So I am due in New York 4 hours later, 3 hours later, and so they start looking for me somewhere between Macon and New York. Therefore, when we start taking a look at this whole thing in its entirety, a flight plan is not really going to be the total answer by any stretch of the imagination.

If I file an IFR flight plan, no flight service station in the United States can tell you where I am. They don't know when I am going or how I get there; they don't even know if I left. The only guy that knows is the one in ATC. They are the people who know where we are at. Our system as it now exists just will not provide us with what we are looking for.

Mr. EVANS. Let me ask you this, now: Of course, I recognize that we have got a number of planes that are going to fly in under the radar through the ADIZ. But in the event that we did require the flight plan and in the event that you received a call that a plane was about to penetrate within 10 or 15 minutes, I assume that the FAA would get an identification number, whatever the number of the plane was. They could, I guess, have access to where that plane was going. If a flight plan was required, they could ask of that individual where they were going. Would that be permissible?

Mr. MURVALE BELSON. Certainly; yes.

Mr. EVANS. If no flight plan had been filed, then there would be, because in connection with intelligence operations, if you were able to get information that illegal activity was supposed to be in that area at a certain time, you would have at least a lead that that may be the plane you were looking for, especially where there was no flight plan filed.

Mr. MURVALE BELSON. Now, are we talking about a domestic deal here or an ADIZ situation?

Mr. EVANS. We are talking about ADIZ?

Mr. MURVALE BELSON. None of the ADIZ business. You must, if you are going about this legally, give a penetration time to the controller. And if you are coming out of the south, you are dealing with Miami center, oceanic control, either Miami or New York. So, therefore, you give the number of your airplane and your penetration time and your estimated time of arrival at port of entry where you must undergo customs.

So, as Glenn was saying here, if you have one in trail and he falls right in behind you, here you go. He can drive right on in. And so as you begin your letdown into the coastal area, you come right down together. And you get down underneath the radar bit, and as you pass over an airport, your buddy does a 180 and lands, and you keep right on going down to St. Lucy, to the customs folks, and let them take a look at you.

Mr. EVANS. So there are a number of ways you can avoid the thing? Mr. MURVALE BELSON. In each case, I have filed a flight plan and done all the things I am supposed to do. And they have kept track of me, but they haven't kept track of this other guy.

Now, from the standpoint of safety and the welfare of the individuals, a flight plan is fine. It is absolutely superior. It may save your life if you have an accident. But I don't think that it is the answer to the interdiction or the interception or control. It may help.

Mr. EVANS. Is there any way you can tell if the person gave the wrong identification number?

Mr. MURVALE BELSON. No; no way.

Mr. EVANS. There is one other question I have of any of you who would care to answer. And that is, recognizing the equipment and technology available to the military, is there any way if the military assists, if posse comitatus would allow that assistance to law enforcement in the drug area?

Mr. Glenn Belson.

Mr. GLENN BELSON. Sir, I believe if you get the Navy aircraft out on shuttle patrols, if you get the aircraft carriers and ships equipped with radar, when they are on the shuttle patrols, you would have detection from the surface.

Mr. EVANS. In the event that you had that assistance, would not that have to be coupled with assistance or intelligence from the various agencies looking for a particular plane or otherwise would you not have so many blips and so many planes and everything that it would bo impossible to keep up with them?

Mr. GLENN BELSON. You would have to segregate your traffic and identify each one.

Mr. EVANS. So that really it would be a great deal of assistance in aiding the proper intelligence or surveillance if requested?

Mr. GLENN BELSON. If there were another way of doing it, if there were certain points or fixes that penetrating aircraft had to come over as though you were beginning a funnel and each aircraft channeled through the funnel at their particular point, then you may have an opportunity to selectively identify each aircraft.

Mr. EVANS. But you see a potential for a great deal of assistance from the military?

Mr. GLENN BELSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. EVANS. Would you agree with that, Murve?

Mr. MURVALE BELSON. I would think so.

Mr. EVANS. How about you?

Mr. ELDER. I certainly would think so. If I were a U.S. Government, U.S. Army and Air Force, if they don't have sophisticated equipment that could assist us, we are in bad shape, Congressman. Mr. EVANS. Yes; we appreciate your testimony. You have been a great deal of help to us. And thank you.

