Art. 14.-THE PEACE WITH GERMANY

THE first diplomatic sign of an inclination towards peace on the part of the Central Powers and their allies was manifested in the notes sent by them to the neutral Governments, for transmission to the Entente Powers, on Dec. 12, 1916. Confident in their resources and in their capacity to maintain successfully what they asserted to be a defensive war, they yet expressed their willingness to enter forthwith into negotiations for peace.' That the peace contemplated was one which would have secured for Germany at least the greater part of her existing advantages was evident from the uncompromising speech of the German Chancellor, uttered on the same day. No hint was given respecting the actual intentions of the Central Powers, nor was any prospect of concessions held out. Military conditions at the moment were, to all appearance, favourable to Germany, and there was as yet no sign that the United States would intervene. The occasion therefore seemed opportune. The German rulers evidently calculated either that their opponents would grasp at the chance of peace, or that, if they refused, their own peoples would be strengthened in their resolution to continue the war.

The reply (Dec. 30) was the only one that was possible in the circumstances. It was an unequivocal refusal, on the ground that 'a mere suggestion, without a statement of terms, that negotiations should be opened, is not an offer of peace'; and that the German note was 'no more than a calculated attempt to influence the course of the war, and to end it by imposing a German peace.' The Allies added that

'No peace is possible so long as they have not secured reparation for violated rights and liberties, the recognition of the principle of nationality and of the free existence of small States; so long as they have not brought about a settlement calculated to end once for all forces which have constituted a perpetual menace to the nations, and to afford the only effective guarantee for the future security of the world.'

The German rejoinder (Jan. 11, 1917) threw no further light on the intentions of Germany, beyond the remark

that she and her allies considered their aims-'the defence of their liberty and their existence-to have been already attained.

Meanwhile President Wilson had, on Dec. 18, addressed a letter to the belligerents, in which he suggested an immediate interchange of views. He took care to guard himself against the assumption that his proposal was prompted by, or in any way associated with, the overtures of the Central Powers; and he carried the aloofness of the impartial neutral to the length of attributing a virtual identity of aim to both sides in the conflict. It was only natural that this suggestion should be repudiated, with some indignation, by the Allies in their reply of Jan. 10; but, in order to remove all doubt as to the meaning of their triple demand for restitution, reparation, and guarantees,' they amplified their reply to the German note by setting forth their concrete objects in considerable detail. The Allied Governments were at the time, and have been since, taken to task for this declaration, on the one hand by some who thought the demands excessive and therefore likely to discourage negotiation; on the other, by those who considered such a proceeding undiplomatic and likely to prove inconvenient in the future. But frankness was probably in this case, as usual, wisdom; and it has been justified by the sequel. The statement was as follows:

'Their objects in the war are well known; they have been formulated on many occasions by the chiefs of their divers governments. These objects will not be made known in detail, with all the equitable compensations and indemnities for damages suffered, until the hour of negotiations. But the civilised world knows that they include, of necessity and in the first line, the restoration of Belgium, Serbia, and Montenegro, and the indemnities which are due to them; the evacuation of the invaded territories of France, Russia, and Rumania, with just reparation; the re-organisation of Europe, guaranteed by a stable regime and founded not only on respect for nationalities and on the right to full security and liberty of economic development which all nations, great or small, possess, but also on territorial conventions and international regulations suitable to guarantee territorial and maritime frontiers against unjustified attacks; the restitution of provinces or territories wrested in the past from the

Allies by force or against the will of their populations; the liberation of Italians, Slavs, Rumanians, and Tcheco-Slovaks from foreign domination; the enfranchisement of populations subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks; the expulsion from Europe of the Ottoman Power, which is distinctly alien to Western civilisation. The intentions of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia regarding Poland have been clearly indicated in the proclamation which he has just addressed to his armies. It need hardly be said that, while the Allies desire to liberate Europe from the brutal covetousness of Prussian militarism, it has never been their design, as has been alleged, to compass the extermination of the German peoples and their political disappearance. That which they desire, above all, is to ensure a peace upon the principles of liberty and justice, and upon the inviolable fidelity to international obligations, with which the Government of the United States has never ceased to be inspired.'

Meanwhile the German Government, in their reply to Mr Wilson's note (Dec. 26), refrained entirely from showing their hand, and merely reiterated their proposal for an immediate meeting of delegates' with the object of an exchange of views.' The frankness displayed by the Allies was neither congenial nor convenient to the Central Powers.

