can realise. He found, in our public life, the paradox that from the very lips which preach pacifism abroad we hear the cries for war at home.' He dreaded the 'subtle poison of hatred that was being preached, to weaken the faith of men in their own efficient service and sound workmanship-the very things which have built up the reputation of our great country, on which we still live.' He foresaw that if the great trade unions, such as the miners, the transport workers, and the railwaymen, united in a policy to enforce a demand for higher wages in their own trades by means of a strike, they would have it in their power to hold up at the same time many industries in this country and do them. irreparable damage.

After congratulating Mr Sidney Webb on coining such a phrase as 'the inevitability of gradualness,' he pleaded eloquently for the application of such evolutionary principles, and for the solution of our urgent industrial problem in a spirit of goodwill, avoiding both secrecy in business methods and the suspicion which it engenders. The Prime Minister's speeches were made in March 1925. The storm which he foresaw broke over our heads with its maximum intensity in May 1926. We weathered it, in a manner which amazed the world, largely through his own leadership and character as a 'typical Briton,' who

'both showed and proved certain essential qualities which we claim are peculiarly British. It is because of them that we are proud of our imperial citizenship and heritage; and are confident that, so long as these characteristics continue, Great Britain and the British Commonwealth of Nations will remain the foremost spiritual and political power and influence for human good in the world.'

*

We cannot apply, to so recent an event, the perspective of the historian; but it may be that, after passing through such an experience, Commander Bowles would join with Mr G. M. Trevelyan in the view that there are certain qualities in our race likely to serve us well in the world mission that the 'sea-centrality' has enforced upon us. Mr Baldwin deprecated the use of text-books to guide our views and our conduct towards

"The British Spirit,' 'Quarterly Review,' July 1926.

each other during the present-day industrial revolution. In Politics and Economics,' by Mr H. G. Williams, we have one of the most recent of such books, which develops, amongst other points, the well-known idea that, by calling to our aid the resources of the British Empire, we can find a line of economic development whereby we, in these islands, can hope to maintain, and maybe to improve, our present standards of living. The author deals with elementary principles of political economy, with socialism, currency, banking, foreign exchanges and foreign trade, the capital levy, taxation and the national debt, protection and preference, the economic development of the crown Colonies, and the fundamental causes of unemployment. Under the heading The New Spirit of Industry,' we read that the principles which led to the greatest measure of production, and, therefore, to the highest wages and profits, were very imperfectly understood in the early days of the modern capitalist system which developed out of the first industrial revolution. Excessively low wages could not provide the nourishment necessary for good work, excessive hours resulted in such fatigue that not only was the output per hour reduced, but the output per day of long hours was less than the output per day of shorter hours, while the employment of child labour was not efficient in itself, and led to inefficient adults later. Karl Marx, who has had such a disturbing influence upon industrial progress, built his theories upon this foolish abuse of the system, and in no way upon present-day conditions:

'The organisation of labour, the growing sense of humanity, and the increasing appreciation of the folly of this method of working, looked at from the most selfish point of view, brought about rapid changes, and to-day the worstpaid worker in the country would rightly regard as deplorable the industrial conditions in the period about which Marx writes.'

Both Mr Baldwin and Mr Williams arrive by different routes at employment in the labour market as the test of economic prosperity, a conclusion subscribed to for Mr Williams many years by leading statisticians. attributes fluctuation in employment to changes in the direction and volume of expenditure, and there are

some causes of unemployment entirely outside human control and therefore completely independent of the system of society.' Of those which result from the action of human beings, some are quite beyond the control of Governments:

'On the other hand, there are many things which come definitely within the control of Governments and employers and of work-people, and if we are to reduce the fluctuations of trade and so to some extent avoid the widespread unemployment which we experience from time to time, every Government must take into account the immediate and the ultimate economic effect of its legislative and administrative policy, while every employer and every employee should carry on his or her work so as to cause the least amount of disturbance.'

Having now derived, from the authorities mentioned, such guidance as we have been able to obtain about the sources of our economic stability, we can revert to our original theme, the strength of England, as dependent upon ships and seamen.

