and Ireland. In any case, the amount of autonomy proposed for Ireland has never depended on whether Ireland was or was not to be represented in the Imperial Parliament. Isaac Butt's scheme of Federal Home Rule involved a far fuller measure of self-government than did the scheme of 1886, under which Ireland was not to be represented at Westminster. Again, though such representation was conceded in 1893 and 1914, the powers then given were certainly not less than the powers of 1886. Moreover, if the powers recommended by the Convention and the League are given, they would not become less because representation at Westminster is also given.

The argument, however, against representation that appeals to thinking men in Ireland is the view which Parnell advanced in 1886 but withdrew two years laterthat Ireland needs the best brains of her sons, and that representation in Imperial Parliament would divert the mind of Ireland from Dublin to Westminster. Exclusion from Westminster seems, however, more likely to divert the attention of Irishmen, especially the men of the Irish Parliament, from Irish affairs. If Ireland had no voice in a Parliament which controlled foreign and colonial affairs, peace and war, defence, etc., an Irish Parliament might well feel itself compelled to discuss these matters, which might vitally affect Ireland, and towards which she would be paying a contribution. The fact that there would be no other way of 'voicing' Irish opinion would almost inevitably lead to discussions in College Green of motions expressing Irish opinion on the policy of the Imperial Parliament; and Irish Ministers would be more than human if they did not sometimes, when the opposition threatened trouble, yield to the temptation thus held out to them to busy giddy minds with foreign quarrels.' No doubt, the cessation of Irish representation proposed by the Irish Dominion League would be a real concession to Sinn Fein prejudice against the retention by Ireland of her place in the Empire, but it has little else to recommend it. It certainly runs counter to the views of over a quarter of a million Southern Unionists, whose spokesman in the Convention declared that representation at Westminster was a sine quâ non of their acceptance of Home Rule, and to the opinion of most federalists, who regard it as a retrograde proposal.

The question of the federalisation of Ireland is comparatively simple. It means the establishment, in addition to an All-Ireland Parliament, of two or more provincial legislatures, and the division between the central Irish Parliament and these provincial legislatures of all powers not reserved to the Imperial Parliament. Even with a grant of the fullest possible powers of self-government, one parliament and one government would, from an administrative point of view, be quite sufficient for Ireland. Any decentralisation which might be required could be fully met by a moderate extension of. the existing system of local government. The truth is that almost the sole reason why the federalisation of Ireland, or any form of home rule within home rule,' has been advocated is that some people regard the establishment of provincial legislatures as a means of meeting the Ulster objection to Home Rule. It is no secret that the matter was discussed in the Convention, but allowed to drop, as no encouragement was forthcoming for the idea that the grant of autonomy to Ulster in respect of the matters to be assigned to provincial legislatures would diminish the objection of Ulster to the control of other matters by an All-Ireland Parliament. It was, however, revived by the Irish Centre Party under the leadership of Captain Gwynn; and its claim for consideration has been strengthened by the fact that it is the central feature of the scheme advocated by 'The Times.'

It may be said at once that this scheme is well thought out, and that the author frankly faces the difficulties of the situation with definite suggestions, instead of turning them aside with a phrase, as do most English federalists and Irish constitution-makers, not excluding Sinn Fein republicans. The source from which the scheme emanates has secured for it adequate publicity in England; and in Ireland it has been received, to use the words of The Irish Statesman,' as 'an overture honestly made and made in the grand style.' The scheme suggests the immediate establishment of two state or provincial legislatures in Ireland, one for Ulster and one for the other three provinces, with power over such matters as agriculture, fisheries, technical instruction, municipal interests and local government, local works

and undertakings, licensing, hospitals and charitable institutions, direct taxation for provincial purposes, control of provincial revenues, borrowing on the sole credit of the province, factory legislation and private bill legislation in matters affecting the province. It may be noted that these powers are roughly comparable with the powers possessed by the provincial legislatures in Canada, though considerably less than the powers possessed by an American or Australian State. An All-Ireland Parliament is also to be established, but is to be endowed with power only at some later date. The powers suggested for this parliament are substantially the powers recommended by the Irish Convention, minus the powers mentioned above as assigned to provincial legislatures. The scheme, so far as it has been outlined above, contains nothing new. It is certainly federal, and would possibly be acquiesced in by Nationalists if acceptable to Ulster-a point which will be shortly considered; but it contains three additional features, one of them novel, which entirely alter the situation and call for consideration.

*

In the first place, the Irish Parliament is to be composed of representatives of Ulster and of the rest of Ireland in equal numbers. The Nationalists showed in the Convention that they were quite ready to give both Northern and Southern Unionists generous representation in an Irish Parliament, far in excess of what would be justified by population; but it seems an extreme measure to give one and a half million people in the North of Ireland the same weight as nearly three million people elsewhere. Still, it might be accepted if it would content Ulster.

In the second place, the Ulster state or provincial legislature is to have a perpetual veto on every legislative measure of the Irish Parliament and every administrative act of the Irish Government, so far as Ulster is concerned. It is known that it was suggested in the Convention that the members representing each province

Treason felony, trade marks, alienage and naturalisation, quarantine and navigation, are the only matters placed under Irish control in the Convention's scheme which are reserved to Imperial Parliament in the 'Times' scheme.

in the Irish Parliament should be constituted into a provincial Grand Committee with special powers of veto, and possibly of initiative, in respect of legislation and administration, so far as that province was concerned'; and it is stated that a scheme was worked out by Lord MacDonnell (Report, p. 10). It seems almost impossible to give one province an absolute veto, so far as that province is concerned, over all Irish legislation, and it would obviously be hard to make any administrative veto workable in practice; but still the suggestion might, with modifications, be accepted by Ireland if it would placate Ulster.

The third special feature of the 'Times' scheme is new, but apparently impossible of acceptance. It is an essential part of the plan that all the matters indicated for control by the Irish Parliament are to remain under the exclusive control of the Imperial Parliament unless and until both the state or provincial legislatures assent to the transfer of some or all of these powers to the Irish Parliament, which until that event would be a mere debating society. Until Ulster consents, the Irish Parliament could not, to take an example, amend the National Health Insurance Acts or control their administration; so long as Ulster objects, the Irish canals, to take another illustration, must remain under the exclusive control of the Imperial Parliament and the Executive responsible thereto. This would never do. At present, though Ulster blocks the way, it does not claim to exercise a veto over the enjoyment of autonomy by the rest of Ireland. Its claim is confined to Ulster, and is based not on an Act of Parliament, but mainly on undertakings of certain ministers and ex-ministers. Constitutional Nationalists now deny the reasonableness of this veto and the sanctity of these undertakings. It seems futile to expect them to accept an arrangement under which Ulster's veto is to be given statutory recognition and extended to the whole of Ireland.

If this-in the eyes of the Nationalists-radical defect were removed, and the perpetual veto on legislation and administration modified, the general scheme might be accepted, if it disarmed Ulster's hostility to Home Rule. This could be the only reason for dividing Ireland (for certain purposes) into two states, for there is no real

need, apart from the Ulster question, for the multiplication of legislatures in Ireland. Moreover, differences in both law and administration between Ulster and the rest of Ireland, in some of the matters suggested for provincial control, might be productive of much inconvenience in view of Ulster's artificial frontier; * and the settlement of provincial finance is notoriously difficult.

There does not, however, seem to be the slightest reason for imagining that Ulster's objection to the establishment of an All-Ireland Parliament would be to any appreciable extent diminished by the assignment to an Ulster provincial legislature of the matters suggested by The Times.' It is not about these matters that the soul of Ulster is mostly vexed; it is about taxation (especially customs and excise), trade, railways, education, etc.; and these matters are, under the 'Times' scheme and every quasi-federal scheme as yet suggested, to be controlled by the All-Ireland Parliament. Ulster might, of course, be placated if these and all the other matters about which it is apprehensive were transferred from the Imperial Parliament, not to the central Irish Parliament but to the provincial legislatures; but that would be only thinly veiled partition. That policy may be good or bad, inevitable or impossible, workable or unworkable, but it is not the 'Times' scheme, nor is it federal, and it is therefore outside the scope of this article. The conclusion seems inevitable that, while the solution of the future relations between Great Britain and Ireland may be found in federalism, no federalisation of Ireland, which would leave the central Irish Parliament any genuine power, seems to offer any real hope of affording a modus vivendi between Ulster and the rest of Ireland.

The outbreak a few years ago of foot-and-mouth disease illustrates how easily inconvenience might become disaster if dual control within Ireland of the greatest national industry were permitted. Incidentally it may be noted that similar dangers are inevitable under all schemes of partition.