided a more detailed analysis of the aluminum tubes and their applicability to a uranium centrifuge enrichment program. The assessment said:

10 Centrifuge rotors are typically thin walled tubes which spin at very high speeds and cause uranium gas to enrich into the isotope - U235 (enriched uranium). The high rate of spin required for a centrifuge requires that the tube be composed of a high-strength material, such as 7075-T6 aluminum.

on

11 The CIA has told Committee staff that the first assessment they published was actually a PDB published The Committee cannot verify the date or describe the content of this document because the CIA has not provided it to the Committee.

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