With this interchange of notes the first attempt at pacification—if such it can be called-came to an end. But, a few days later, Mr Wilson summed up the results and his own ideas about peace in an address to the Senate of the United States (Jan. 22, 1917). After noting, with satisfaction, that both parties had abjured any intention of crushing their opponents, he observed that, to his mind, this statement implied that it must be a peace without victory.' However explained, it was an unfortunate phrase, for it meant, at any rate, a compromise peace, one in which the Allies would have to sacrifice the greater part of their aims. Nevertheless. among the results which were to be regarded as assured by universal agreement he included a united, independent and autonomous Poland.' How such a result was to be secured without victory over the Central Empires it is not easy to perceive. There was no hint of active intervention; nevertheless, ten weeks later, the United States entered the war.

Before this event occurred, but possibly with 'intelligent anticipation' of it, the Emperor Carl, in March 1917, authorised his brother-in-law, Prince Sixtus of Bourbon, to communicate to President Poincaré, 'secretly and unofficially,' the information that he (the Emperor) would 'support, by all means and with all his personal influence, the just claims of France with regard to AlsaceLorraine.' He added that Belgium should be entirely restored, with its sovereignty undiminished and its African colonies; and that Serbia should also recover its sovereignty, with secure access to the sea, subject only to the condition of behaving well in future. The views of Great Britain touching these proposals were also to be ascertained, in order to provide a basis for official conversations which would result in the satisfaction of all concerned. The Emperor's letter, written with his own hand, was communicated by the Prince to the French President on March 31.

What connexion this step had with the next is not clear, but the somewhat mysterious negotiations which took place during the summer of 1917 can hardly be disconnected from the Emperor's letter. In June 1917, the French Government, according to M. Painlevé's statement (April 8, 1917), was informed that Count Nicholas Revertera had made several attempts to get into communication with a distant relation of his, Major Armand, who was in confidential French employ. With the consent of M. Ribot, meetings took place at Freiburg between these two persons in the month of Auguston what basis does not appear. No positive result was attained; but when, in November, M. Clemenceau came to power, he found the conversations still going on. Not wishing to put a stop to interviews which might at least result in useful disclosures, the new Premier allowed them to continue-with instructions, however, to Major Armand, Écouter, et ne rien dire.' According to Austrian authorities, Armand renewed his approaches in January 1918; and on Feb. 2 a meeting took place at Freiburg, in which Revertera informed Armand that Count Czernin was of opinion that a conversation between

This letter was published in the French papers on April 12, 1918. The narrative in the text is drawn from official or semi-official statements only.

him (Czernin) and a French representative might lead to good results, if only France would abandon the claim to Alsace-Lorraine. M. Clemenceau replied that this was impossible; and the negotiation thereupon dropped.

It would, no doubt, be interesting to know whether the Emperor's letter was written with the knowledge and consent of Berlin, or not. Mr Balfour, speaking later on the matter, inclined to believe that it was all a plot concocted between Vienna and Berlin, with a view to sowing dissension between the Allies. To us his arguments do not appear convincing, but it is hardly worth while to discuss the matter now. That Germany, while apparently willing to make terms of some sort with regard to Belgium, was absolutely firm on the question of Alsace-Lorraine, was shown by Herr von Kühlemann's subsequent statement, that only that question stood in the way of peace. The object of such a statement is too obvious to require explanation.

That Austria wished and imperatively needed peace, general or separate, is clear; whether it was possible, is quite another question. The interview, or interviews,* between Count Mensdorff and General Smuts in Switzerland seem to show that our Government thought there was some chance of one or other solution, or at any rate were unwilling to reject offhand an overture doubtless made by Austria. The Reichstag resolution (July 19, 1917), in favour of peace without annexations or indemnities' displayed a pacific tendency in the German people which may have encouraged hopes of success. The Papal appeal (Aug. 1) immediately preceded the Armand-Revertera interviews, of the imminence of which the Vatican could hardly have been ignorant. Finally, Lord Lansdowne's famous letter (Nov. 29), perhaps reflecting the views of a former Government, manifested a conviction that outspoken and conciliatory statements on the part of the Allies might bring about a general peace and avert world-wide disaster.

Nevertheless, it may be confidently asserted that a separate peace with Austria was then out of the question. Germany would not, and could not, have permitted it;

According to French authorities, there was only one interview; according to Austrian, there were several.