So far we have only been able, in an article so limited in its scope, to do scant justice to Mr Trevelyan's fascinating History of England,' covering, as it does, so many factors not strictly germane to the special issue which we are considering. Although only sixty-five, out of the seven hundred, pages of the history refer directly to British sea-power and to seamen, they suffice to indicate, with the sure touch of the artist in literary expression, his contention that 'in early times, the relation of Britain to the sea was passive and receptive; in modern times, active and acquisitive. In both is the key to her story.' Passing over the passive and receptive periods of Roman, Saxon, and mediæval seamen, we come to the active and acquisitive functions of the Tudor Navy, when the new commercial and naval aspirations of England, embodied in the Tudor Royal Navy, in Drake and his captains, and in the trading companies of London-and Raleigh's prophetic visions of Colonial Empire, were all arrayed against the old religion and sailed under the banner of the new monarchy.' And, later, The Royal Navy was Henry's creation, and it saved himself and his daughter after him when they adopted an island policy and defied the Catholic powers

of Europe.' A masterly chapter (pp. 338-367), upon influence of sea-power, follows, and then this :

the

'Forward from the time of Elizabeth, warfare against some great military empire is a recurrent motif of British history, but because such warfare was conducted from behind the shield of the sea and the Royal Navy, the island has never become the scene of foreign invasion, nor until the novel circumstances of 1914-18 was it ever found necessary to sacrifice a large part of the manhood of the country abroad, or to interrupt the usual course of business and pleasure at home. Such continuous security, a privilege usually confined to countries either very humble or very remote, but enjoyed in this case by a Great Power on the very highway of the world's affairs, is the secret of much in British character and institutions.'

We come then to James I, who disliked "men of war" whether by land or sea,' who was the most thorough-going pacificist who ever bore rule in England . . . and not only was James most unwarlike in his own particular; but being a Scot of that period he had no conception of the importance of sea-power.' The indignation produced in the country against the new monarchy, which had abandoned the Elizabethan tradition at sea, was not removed even when Charles I 'honestly appropriated the illegal Ship Money to the reconstruction of the Royal Navy,' and 'the ghost of Raleigh pursued the House of Stuart to the scaffold.' Then, to the Regicide Government which followed belonged the credit of reviving English sea-power, and the measures taken for defence against Prince Rupert's squadron transformed the Navy to its modern scope and established England as the great naval power of the world.'* With the rivalry with Holland in the 17th century we have already dealt, taking due note of the handicap suffered by our opponents in the possession of land frontiers, open to invasion. We have also touched upon the subsequent rivalry with France-France too was a maritime rival, potentially more formidable even than Holland, and if established in Amsterdam she would soon make an end of English naval supremacy. It was the issue of 1588, of 1793, of 1914. England would

Julian Corbett.

not suffer Holland and Belgium to pass under the domination of the greatest military power in Europe.' At the close of the 17th century Louis XIV had the chance to perpetuate French naval supremacy by the proper use of his then dominant fleet, but the courtiers at inland Versailles lacked the sense of opportunity, which was seldom entirely wanting to the statesmen who watched the world's ebb and flow from the tidal shore of the Thames.'

The subject of British sea-power in the 18th century is dealt with in equally lucid passages. France began the war of the Spanish succession with every apparent advantage except sea-power. With the results we have already dealt, as we have with the disastrous effects of our naval weakness later in the century, using Captain W. M. James as our guide. Mr Trevelyan reminds us that 'in the days of Pitt and Castlereagh, as in the days of William and Marlborough, the two props of the alliance against France were British sea-power and British subsidies, applied all along the coasts and in half the Treasuries of Europe.' But the Napoleonic wars not only repeated the past but rehearsed the future. While the issue of the campaigns against Louis had indeed been affected by the course of trade competition between England and France, the commercial struggle a hundred years later was more formal and more decisive as a weapon of war. 'The British blockade of Napoleon's Europe, and his attempt to starve England by the Berlin and Milan Decrees, were warlike operations of the same general character as the British blockade of the Central Powers in our own day, and the German submarine campaign; they disturbed the economy of the whole world and had serious consequences for the combatants in their relations with the United States and other would-be neutrals.'

Having followed this thread-our vital interest in sea-power-through three and a half centuries of our history, dating from the period when 'sea-centrality' was conferred upon us by discoveries and developments beyond the Atlantic Ocean, we are perforce driven back to Commander Bowles, and his 'Strength of England,' and to the Prime Minister's recent acknowledgment in his Guildhall speech that we are in the throes of a