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E. Although We Have Little Specific Information on Iraq's CW Stockpile,
Saddam Probably Has Stocked at Least 100 Metric Tons and Possibly
as Much as 500 Metric Tons of CW Agents – Much of it Added in the
Last Year.
-
...
...205
F. Iraq Had Experience in Manufacturing CW Bombs, Artillery Rockets, and
Projectiles
...206
G. Baghdad Probably Is Hiding Small-Scale Agent Production Within Legitimate
Research Laboratories
206
H. Baghdad Has Procured Covertly the Types and Quantities of Chemicals and
Equipment Sufficient to Allow Limited CW Production Hidden Within
Iraq's Legitimate Chemical Industry
K. Intelligence Agencies' Analysis of Iraq's Chemical Weapons (CW) Prior to
Publication of the NIE
L. Chemical Conclusions....
207
.208
..208
...208
. 211
C. Iraq Was in the Final Stages of Development of the Al Samoud Missile (2000),
May Be Preparing to Deploy the Al Samoud (2001), and Was Deploying
the Al Samoud and Ababil-100 Short Range Ballistic Missiles, Both
Which Exceed the 150-km UN Range Limit (2002)
218
J. Intelligence Agencies' Analysis of Delivery Systems Prior to Publication
of the NIE
232
K. Delivery Conclusions.
234
VII. IRAQ WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTELLIGENCE IN
SECRETARY POWELL'S UNITED NATIONS SPEECH
A. Nuclear Program
B. Biological Weapons
C. Chemical Weapons
D. Delivery Systems
E. WMD Powell Conclusions
239
242
243
251
.. 253
..253
VIII. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COLLECTION ACTIVITIES AGAINST
IRAQ'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
H. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Collection Conclusions
258
. 260
264
265
..266
267
.268
.269
IX. PRESSURE ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ANALYSTS REGARDING
IRAQ'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) CAPABILITIES ....272
A. Allegations of Influence
277
B. INR Analyst
C. Former INR Office Director .
D. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Senior Intelligence Analyst
E. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Senior Intelligence Officer
F. Former Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Desk Officer
G. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Pressure Conclusions
X. WHITE PAPER ON IRAQ'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
PROGRAMS
A. Differences Between the Classified NIE and Unclassified White Paper
1. Nuclear Weapons
2. Biological Weapons
290
. 290
3. Chemical Weapons
4. Delivery Systems
291
..292
. 293
B. Primary Differences in the Key Judgments of the Classified National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) and Unclassified White Paper
C. White Paper Conclusions
→ XI. THE RAPID PRODUCTION OF THE OCTOBER 2002 NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON IRAQ'S CONTINUING PROGRAMS FOR
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION..........
A. Rapid Production of the National Intelligence Estimate Conclusions
XII. IRAQ'S LINKS TO TERRORISM
.. 294
295
298
.302
304
A. Intelligence Products Concerning Iraq's Links to Terrorism
.304
B. September and October 2001 Papers
C. Iraq and al-Qaida: Interpreting a Murky Relationship, June 2002
..305
D. Alternate Analysis in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.. 307
E. Iraqi Support for Terrorism, September 2002
313
2. Iraqi Regime Knowledge of al-Qaida Presence in Northeastern Iraq.. 336
3. Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi in Baghdad
P. Operational Cooperation Between Iraq and al-Qaida
1. 1993 World Trade Center Bombing
2. The September 11th Attacks
337
338
339
. 340
314
315
317
321
323
324
325
.. 326
329
330
331
....
332
334
.335
3. The Foley Assassination
Q. Iraq's Use of Terrorist Strikes in the Event of War with the United States
1. Saddam Hussein's Past Use of Terrorism ...
2. The Decision-Making Environment in Iraq
3. Iraq's Weapons Capabilities
R. Iraqi Links to Terrorism Conclusions
XIII. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COLLECTION ACTIVITIES AGAINST
IRAQ'S LINKS TO TERRORISM
A. Human Intelligence (HUMINT)
B. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)
C. Terrorism Collection Conclusions
XIV. PRESSURE ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ANALYSTS REGARDING
..350
..351
.353
.355
..357
.359
1. CIA Ombudsman for Politicization
..359
2. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and “Alternative
Analysis"
..361
B. Terrorism Pressure Conclusion
363
XV. POWELL SPEECH – TERRORISM PORTION .....
A. Powell Speech Conclusions - Terrorism Portion
XVI. IRAQ'S THREAT TO REGIONAL STABILITY AND SECURITY
A. Background
B. IC Analysis on the Iraqi Threat
C. Agency Level Papers and Current Intelligence Products
D. Key Analysis Topics in Agency Level Documents
E. Review of IC Level Assessments
1. Summary of Assessments 1991 - 1994
2. Summary of Assessments 1995 - 1998 ..
3. Summary of Assessments 1999 - 2003
F. Iraq's Threat to Regional Stability and Security Conclusions
..391
XVIII. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE
ON IRAQI SUSPECT WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION SITES
WITH UNITED NATIONS INSPECTORS
404
A. Background ....
B. The Lead-up to Renewed Inspections.
405
C. The Sharing of Information - the "Pull" Side of the Exchange
D. The Sharing of Information - the "Push" Side of the Exchange
E. Information Shared Compared to the Intelligence Community's Master
Inspection List
F. Multiple Intelligence Community Lists
G. Statements Made by Administration Officials about the Sharing of
Information
H. The Intelligence Community's Sharing of Intelligence on Iraqi Suspect
Weapons of Mass Destruction Sites with United Nations Inspectors
Conclusions...
406
407
. 410
413
415
APPENDIX A...
APPENDIX B ..
GLOSSARY
ACRONYMS & ABBREVIATIONS
.417
423
429
431
437