Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq Together with Additional ViewsU.S. Government Printing Office, 2004 - Всего страниц: 511 NOTE: NO FURTHER DISCOUNT FOR THIS PRINT PRODUCT--OVERSTOCK SALE -- Significantly reduced list price while supplies last This official unclassified report is intended to provide the Senate and the American public with a substantial record of the facts underlying the conclusions of the Committee regarding the intelligence community's prewar assessment of Iraq's program for weapons of mass destruction and its ties to terrorism. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence activities oversees and makes continuing studies of the intelligence activities and programs of the United States Government and reports to the Senate about those activities. Pursuant to this duty, for the past year the Committee has undertaken an in-depth examination of matters described in this report. Related products: Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program is available here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/052-071-01571-0 Report on Intelligence Activities Relating to Iraq Conducted by the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group and the Office of Special Plans... June 2008 is available here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/search/apachesolr_search/Select%20Committee%20on%20Intelligence Iraq & Persian Gulf Wars collection is available here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/us-military-history/battles-wars/iraq-persian-gulf-wars Global War on Terror resources collection is available here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/us-military-history/battles-wars/global-war-terror |
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Стр. 3
... showed Iraq had not reconstituted its nuclear program , had not renewed production of chemical agents , and had abandoned an offensive biological weapons program . In early November 2003 , the IC wrote to the Committee that it was ...
... showed Iraq had not reconstituted its nuclear program , had not renewed production of chemical agents , and had abandoned an offensive biological weapons program . In early November 2003 , the IC wrote to the Committee that it was ...
Стр. 14
... showed that former Iraqi nuclear scientists continued to work at former nuclear facilities and organizations , but the reporting did not show that this cadre of nuclear personnel had recently been regrouped or enhanced as stated in the ...
... showed that former Iraqi nuclear scientists continued to work at former nuclear facilities and organizations , but the reporting did not show that this cadre of nuclear personnel had recently been regrouped or enhanced as stated in the ...
Стр. 15
... showed that Iraq was renovating or expanding facilities that had been associated with Iraq's past BW program and was engaged in research that had BW applications , but few reports suggested specifically that the activity was related to ...
... showed that Iraq was renovating or expanding facilities that had been associated with Iraq's past BW program and was engaged in research that had BW applications , but few reports suggested specifically that the activity was related to ...
Стр. 22
... showed that Iraq was making efforts to hide some activity , but the reporting was not clear about what activity was being hidden or why it was being hidden . Although the IC lacked unambiguous reporting of either active WMD programs or ...
... showed that Iraq was making efforts to hide some activity , but the reporting was not clear about what activity was being hidden or why it was being hidden . Although the IC lacked unambiguous reporting of either active WMD programs or ...
Стр. 38
... showed that an Algerian businessman , Baraka , was arranging a trip for the Iraqi Ambassador to the Vatican , Wissam al - Zahawi , to visit Niger and other African countries in early February 1999 . Based on information from the CIA ...
... showed that an Algerian businessman , Baraka , was arranging a trip for the Iraqi Ambassador to the Vatican , Wissam al - Zahawi , to visit Niger and other African countries in early February 1999 . Based on information from the CIA ...
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Часто встречающиеся слова и выражения
activity al-Qaida aluminum tubes analyst told Committee assessment that Iraq Baghdad believed biological agents biological warfare biological weapons BW agents BW analyst capabilities CBW delivery Central Intelligence Agency chemical weapons CIA analysts CIA's collection concerns Conclusion coordination CURVE BALL detailee detailee's discussed documents draft dual-use efforts equipment facilities foreign government service gas centrifuge Gulf Gulf War HUMINT report IAEA IAEC IC's indicated inspectors intelligence analysts intelligence assessment Intelligence Community Intelligence Community's intelligence reporting intended Iraq's BW Iraq's weapons Iraq's WMD programs Iraqi Support issue key judgments mass destruction programs military missile mobile BW National Intelligence Estimate National Security NIE's Niger noted nuclear weapons Office operations paper policymakers pressure rocket rotor Saddam Hussein Samoud Secretary Powell Senate September small UAVs specific stockpile Support for Terrorism terrorist threat told Committee staff UAVs unclassified UNSCOM weapons of mass WINPAC yellowcake
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Стр. 501 - We know that Saddam Hussein pursued weapons of mass murder even when inspectors were in his country. Are we to assume that he stopped when they left? The history, the logic, and the facts lead to one conclusion: Saddam Hussein's regime is a grave and gathering danger. To suggest otherwise is to hope against the evidence.
Стр. 502 - The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction - and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack.
Стр. 490 - But chemical agents, lethal viruses and shadowy terrorist networks are not easily contained. Imagine those 19 hijackers with other weapons and other plans — this time armed by Saddam Hussein. It would take one vial, one canister, one crate slipped into this country to bring a day of horror like none we have ever known.
Стр. 209 - There is no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons, or where Iraq has — or will — establish its chemical warfare agent production facilities.
Стр. 279 - Here is what we now know: the United States believes that Cuba has at least a limited offensive biological warfare research and development effort. Cuba has provided dual-use biotechnology to other rogue states.
Стр. 502 - The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction - and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack.
Стр. 491 - Baghdad for now appears to be drawing a line short of conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or CBW [chemical and biological weapons] against the United States.
Стр. 488 - America must not ignore the threat gathering against us. Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof— the smoking gun — that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.
Стр. 18 - ... (WMD) programs in defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions; if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade. • Baghdad hides large portions of Iraq's WMD efforts. Revelations after the Gulf war starkly demonstrate the extensive efforts undertaken by Iraq to deny information.
Стр. 66 - The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.