alliance thus begun, Clive secured the general support of something like a party, whereas Bussy could never obtain more than the selfish and uncertain aid of individuals.

The fruits of this were soon evident. Difficulties with Mir Jaffar began almost at once. He delayed payment of the sums he had promised to the Company. At the same time he aroused grave distrust in his Hindu dependents. Several small rebellions broke out. A Hindu, Ram Narayan, was still Deputy of Behar, and was believed to be hostile to the new government. Mir Jaffar decided to make a progress thither and bring him to book; but his chief financial minister, Rai Durlabh, refused, under pretext of illness, to accompany him. It was, in fact, apparent that Bengal was threatened with troubles which would throw the finances into complete disorder. Clive then intervened. He resolved himself to accompany the Nawab into Behar. At his approach the rebels submitted; Rai Durlabh agreed to proceed with him to Patna; and, on the promise of his support, Ram Narayan gave up all thought of resistance.

Successful as it was, this policy was plainly open to grave objection, for it tended directly to encourage that jealousy of English power which was certain sooner or later to outweigh the Nawab's gratitude. Mir Jaffar was much displeased at finding those whom he had hoped to plunder guarded by so powerful a protection. But any other policy involved the still greater danger of administrative chaos and financial ruin. Clive's conduct ensured the continuance of government on the traditional lines, and won for the English additional support besides that of military superiority. But it may be doubted whether any one else could have for so long a time maintained this position of unstable equilibrium. For the two years and a half that elapsed between the revolution of 1757 and his departure early in 1760, he had to employ constant vigilance, unwavering resolution, extraordinary dexterity, to oppose the intrigues which were always being hatched at the durbar by the party of discontented Muhammadans headed by Miran, the Nawab's son, who lost no occasion to incite his father against Clive's control.

The most critical situation that thus arose was the

affair with the Dutch. That nation had hitherto stood aloof from the political complications of India; but now certain of their agents saw in the notorious ill-feeling with which the Nawab regarded English control a heaven-sent opportunity for intervention. Accordingly they entered into relations with Miran, at first (it seems) to establish him instead of his father; subsequently Mir Jaffar himself was brought in, and the project became the deliverance of the durbar from English thraldom by Dutch aid. After some delay their superiors at Batavia were brought to share their aims, and an expedition was despatched, ostensibly to augment the garrisons of Ceylon and Coromandel, but really to expel the English from Bengal.

In this the Dutch, like every nation of that age, were guided by what they believed to be their real interests, as the English had been in their conduct towards Dupleix. The Dutch, however, were guilty of the unpardonable sin of irresolution and delay. Their fleet lay for some time at Negapatam and at the mouth of the Hugli before the leaders could make up their minds to proceed. Clive thus had full warning. As usual, the Nawab looked on while others decided the fate of his province. With exquisite irony the English used his name to forbid the Dutch to enter the river; and, when the latter decided to ignore the commands of their supposed enemy and secret friend, they were beaten with the loss of all their ships, and almost all their men, while the faithless Miran now surrounded their settlement with his cavalry, breathing fire and slaughter against those Chinsura cowards.' There was nothing left for the unfortunate Dutch but to confess their error and accept the terms which the English imposed on them in the Nawab's

name.

A system which could only be maintained by such tours-de-force was evidently unworkable except in the most skilful hands. In January 1760, Clive went home to rest on his well-gilded laurels, leaving the government of Calcutta in the hands of Holwell and Caillaud, until the newly-appointed President, Vansittart, should arrive from the Coast. Holwell was a man of great intellectual ability; Caillaud was an agreeable man and a good soldier; but both were sadly lacking in Clive's force of

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character and honesty of purpose. Behar was invaded by a wandering princelet from Delhi; and, though Caillaud beat the invader whenever he could come up with him, he failed to secure any decisive success because he could not induce Miran and his cavalry to act with vigour. The Nawab, as soon as Clive's influence was removed, again allowed his payments to the English to fall into arrears. Within three months Holwell had resolved that a new revolution was inevitable. Moreover, his acute mind discerned that it would be quite useless to pull down one Nawab only to establish another. More was needed than a mere change of persons. We could never be possessed,' he wrote, 'of a more just or favourable opportunity to carry into execution what must be done, I plainly see, one time or other . . . to wit, take this country into our own hands.' But, however clearly he saw what ought to be done, his want of character led him into conduct which irretrievably ruined his good name. Miran died in the middle of 1760; and at once there stood forth as candidate for the Nawab's succession the most finished politician of his age, the Nawab's sonin-law, Mir Kasim. He immediately entered into correspondence with Holwell, and, as we shall see, converted him from the views which he had at one time entertained.

