in the electoral-vote system; that is, these States have a greater proportional voice in determining the outcome of a presidential election than they would if the election were conducted on the basis of direct popular vote.

Thus, the influence of these States would decline-both nationally and within their party organizations-if the present system were scrapped in favor of the direct popular vote. I would submit that with this many States in jeopardy of declining political influence, the chances of the Congress approving the direct popular election are, putting it optimistically, extremely slim-if not hopeless. I would return to another concern of the Framers of the Constitution when they considered the direct popular election: the unlikelihood of any candidate receiving a majority. If we had a direct popular election, would we require that the winning candidate receive more than 50 per cent of the total vote? If we did, then we face the expense and uncertainty of runoff elections-not on a statewide basis, but on a national basis. If we did not, then where would we set the figure? Forty-five per cent? Forty per cent? Less? Abraham Lincoln was elected President of the United States in 1860 with 39.8 per cent of the popular votes. But he received a majority of the electoral votes and became one of the greatest Presidents in our history. Had there been a runoff, he probably would have been defeated—and perhaps there would be no union today.

The obvious answer is that to have a direct popular election, we would have to require the winning candidate to secure either a fixed percentage of the votes, or simply to receive the greatest number of votes from among all the candidates. In either case, we would be risking taking a giant step down the road toward splinter parties, toward the multi-party mess that has plagued many European countries for years and which prevented the emergence of political stability. The two-party system is too important, too unique, too great a rudder of stability to risk for the sake of the theoretical perfection of the direct popular vote.

I stand with political philosophers like Edmund Burke who said, "People will not look forward to posterity who never look backward to their ancestors." What Burke was saying is that we must always seek to balance innovation with preservation; exploration with caution; and promulgation of the new with derivation from the old.

In 1956, a man stood on the floor of the United States Senate to argue against radical departure from our traditional system of electing the President. This is what he said:

"Today, we have a clearly federal system of electing our President, under which the States act as units. Today, we have the two-party system, under which third parties and splinter parties are effectively discouraged from playing more than a negligible role. Today, we have a system which—in all but one instance throughout our history-has given us Presidents elected by a plurality of the popular vote. . . . And today we have an electoral vote system which gives both large States and small States certain advantages and disadvantages that offset each other.

"Now it is proposed that we change all this. What the effects of these various changes will be on the federal system, the two-party system, the popular plurality system, and the large-State, small-State checks-and-balances system, no one knows. Nevertheless, it is proposed to exchange this system-under which we have, on the whole, obtained able Presidents capable of meeting the increased demands upon our Executive for an unknown, untried, but obviously precarious system. . . ."

The Senator was John Fitzgerald Kennedy who four years later would be elected President of the United States with more votes than his opponent, but with less than 50 per cent of the popular votes cast.

Senate Joint Resolution 58 provides for the elimination of electors, who have proven troublesome to carrying out the will of the people, and whose trend toward independence presents a clear and present danger to American tradition. But Senate Joint Resolution 58 would retain the tradition of the State-by-State unit vote which, though imperfect, has worked well and is, in my opinion, far safer than any of the proposed alternatives to the maintenance and development of American tradition.

The resolution also provides a more equitable plan of electing a President in the event no candidate receives a majority of the electoral votes. At present, the House of Representatives elects a President in this situation-but each State may cast only one vote. This means that the voice of our largest State would have no greater weight than that of our smallest. This, I believe, goes well beyond the

principle of large-State, small-State check-and-balance and grants too much influence to too few people.

Therefore, we propose a joint session of the House and the Senate in which each Member would cast one vote to select the President from among the three candidates receiving the greatest number of electoral votes.

We further propose in this resolution that in the event of the death of the President-elect between the day of the national election and the day on which the Congress certifies the electoral votes, the Vice President-elect shall be entitled to the electoral votes which otherwise would have been awarded to the President-elect. This is the same procedure now provided in the Constitution in the event the President-elect should die between the time Congress certifies the electoral votes and the day of the inauguration.

I want to assure my colleagues that the chair shall give earnest consideration to any and all testimony before this committee. The fact that Senate Joint Resolution 58 bears my name should not be construed as meaning my mind is closed to further argument.

I simply have stated my beliefs based on my study of the various factors weighed in the formulation of Senate Joint Resolution 58.

If it can be shown that the unit system presents greater danger to the nation than alternative procedures, I shall gladly alter my position. If it can be shown that the retention of electors is beneficial to the Nation, I shall gladly join those who would retain them.

I would like to close with this final thought: Let us not detest all change. But let us not be so enamored of change that we automatically equate it with progress.

Senator BAYH. The colleague from Nebraska has a statement before recognizing our first witness this morning.

Senator HRUSKA. Mr. Chairman, I will insert in the record at this point a statement which I have prepared and thereby we will get to the distinguished Senator from Florida in a hurry because I know he has words of great encouragement and wisdom for us today. So I will submit this statement for the record by way of preliminary. Mr. Chairman.

