Unmolested the British flag might wave, but the occupation none the less was still ineffective. Raffles, however, was equal to the occasion. Without difficulty he concluded, on Jan. 30, a preliminary arrangement with the Dato' Temenggong of Johore, a high state official with ill-defined powers which placed him almost on an equality with the Sultan. This understanding was of value as a provisional concession of occupancy rights, but Raffles was well aware that only the Sultan could conclude a regular treaty. Unfortunately for his purpose, the reigning Sultan of that day (Abdul Rahman) was a usurper upheld on the throne by the Dutch and completely under their influence. Casting about him, Raffles speedily found a way out of the difficulty by getting into touch with Abdul Rahman's elder brother (Tunku Hussan), the legitimate prince, and concluding with him, on Feb. 6, the treaty by which Britain's right to establish a settlement at Singapore was recognised. The validity of this instrument was fiercely assailed by the Dutch, but it stood the heavy tests of criticism to which it was subjected; and, in conjunction with three other agreements concluded respectively in June 1819, June 1823, and November 1824, it constitutes to-day our title to this invaluable Imperial outpost.

No action of Raffles' has been the object of more hostile comment than the conclusion of the first Singapore treaty, with its cool ignoring of the Sultan's nominal authority. It was certainly a daring act, one to which even the epithet 'sharp practice' might be applied if the locale were western and not eastern. But viewed in the light of Malayan history, it was the natural and reasonable outcome of the situation created by the aggressive tendencies of the Dutch. That Abdul Rahman was a usurper is undoubted; it is equally certain that he was kept in power only by Dutch aid. In such circumstances, it was well within the province of the British to place the rightful successor to the throne in power for their own ends. A curious precedent for the adoption of this course is to be found in the earlier history of European influence in the Archipelago. At Bantam, in Java, towards the end of the 17th century, the Dutch supported the claims of one aspirant to the throne, while the English identified themselves with the interests of

his rival. Unfortunately, we backed the wrong candidate, and in consequence had to leave Bantam. It was this astute support of the stronger Bantam prince which gave the Dutch final domination in Java and drove us from the Archipelago. Raffles may have had this episode in mind when he called in Tunku Hussan to make his position good.

Raffles had skilfully overcome the native difficulty, but he had still to reckon with the foes of his own household. At Penang Bannerman was eagerly watching for an opening for spoiling his brother official's plans. It only required the receipt on Feb. 11 of the news of the occupation of Singapore to inspire him to indite a minute embodying a ferocious attack on Raffles. In insulting language he charged his colleague with acting solely under the promptings of personal ambition, and flatly declined to forward to the new settlement reinforcements for which an urgent request had been made by Major Farquhar in Raffles' absence.

It would seem, from reading the extraordinary effusions which flowed from Bannerman's pen in these eventful days, that he had completely lost his balance. He was so obsessed with the view that Raffles had taken up an untenable position in occupying Singapore that he confidently imagined the higher authorities would commend his Government for the obstructive attitude it had assumed. A painful disillusionment awaited him. Lord Hastings, writing from Calcutta on April 8, 1819, denounced in unsparing terms the action of Bannerman and his colleagues. While not prepared to pronounce a final opinion upon the occupation of Singapore, the Governor-General denied the right of Colonel Bannerman to express a decisive opinion upon a violation of Sir Stamford Raffles' instructions.

'Commissioned and entrusted by this Government,' continued Lord Hastings, 'to this Government alone he was answerable. The instructions under which he acted... were adapted to the port of Rhio chiefly; and the probability that the Dutch might anticipate us there rendered it necessary to prescribe a line which was in that contingency to be followed with the utmost exactness. The same principle was, in the subsequent instructions, extended to Johore. In both cases the injunctions referred to the possible event of

an apparent right having been actually advanced by the Dutch. But, though the spirit of the inculcation to avoid collision with the Dutch applied itself to any other position, it necessarily did so with a latitude suited to the circumstances. We think your Government entirely wrong in determining so broadly against the propriety of the step taken by Sir Stamford Raffles on a simple reclamation from the Governor of Malacca, which, whether well or ill founded, was to be looked for as certain.'

Lord Hastings severely condemned Bannerman's action in withholding the support asked for by Major Farquhar. The jealousy of the Singapore settlement, which, to the regret of the Supreme Government, had been avowed and recorded, would, he said warningly, 'find no tolerance with the British Government should misfortune occur and be traceable to neglects originating in such a feeling.'