Mr. ELDER. Thank you, I enjoyed meeting you.

[Mr. Murvale Belson's prepared statement appears on p. 167.] Mr. EVANS. Our next panel includes Mr. Louis J. Cardinali, director of the southern region of the Federal Aviation Administration; Mr. John Keyser, regional counsel, Mr. Daniel E. Carr who is on the staff, and Mr. James E. Purcell, chief of the Flight Standards Division.

Gentlemen, we appreciate your attending these hearings today. At this time, Mr. Cardinali, if you have a statement, you may proceed as soon as we have sworn you.

[Mr. Cardinali, Mr. Keyser, Mr. Carr, and Mr. Purcell were sworn by Mr. Evans.]

Mr. EVANS. If you will give your statement, Mr. Cardinali, we will be open for the complete statement and proceed to questions.

TESTIMONY OF LOUIS J. CARDINALI, DIRECTOR, SOUTHERN REGION, FAA, ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN KEYSER, REGIONAL COUNSEL; DANIEL E. CARR, STAFF; AND JAMES E. PURCELL, CHIEF, FLIGHT STANDARDS DIVISION

Mr. CARDINALI. Mr. Congressman, my name is Louis J. Cardinali. I am director of the southern region of the Federal Aviation Administration in Atlanta, Ga. We are pleased to assist the committee in its identification and evaluation of the extent of the international drug traffic into the State of Georgia and of the effectiveness of Federal and local law enforcement to combat these illicit activities.

Although the Federal Aviation Administration is designed and devoted to the furtherance of aviation safety and has no direct responsibility for enforcing the drug and narcotics laws of the United States, we do help other State and Federal agencies who bear this responsibility in any way we can. We are aware of the drug problem and have devoted substantial manpower and effort to assist those who are directly involved.

We do have certain helpful statutes and regulations. For example, two sections of the Federal aviation regulations provide that no person who is convicted of violating any Federal or State statute relating to the growing, processing, manufacture, sale, disposition, possession, transportation or importation of narcotic drugs, marihuana, and depressant or stimulant drugs or substances is eligible for any pilot or mechanic certificate or rating issued by the FAA for a period of 1 year after the date of final conviction.

Moreover, no person who commits an act prohibited by another section of the regulations dealing with unlawful transportation of drugs by aircraft is eligible for any certificate or rating for a period of 1 year after the date of that act.

In addition to denial of new applicants, the final convictions and illicit carriage also form the basis for suspension or revocation of pilot or mechanic certificates and ratings.

Although these regulations deal with the carriage or possession of narcotics and final conviction of drug laws, they are designed to promote aviation safety. The underlying rationale associated with the promulgation of these rules was that those who partake of this kind of conduct are likely to ignore or violate air safety regulations. A common practice of the drug runner is to fly his aircraft low and unlighted. They frequently land on unimproved, unsafe landing strips to avoid detection. More often than not, the aircraft lack proper maintenance and crews are not properly qualified.

Our statute contains certain prohibitions against acts that may be related to drug trafficking. For example, people who haul drugs sometimes forge or counterfeit certificates and falsely mark aircraft so as to avoid detection. Section 902(b) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 as amended [49 U.S.C. 1472(b)] imposes felony sanctions for those who knowingly and willfully forge, counterfeit, alter or falsely make any certificate authorized to be issued under the act, or who knowingly and willfully display or cause to be displayed on any aircraft any marks that are false or misleading as to the nationality or registration of the aircraft.

In addition to the regulations cited and the portions of the act about which we have talked, within our sphere of responsibility, we have assisted the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the U.S. Bureau of Customs, and various State and other Federal authorities, domestically and internationally. We do not have the power of arrest nor do we have authority to enter an aircraft without the owner's permission or physically restrain aircraft operations. Consequently, our ability to help is somewhat limited.

We have identified the operation of illicit drug aircraft, large and small, as one of four top safety priorities. Accidents involving these aircraft frequently are a threat to persons and property on the ground. Such aircraft are likely to be unairworthy; they are often improperly registered and operated by crews not qualified in the aircraft.