Senator BAYH. The record will indicate the statement has been read before the subcommittee, and we will put it in, Mr. Reporter.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROMAN L. HRUSKA, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF NEBRASKA

Senator HRUSKA. Mr. Chairman, it has become increasingly apparent that there is a need to reform our system of electing Presidents. In these complex times, it is vitally important that there be an accurate expression of the will of the voters not only in the election of those who represent their State, but also in the national elections.

The "general ticket" or unit system which we now have was not comprehended by our founding fathers and is not in keeping with our current belief that each man's voice in the affairs of his government should be maximized. The "winner-take-all" result under the unit system is generally recognized to create a litany of abuses. They can be listed in these general categories: (1) disfranchisement of minority voters in every State, (2) creation of the possibility of minority Presidents, (3) disproportionate attention being paid to pivotal States at the expense of the smaller States, (4) thwarting of the development of the two-party system in "sure" States, (5) magnification of both the temptation for and the effect of vote fraud in closely contested pivotal States and subject the results in whole States to vagaries of accidents of nature, (6) the vesting in minority and pressure groups unwarranted power in States where the outcome is in doubt.

The problems which have arisen under the unit system point up the need for effective reform and should preclude any thoughts regarding a constitutional amendment which would weld this manner of selecting Presidents into our Constitution. For this reason, this Senator will oppose the approach contained in Senate Joint Resolution 58. Adoption of this resolution would give constitutional cognizance and approval for the first time in our history-to the "general ticket" system, which gives all of a State's electoral votes to the popular vote winner while totally disregarding the minority vote.

In searching for an appropriate vehicle through which to effect this needed reform, several other approaches have been suggested.

The direct election plan, which is currently offered in Senate Joint Resolution 4, has been generally conceded to be unworkable and undesirable. It flies in the face of the concept of a federated republic for it would completely destroy the State as a political entity and would erase the weighted composition of the electoral college which was established by the authors of the Constitution to equalize the disadvantage under which the smaller States labor in national elections. As a practical matter, this approach would have little or no chance of ratification because 36 States would lose the added weight in the election of the President, which is provided them under the electoral college system.

Elimination of the "direct vote" concept leaves two other tacks which are available. One is the "Proportional Division of Electoral Votes" suggested by Senate Joint Resolutions 7 and 28. The other is the "District System" contained in Senate Joint Resolution 12 of which I am a cosponsor.

While the proportional approach would seem to be workable, it has disadvantages which make it less desirable than the district system so ably urged by Senator Mundt. The proportional plan would appear to encourage splinter parties as well as work to make the votes of oneparty States more attractive to and sought after by presidential candidates. It could also work a fundamental change in the voting practices within a State.

Senate Joint Resolution 12, on the other hand, would bring about the necessary reform with a minimum of change, and would tend to put every citizen of every State on the same basis in voting to elect a President. It provides that in every State a voter would cast his votes for three, and only three electors, two of them corresponding to his two U.S. Senators, to be elected at large, and one corresponding to his Representative in the House, to be chosen from his district.

The district plan would obviate, to a large extent, every difficulty posed by the existing system of electing Presidents. It would reflect more accurately the popular vote than does the present system. It would encourage two-party activity in the so-called one-party States for each district would have a voice in selecting the President.

This system would provide greater protection for the political power of small and sparsely populated States and areas and make them participants rather than onlookers in our national campaigns and elections. It would also equate the political pressures on the President with those felt by the Congress and result in a more responsive executive branch in the Government. No longer could the presidential candidates ignore large sections of the country nor could they concentrate

their efforts in a few pivotal States. There would be the additional benefit that candidates could more nearly be chosen on the basis of merit rather than geography.

Additionally, by preserving the electoral college, the district system would not represent a threat to the role of States in the presidential election or to State control over voting qualifications.

One of the major objections to the district system in the past has been the supposed difficulty which would result from the requirement of independent single-elector districts being established for the selec tion of the electors. Recent developments would indicate that this question has become largely moot. It would seem appropriate to consider revising Senate Joint Resolution 12 to provide that the single-elector districts would coincide with the congressional districts in each State. This amendment would now seem feasible for the Supreme Court in Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) held that congressional districts within a State are now required to be substantially equal in population. In response to this opinion the House passed H.R. 5505 last session. It requires congressional districts to be compact and to vary not more than 15 percent in population from the average district in the State. While the bill has not yet been acted on by the Senate, it has been ordered reported by the Judiciary Committee. The advancing state of the law is eliminating the possibility of flagrant malapportionment and gerrymandering of congressional districts.

By allowing the election of presidential electors from established districts, Senate Joint Resolution 12 would allow the needed reformation with very little upset in the established election procedures in the States.