In a private letter to Bannerman Lord Hastings expounded the principles upon which the Supreme Government acted in regard to the new settlement.

'We never meant,' he said, 'to show such obsequiousness to the Dutch as to forbear securing those interests of ours which they had insidiously and basely assailed out of deference to the title which they were disposed to advance to supremacy over every island and coast of the Eastern Archipelago. It was to defeat that profligate speculation that we commissioned Sir Stamford Raffles to aim at obtaining some station which would prevent the entire command of the Straits of Malacca from falling into the hands of the Dutch, there being many unpossessed by them and not standing within any hitherto asserted pretensions.'

Overwhelmed by the censure he had received, Bannerman made an effort to justify his action in an apologetic despatch. Later his old confidence revived sufficiently to induce him to appeal to the Court of Directors against what he regarded as the harsh judgment of the Supreme Government on his conduct. They replied in a despatch in which, while conceding that Bannerman had been actuated by a sense of duty, they regretted that he had been betrayed into an imputation on Sir Stamford Raffles' motives 'totally irreconcilable with every principle of public duty.' Happily for Bannerman's peace of mind he was spared this final rebuff, for he died before the despatch reached Penang.

Melancholy as the whole record is in its revelation of official ineptitude, it does not by any means complete the tale, of the troubles brought upon Raffles. Before the local storm had died away, he was called upon to face a new and more formidable assault on his policy directed from home. The Government of the day were directly hostile to the step he had taken. They declared against it in language which admitted of no misinterpretation. The India Board were not less outspoken in their denunciation. If Raffles had been a traitor who had betrayed his country, he could scarcely have been more bitterly assailed in high quarters. The one excuse for the attitude assumed was the desirability, viewed from the country's general foreign policy, of maintaining good relations with Holland. The ink on the Treaty of Vienna was scarcely dry; and Ministers shrank from measures which might appear to reopen the settlement, more especially as the condition of the nation in 1819 was very grave. Furthermore, Singapore was, to most officials, nothing but a worthless islet, more likely to be a burden than a blessing to the country.

Abandonment seemed inevitable in view of the pronounced antipathy officially manifested to the occupation. But the Government were happily precluded from following this suicidal course by the rapid march of events. The truth is that, as a port, Singapore was a success from the very earliest days. With rare instinct for the true future position of the settlement, Raffles made the trade absolutely free, while at the same time he did his utmost to attract as settlers the Chinese and other native traders, by whom the vast bulk of the trade of the Archipelago was done. Favoured by this liberal policy, a considerable commerce grew up almost immediately. In the third year of the occupation we find Raffles estimating that the exports and imports by native boats alone exceeded 4,000,000 dollars in the year. In 1822 the total shipping clearances of the port reached 130,689 tons, and the trade exceeded 8,000,000 dollars. Two years later the annual trade had increased in value to 13,000,000. Singapore, in short, had absolutely justified itself while short-sighted critics at home were still discussing the expediency of the occupation.

Raffles' own faith in the future of the settlement

never wavered. Quite early in the occupation, in June 1819, he maintained that, among Eastern ports, it was likely to be second only to Calcutta. It was, he declared, ' of much higher value than whole continents of territory.' About a year later, with prophetic instinct, he assigned to the port a position as 'a connecting link and grand entrepôt between Europe, Asia and China.' It seemed to him impossible, in the circumstances, that the position should be abandoned; and he was right. The inevitable decision to make the occupation permanent came only after years of discussion and, for Raffles, of heart-breaking criticism and censure. Eventually, in 1824, it took the form of a treaty concluded with the Dutch, by which, broadly speaking, we exchanged our Sumatran station of Bencoolen for Malacca, with the understanding that, while we retained Singapore and exercised exclusive rights on the Peninsula, the Dutch were to have a free hand in Sumatra.

Raffles did not long survive the vindication of the principles for which he had so strenuously fought. Quitting Bencoolen in February 1824, he spent some troubled months in England in contention with the authorities over questions arising out of his Java administration and his Singapore mission, and then, on July 5, 1826, succumbed to an attack of apoplexy at his residence, Highwood Hill, Middlesex. He was buried in Hendon churchyard. His memory was so soon forgotten by an ungrateful country that even the exact site of his grave became a matter of controversy, not finally cleared up until a few years since, when, on some alterations being made in Hendon Church, an investigation resulted in the position of his remains being accurately located.