To cope with the drug problem, we have sponsored meetings in Georgia and Florida as well as elsewhere with law enforcement agencies. We also have met with State aeronautics directors and are planning a 3-day seminar in May involving directors of civil aviation representing 17 Central and South American and Caribbean countries to discuss and deal with our aviation safety problems, many of which are drug related.

Our meetings have resulted in increased effectiveness in dealing with this problem through improved cooperation and coordination with local law enforcement agencies, DEA, Customs, and State bureaus of investigation. Additionally, we have designated an individual in the most affected regional headquarters as coordinator of large aircraft and drug-related operations and identified one inspector in each district office, as the coordinator for that district.

As an example of actions taken, we have established stringent procedures for complying with the rules regarding issuance of ferry permits for large aircraft. We believe that these efforts have reduced a number of unsafe illicit drug aircraft movements.

Additionally, there are a number of aircraft parked on airports which we suspect have been used for drug purposes where proper ownership of these aircraft cannot be determined; registration requirements have not been met, or airworthiness of the aircraft have not been established. We will continue to deny ferry permits and not issue airworthiness certificates for these aircraft until we are satisfied that they are properly registered and safe for flight.

During our meetings with drug-interested agencies, we have explained that our authority to summarily seize airplanes is limited to those cases where the airplane is involved in certain prescribed aviation safety violations committed by its registered owner or person in command. Some large aircraft which we have seized have been suspected drug aircraft.

The airplane, once seized, however, is subject to release once a civil penalty is paid or a bond posted in the amount of the penalty. Unfortunately, the maximum amount of civil penalty per violation at the present time is $1,000, an amount of little consequence to dope peddlers. We will talk later about a Department of Transportation legislative proposal to increase that penalty, which we urge the committee to consider and support.

I might add that it has been our experience that many of the large suspected drug aircraft seized by the FAA have remained seized for

long periods of time. We find that the owners of the aircraft are reluctant to come forward to claim them. As a result, they remain under lock and chain in our custody out of the drug trade for an extended period of time.

In addition to aircraft seizures, we are authorized by law to issue emergency orders of suspension and revocation of pilot, mechanic, and aircraft airworthiness certificates. If we encounter a pilot who has been actively engaged in narcotic trafficking and are able to marshal sufficient proof, we can issue an emergency order of suspension or revocation of his airman certificate.

When a drug aircraft is found to be unairworthy, we can and do issue emergency orders of suspension or revocation of the airworthiness certificates. Again, these actions are based on aviation safety and not really designed as a punitive measure to deal with the narcotics traffic problem. Nonetheless, they have proved to be of some help in the struggle against unlawful drug operations.

Our air transportation security personnel help in the drug enforcement effort by extensive coordination with local, State, and Federal law enforcement agencies on many criminal matters including drug crimes. They conduct the investigations which form the basis for actions against pilots and others involved in narcotics law violations. Security personnel actively participate in the Drug Enforcement Administration's El Paso Intelligence Center program.

As you know, the FAA staffs, the air traffic control system which includes air route traffic control centers, airport towers, and flight service stations. Our air traffic personnel have assisted various law enforcement agencies by reporting suspicious aircraft activity. These observations of aircraft activity were made by air controllers using radar, visual observations, and traffic control computers.

We talked earlier of a legislative proposal being made by the Secretary of Transportation. On February 22, 1980, a proposal was transmitted to the Honorable Thomas P. O'Neill, Speaker of the House, and the Honorable Walter E. Mondale, President of the Senate, dealing with some suggested legislation that could assist in dealing with the drug problem.

For example, we have asked for an increase of the maximum amount of civil penalties from $1,000 to $25,000. The increase would apply to all safety violations, including those related to narcotics. With the legislatively elevated sanction to $25,000, we could help to make the carriage of narcotics and controlled substances unlawfully in aircraft less profitable.

The Secretary also has asked for the criminalization of willful and knowing violations of certain air safety regulations. Included would be the regulations dealing with final drug convictions of pilots and the carriage of narcotics in aircraft. Accordingly, we could provide criminal sanctions as well as civil sanctions for any violations of these sections.

We respectfully urge this committee to consider and support the Department of Transportation's legislative proposal.

Congressman, we will be pleased to respond to any questions you may have at this time.

Mr. EVANS. Thank you, Mr. Cardinali.