In the following August Vansittart arrived from Madras, and naturally enough consulted Holwell and Caillaud regarding the situation in Bengal. It was decided to give Mir Kasim the whole power of the Nawab, leaving to Mir Jaffar the name only. The maintenance of the English troops was to be assured by the grant of certain districts which were to be entirely under English management; and the Company's immediate necessities were to be provided for by the payment of a considerable sum of money. When the old Nawab refused his consent, declaring that his life would not be worth a week's purchase, he was allowed to retire to Calcutta, and Mir Kasim reigned in his stead.

Although every one concerned in this revolution of 1760 knew perfectly well that Mir Kasim would in due time give solid proof of his gratitude to those who had made him Nawab, it is probable that only one was actuated by corrupt motives. After all, as an acute observer has said, those who wished to make unlawful

fortunes had many ways open to them, far more convenient than this public method of a revolution. But Holwell was on the point of going home; it was the last chance he had of a considerable coup; and to him Mir Kasim's generosity was swifter than to any one else. There is no other explanation of the change in his views. He had been convinced of the futility of changing one Nawab for another; but, on Vansittart's arrival, he advocated the claims of Mir Kasim to be the Nawab's deputy, knowing full well that Mir Jaffar could not possibly agree to the appointment, and that the proposal would lead inevitably to the substitution of the former for the latter.

Vansittart doubtless believed that in replacing Mir Jaffar's incompetence by Mir Kasim's energy he was achieving a great stroke of policy; but, from this moment, we can trace a steady, unceasing effort to escape from English control. Thus the capital was removed from Murshidabad to the distant city of Monghyr. He had promised to reduce his troops to 6,000 horse; but instead set about augmenting the forces, training them after the European model, and establishing factories for cannon and small arms. He had agreed that the English should assist the wandering Emperor Shah Alam to recover the throne of Delhi, but intrigued so industriously that Shah Alam departed without a single EnglishHe insisted that the commanders of the English forces should be placed under his orders; he affected to regard them as mere mercenaries in his pay; and the least hint of independent volition on their part was declared to be a studied insult to his authority.

man.

Two matters deserve something more than a passing mention. One was the question of Ram Narayan, whom the English had maintained in Behar ever since 1757. At first Vansittart followed Clive's policy, and repeatedly assured him of English protection. But Mir Kasim had long nursed a grudge against the man whom he had twice tried to supplant. In the face of his repeated complaints, Vansittart and his committee gave way, and at last, after long hesitation, delivered Ram Narayan into the Nawab's hands. When as much money as possible had been extorted from him, he was put to death as a signal proof that English protection availed Vol. 232.-No. 460.

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little against the Nawab's hostility. None can now tell whether the deputy's conduct had been unusually corrupt; but, in any case, the least that Vansittart could have done was to offer him an asylum in Calcutta.

The other matter was the Inland Trade, which Mir Kasim began to obstruct in December 1761, and to complain of in the following May. A careful examination of the facts shows that this matter was not quite as it is usually represented. The old farmans, under which the English had formerly traded in Bengal, had never drawn any distinction between goods intended for export and goods intended for consumption in the country; but, in practice, the former Nawabs had prevented the English from trading in the second sort, and on one occasion had compelled the English chief of Kasimbazar to sign a renunciation of all right to take part in inland trade. To the English this had always appeared a grievance; and in 1757 Clive had been instructed to see that Mir Jaffar's parawana should abrogate the renunciation. The parawana reads: 'Whatever goods the Company's gumastahs may bring or carry to or from their factories. you shall neither ask for nor receive any sum, however trifling, on the same. .. Whoever acts contrary to these orders, the English have power to punish them.'

At a later date Clive denied that he had allowed the English to trade in articles of internal consumption during his first government. Be that as it may, they did so, for at the end of 1759 Mir Jaffar complained of the extent to which the privilege was carried, and was referred by Clive to the Council for an answer. Under Holwell and Vansittart it was certainly allowed; and Mir Kasim not only accepted the nawabship with a full knowledge of this practice, but allowed it to continue without protest for almost two years. This explains why his attacks on this valued but impolitic privilege were so bitterly resented by the English.

Another point arises in this connexion. Mir Kasim suddenly objected to the English custom of punishing the revenue-people who invaded their privileges. We have seen that this was expressly authorised by Mir Jaffar's parawana of 1757. More than that, it was an admitted principle of action. Hastings writes in 1759: