uses for wooden ships in the coasting trade of the United States. If these were entirely excluded, the American seagoing tonnage would be reduced to 8,426,000 tons, as compared with 16,267,000 tons for the United Kingdom.

Lloyd's Register makes a very striking comparison between the relative positions of the United Kingdom and United States in 1919 and 1914. In the earlier year 416 per cent. of the world's tonnage was owned in the United Kingdom, and 4:46 per cent. consisted of the seagoing tonnage of the United States. At the present time, the United Kingdom owns 34.1 per cent. and the United States 24.9 per cent., including 20-4 per cent. of the seagoing tonnage. These United States figures include wooden shipping.

An interesting calculation is made by the Register to show the real effect of the war on the world's Merchant Marine. The calculation is made on the assumption that the percentage of addition to the world's tonnage would have continued at the ratio (a decreasing one) recorded during the last fifteen pre-war years, and that countries in which there had been a large addition of tonnage during the previous quinquennial period might be expected to show a reduction in the ratio of increase. The conclusion is reached that the real loss of British tonnage was 5,202,000 tons, and that of foreign tonnage, excluding the United States, 9,000,000 tons, making a total loss for the world of 14,202,000 tons. The net gain to the United States is put at 6,729,000 tons, thus reducing the net world's loss to 7,473,000 tons. It will therefore be seen that by far the largest loss was incurred by the United Kingdom. Excluding enemy countries, the greatest sufferers on this basis after the United Kingdom were Norway, which lost over 1,000,000 tons; Italy to the extent of 677,000 tons; and France, which lost 536,000 tons. Further, there is a hidden loss, through depreciation in the efficiency of ships by special strain, and also owing to the fact that a large proportion of the tonnage built during the war was not equal in general efficiency to that completed in the few years previous to the war. The Register does not, however, attempt to estimate the full extent of the depreciation, and considers it reasonable to assume that the world has actually lost through the war 8,500,000 tons gross of shipping,

representing a deadweight carrying capacity of about 12,500,000 tons.

The enormous increase in the American Mercantile Marine is of course due mainly to the great ship-building crusade of 1917-18; and the progress of this wonderful development should be studied in detail. Last year the output of tonnage of the United States amounted to 3,033,000 tons, in comparison with only 1,348,000 tons gross launched in the United Kingdom. Our losses amounted to about 1,940,000, and so substantially exceeded our new construction. The output in the United Kingdom fell far below that anticipated by the then First Lord of Admiralty (Sir Eric Geddes) in the spring of last year. That estimate was for 1,800,000 tons, whereas in the best year yet experienced-1913-approximately 2,000,000 tons were produced. By the spring of last year the Government had at last been aroused to an appreciation of the urgent need of maximum output; and but for the strong agitation the output must have been far smaller. Nothing like the 1913 total can be expected for 1919, although the recent decision to reduce warship construction should leave an opening for much more merchant building than has hitherto been practicable. The decline in the share of the world's shipping taken by the United Kingdom was shown in the tables issued by Lloyd's Register early in the year. During the five years 1894-98 the share of the United Kingdom amounted to 744 per cent. of the total output. In the following quinquennial periods the proportion was 60 per cent., 59.8 per cent., and 61 per cent. respectively, thus showing that for the fifteen years 1899-1913 the share of the United Kingdom was quite 60 per cent. During the war years 1914-18 only 38.6 per cent. of the world's output of mercantile tonnage was launched in the United Kingdom. The diminution was really the more striking because the figures of the total output for the world during the war did not include the production in Germany and AustriaHungary, whereas in the earlier years the figures for these countries were included.

It is, of course, true that, but for the absorption of the ship yards of the country on naval work, the production of British yards during the war period would have been very much greater. Here, again, in constructing

warships which were at the service not only of herself but also of the Allies and Associated Nations, Great Britain did not think of after-war conditions. These conditions have now to be faced.

For trustworthy figures of present construction we again have to rely upon Lloyd's Register. The last returns available are those for the quarter ended June 30. There were then under construction in the United Kingdom 782 vessels of 2,524,000 tons gross, showing an increase of 269,000 tons as compared with the March quarter, and 709,000 as compared with June 1918. These figures compare with 994 vessels of 3,874,000 tons under construction in the United States. The tonnage building in the United States is consequently 1,350,000 tons more than in this country. Comparing steel ships alone, there are now building in this country 711 steamers of 2,492,000 tons, as compared with 680 steel steamers of 3,165,000 tons building in the United States. Taking steel steamers alone, the tonnage building in the United States is thus still larger than that under construction in this country, although the number of ships is not quite as great. In the American figures 133 steamers of 326,000 tons building on the Great Lakes of North America are included, because the great majority of steamers building lately on the Great Lakes have been for ocean service.

The total tonnage under construction abroad now amounts to 5,494,000 tons. This, with the 2,524,000 tons building in the United Kingdom, gives a total under construction of 8,018,000 tons. It is generally found, at any rate in normal times, that an amount of tonnage equal to that under construction at the end of any quarter is launched within the ensuing twelve months. It is therefore reasonable to assume that a year hence there will be in the water an additional 8,000,000 tons of shipping. This, it will be noticed, falls not far short of the amount of tonnage by which the world is now the poorer in consequence of the war. In other words, a year hence the mercantile marine of the world should represent nearly the amount of tonnage which would have been in existence if there had been no war. One great change brought about will, however, be that a much larger share of the ownership will rest with

countries other than Great Britain. Further, the tonnage now under construction, especially abroad, is largely cargo shipping; and, in order to maintain mail and passenger services, Great Britain must build a very large amount of high-class shipping, her liner fleet having been most seriously depleted.

Freights are still high, and, but for new factors which have been introduced, a substantial reduction might reasonably have been anticipated. One of these chief factors is the heavy cost of shipbuilding, common to all countries. In this country it now costs three or four times the pre-war price. How this high price affects freights may be illustrated by an example. A cargo vessel of refrigerated type may have cost 135,000l. to build before the war. The estimate for building such a vessel to-day on the time and line basis would be 500,000l. If interest on this money be calculated at the rate of 5 per cent. and depreciation at the rate of 5 per cent. which, in view of the inflated price is probably far too low, 10 per cent. on this money, representing 50,000Z. a year, has to be earned before working expenses begin. These expenses include wages, coal, stores, port dues and pilotage, etc., and are all now on a high scale. A vessel of this type can only be expected to make two round voyages to New Zealand and back in a year, upon which this great sum of money has to be earned. For some months past, vessels have been proceeding to Australasia with very little if any cargo, so that practically the whole amount has to be earned on the two homeward voyages.

Considering the enormous shipbuilding costs to be faced, the prospect of low freights does not seem promising. British shipping companies have in the past been able to rely upon carrying at rates much below those of most other nations, although the working costs of the Scandinavian countries have been lower. Shipbuilding costs in this country, for instance, are now not much lower than in the United States. The costs of construction in the two countries have been gradually approaching the same level-a fact of immense significance. In view of the greatly increased cost of building, it will be in the interest of shipowners in all countries to maintain freights for some time to come on a fairly high level.

Yet, when the competition of much new tonnage prepares the way for falling freights, some of the foreign mercantile marines may find themselves in a more favourable position than our own to meet it. The neutral countries have, ever since the outbreak of the war, been able to earn higher freights, because they were not controlled by Government. British shipping is still so controlled. The continuance of control, which takes the form of direction of voyages and licensing, is a subject often discussed in the shipping exchanges. Every shipping man would like to see control lifted, for he knows that there will be little opportunity for the enterprise by means of which British shipping obtained its former pre-eminent position until it is removed. But the fact has to be recognised that control of food and control of shipping are closely linked together. Thus, all wheat imports are still in the hands of the Wheat Commission; and vessels are directed to load wheat at the various ports at fixed rates. The alternative would be for the Wheat Commission to go into the market and bid for tonnage. Presumably freight rates would rise. At present vessels are directed to load wheat in Argentina at 62s. 6d. per ton or in Australia at 105s. per ton. Many steamers were lately directed to proceed to load at Canadian ports before the closing of river navigation for the season at 10s. per quarter. These rates, although high as compared with pre-war terms, are considered to leave only a small profit, even though the steamers may be able to load a cargo of coals for South America at 40s. a ton. Foreign ships, uncontrolled, are able to secure an advantage of 51. per ton or more for the voyage from South America to the Continent, as compared with the corresponding voyage of British ships to the United Kingdom. The rates in other trades show similar discrepancies; and in all cases the advantage to the foreign ships may amount to a great many thousands of pounds for practically the same voyage. For bunker coals as much as 60s. a ton has now to be paid. The American ships can bunker in United States ports at the equivalent of 25s. a ton.

While British ships are controlled in this way, foreign vessels can go where they please and earn the highest freight they can. The discrepancy is again made clear