Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq Together with Additional ViewsU.S. Government Printing Office, 2004 - Всего страниц: 511 NOTE: NO FURTHER DISCOUNT FOR THIS PRINT PRODUCT--OVERSTOCK SALE -- Significantly reduced list price while supplies last This official unclassified report is intended to provide the Senate and the American public with a substantial record of the facts underlying the conclusions of the Committee regarding the intelligence community's prewar assessment of Iraq's program for weapons of mass destruction and its ties to terrorism. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence activities oversees and makes continuing studies of the intelligence activities and programs of the United States Government and reports to the Senate about those activities. Pursuant to this duty, for the past year the Committee has undertaken an in-depth examination of matters described in this report. Related products: Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program is available here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/052-071-01571-0 Report on Intelligence Activities Relating to Iraq Conducted by the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group and the Office of Special Plans... June 2008 is available here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/search/apachesolr_search/Select%20Committee%20on%20Intelligence Iraq & Persian Gulf Wars collection is available here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/us-military-history/battles-wars/iraq-persian-gulf-wars Global War on Terror resources collection is available here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/us-military-history/battles-wars/global-war-terror |
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Стр. 14
... continued development of prohibited ballistic missiles were reasonable and did accurately describe the underlying intelligence . ( U ) The assessment that Iraq " is reconstituting its nuclear program " was not supported by the ...
... continued development of prohibited ballistic missiles were reasonable and did accurately describe the underlying intelligence . ( U ) The assessment that Iraq " is reconstituting its nuclear program " was not supported by the ...
Стр. 18
... continued deceptive behavior , and its failure to fully cooperate with UN inspectors left the IC with a predisposition to believe the Iraqis were continuing to lie about their WMD efforts . This was compounded by the fact that Iraq's ...
... continued deceptive behavior , and its failure to fully cooperate with UN inspectors left the IC with a predisposition to believe the Iraqis were continuing to lie about their WMD efforts . This was compounded by the fact that Iraq's ...
Стр. 38
... continued to doubt the accuracy of the reporting , again because they thought Niger would be unwilling and unable to sell uranium to Iraq and because they thought Iraq would be unlikely to risk such a transaction when they were " bound ...
... continued to doubt the accuracy of the reporting , again because they thought Niger would be unwilling and unable to sell uranium to Iraq and because they thought Iraq would be unlikely to risk such a transaction when they were " bound ...
Стр. 66
... continued to hold that belief until the IAEA reported that the documents were forgeries . J. Secretary Powell's UN Speech ( U ) Beginning in late January the CIA , State Department , White House and NSC officials began to work together ...
... continued to hold that belief until the IAEA reported that the documents were forgeries . J. Secretary Powell's UN Speech ( U ) Beginning in late January the CIA , State Department , White House and NSC officials began to work together ...
Стр. 71
... continued to judge that Iraq had been " vigorously trying to procure uranium ore and yellowcake " from Africa , as indicated in the October 2002 NIE . To date , the IC has not published an assessment to clarify or correct its position ...
... continued to judge that Iraq had been " vigorously trying to procure uranium ore and yellowcake " from Africa , as indicated in the October 2002 NIE . To date , the IC has not published an assessment to clarify or correct its position ...
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activity al-Qaida aluminum tubes analyst told Committee assessment that Iraq Baghdad believed biological agents biological warfare biological weapons BW agents BW analyst capabilities CBW delivery Central Intelligence Agency chemical weapons CIA analysts CIA's collection concerns Conclusion coordination CURVE BALL detailee detailee's discussed documents draft dual-use efforts equipment facilities foreign government service gas centrifuge Gulf Gulf War HUMINT report IAEA IAEC IC's indicated inspectors intelligence analysts intelligence assessment Intelligence Community Intelligence Community's intelligence reporting intended Iraq's BW Iraq's weapons Iraq's WMD programs Iraqi Support issue key judgments mass destruction programs military missile mobile BW National Intelligence Estimate National Security NIE's Niger noted nuclear weapons Office operations paper policymakers pressure rocket rotor Saddam Hussein Samoud Secretary Powell Senate September small UAVs specific stockpile Support for Terrorism terrorist threat told Committee staff UAVs unclassified UNSCOM weapons of mass WINPAC yellowcake
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Стр. 501 - We know that Saddam Hussein pursued weapons of mass murder even when inspectors were in his country. Are we to assume that he stopped when they left? The history, the logic, and the facts lead to one conclusion: Saddam Hussein's regime is a grave and gathering danger. To suggest otherwise is to hope against the evidence.
Стр. 502 - The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction - and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack.
Стр. 490 - But chemical agents, lethal viruses and shadowy terrorist networks are not easily contained. Imagine those 19 hijackers with other weapons and other plans — this time armed by Saddam Hussein. It would take one vial, one canister, one crate slipped into this country to bring a day of horror like none we have ever known.
Стр. 209 - There is no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons, or where Iraq has — or will — establish its chemical warfare agent production facilities.
Стр. 279 - Here is what we now know: the United States believes that Cuba has at least a limited offensive biological warfare research and development effort. Cuba has provided dual-use biotechnology to other rogue states.
Стр. 502 - The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction - and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack.
Стр. 491 - Baghdad for now appears to be drawing a line short of conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or CBW [chemical and biological weapons] against the United States.
Стр. 488 - America must not ignore the threat gathering against us. Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof— the smoking gun — that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.
Стр. 18 - ... (WMD) programs in defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions; if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade. • Baghdad hides large portions of Iraq's WMD efforts. Revelations after the Gulf war starkly demonstrate the extensive efforts undertaken by Iraq to deny information.
Стр. 66 - The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.