Senate Joint Resolution 12 would also change the procedure under which the President and Vice President are elected by the Congress if no major party candidate receives a majority of the electoral vote. At present, in such a contingency, the President is elected by the House with each State entitled to one vote for the presidential candidates with the three highest numbers of electoral votes. If a State's House delegation is evenly split between the two major parties, its vote does not count. This procedure is obviously unfair to the larger States.

Senate Joint Resolution 12 corrects this situation. It provides that. in the event no candidate receives a majority of the electoral votes, Congress shall meet in joint session and elect a President and Vice President. In this joint session, each Senator and Representative would have one vote.

It also provides for the binding of the electors so that they must accurately reflect the popular will of the voters.

Mr. Chairman, it is my hope that Senate Joint Resolution 12 will receive careful consideration by the subcommittee and that it can be favorably reported to the Senate for early action.

Senator BAYн. Senator Ervin also has a statement which he has asked me to place in the record. Since he has a conflicting committed meeting his statement shall also be placed in the record at this point.

STATEMENT OF HON. SAM J. ERVIN, JR., A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF

NORTH CAROLINA

Mr. Chairman, as you know, I have joined Senators Dodd, Sparkman, and Saltonstall in sponsoring Senate Joint Resolution 138, to abolish the electora college and institute a proportional method of casting electoral votes.

This proposal is substantially similar to other measures which we have introduced individually in the past. However, none of us claim pride of authorship since this is much the same resolution as the so-called "Lodge-Gossett Amendment", which this subcommittee has examined exhaustively on many occasions. With each successive examination, I have become more convinced that this is the best possible answer to a great constitutional issue.

Our proposal will accomplish a number of reforms while avoiding the pitfalls inherent in each of the other resolutions that have been introduced.

First, we would abolish the electoral college which has been a useless appendage to our governmental institutions since the rise of political parties. Legally, the elector still stands where the Constitution placed him: an officer in whom rests the awesome discretion as to who shall lead the most powerful nation in the world. In many States, however, the elector is nothing more or less than the recipient of an empty honor gratefully given for long and faithful service to a political party. But whatever the qualifications of the electors, few of us now believe that any man or any few hundred men, no matter how wise or faithful, should be entrusted to make our greatest decision. We, therefore, assume that they are under a moral obligation to vote for their party's nominees. But ours is a Nation of written laws and not of moral imperatives, and the language of the Constitution should be made to conform to what the overwhelming majority of citizens know is correct.

Second, we would also abolish the unit-rule system of counting electoral votes. This system, which completely disfranchises those who did not vote for the winner within their state, is indefensible. It requires candidates to concentrate on the large, pivotal States where elections are historically closely contested to the exclusion of smaller states and one-party states. It encourages the formation of third parties and of bloc-voting since a small group can often determine the course of the entire electoral vote of a large state. This is precisely the same unit-rule system which many found invidious in Georgia. I personally feel that Georgians are perfectly capable of deciding what is best for themselves, but it is for us to propose what we think is best for the country. In a case challenging Georgia's unit-rule, the courts found that the system was a denial of equal protection of laws. Certainly those who hailed that decision should support this amendment. Since it provides that electoral votes would be cast in proportion to the popular vote in each state, every man would have a voice in the election, and candidates would solicit the vote of every man in every State.

In 1956, the late President Kennedy led the eloquent and successful Senate opposition to an earlier version of this Amendment. At that time, he frankly admitted our present system forces candidates to look to the large States in drafting platforms, nominating candidates, and running campaigns. It was his thesis that urban interests are justified in having this power because State legislatures and the National House of Representatives were, allegedly, through gerrymandering, far overbalanced in favor of rural interests. Whatever the validity of this argument may have been in 1956, "one man, one vote" is clearly the law of the land today, and population is the only constitutionally permissible consideration a State may use in drawing districts for either house of its own Legislature or for the seats of its congressional delegation. Since the objection that was raised in 1956 is no longer valid, I would trust and hope that those who embraced it then will join us now.

Third, our resolution proposes that if no candidate receives 40 per cent of the total electoral votes, the election would be decided by the Senate and House in joint session, with each Senator and Representative having one vote. This would eliminate the undemocratic and unfair method according to which each State delegation-no matter how large or small the State may be-would have one vote in elections thrown into the House. By the reduction of the percentage of electoral votes required for election, we would also reduce the threat of elections being decided by Congress instead of the people and the threat of multiple parties.

Before concluding, I would like to mention three other proposals which have received serious consideration over the years. One of the most appealing, on its face, and the one closest to ours in principle is the direct election approach. Except to say that our amendment has the advantage of preserving the identity of the States in the Presidential electoral process, I will not discuss the merits of direct election, because, frankly, I believe there is no chance of ratification. The legislatures of three-fourths of the States are not going to vote away the added advantage of the two additional electoral votes granted them by reason of senatorial representation which benefit the great maio ty of States.

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