people appreciate your efforts on their behalf. However, we still have problems in some critical areas such as the maintenance career field, and to overcome them, we need your continuing and constant support. Our next priority is to realize the full potential of our existing resources. A key step toward achieving this has been the congressional action to fund the spare parts deficit for the C-5 and C-141, which currently constrains our wartime capability. This problem cannot be cured overnight because of the long lead times required for some items. However, our utilization potential will continue to increase as additional spares reach the shelves. If present funding levels continue, we will correct our spares problem by FY 85/86. Another vital factor in realizing the full potential of our assets is the ability to exercise effective command and control over them. MAC requires a system that is responsive, secure, survivable, jam-resistant, and deployable. We are in the process of a long overdue upgrade to our present system which is very important because the improved ability to direct our fleet in near real time will maximize the utilization of our limited assets. Another program helping us achieve our full potential is the C-141 stretch, which lengthens the fuselage by 23 feet and adds an aerial refueling capability. Not only is this program ahead of schedule and below originally projected cost, but it also has greatly increased our efficiency and flexibility. Program completion is expected next month. The C-5A wing modification will preserve a unique and vital air mobility asset. This program will permit us to operate these aircraft at full capacity and obtain an additional 30,000 flying hours on each. The first production aircraft entered the LockheedGeorgia facility in January, and all 77 C-5 aircraft are scheduled to be modified by the end of FY 87. Another area requiring attention is our intratheater airlift force. Success in battle depends on the capability of placing the right forces in the right place at the right time. This requires the capability to move all categories of cargo, including outsize. Currently, we do not have an outsize intratheater aircraft; however, for the past 25 years, our C-130s have provided a vital capability for bulk and oversize cargo, and it is imperative that battle commanders continue to have this capability in the future. Due to extensive low-level flying and short-field landing operations, we are experiencing an excessive number of fatigue cracks in the outer wings of our C-130Bs and C-130Es. Additionally, due to its age, our C-130As are experiencing corrosion problems in the center wing. Outer wing replacement and center wing rehabilitation will be necessary if we are to maintain the capability of these aircraft. Correcting these wing problems will extend the service life of the C-130 beyond 50 years, or well into the 21st century. As we extend its service life, we must also address the ability of these aircraft to effectively deliver the equipment, supplies, and personnel needed to insure our forces prevail. The capabilities of the C-130 have remained relatively static while the environment in which they operate continues to change dramatically. Upgrade of its navigation, communication, and aerial delivery capabilities is necessary if the C-130 is to operate and survive in tomorrow's tactical environment. Our third priority is to procure new aircraft to meet the remaining airlift requirement. The proposed addition of 50 new C-5B and 44 KC-10A aircraft will make a major contribution to the recognized CMMS ton-mile per day shortfall. The C-5Bs will provide nearly a 60 percent increase in outsize capability and can be integrated into the airlift system to produce an additional 8 million ton-miles per day (MTM/D) of capability before 1990. The In this last role, a single KC-10A can provide air refueling for eight F-16 aircraft over a 3,000 nautical mile range while airlifting 100,000 pounds of support cargo and personnel. This capability will allow us more effectively to deploy the tactical fighter forces necessary to insure air superiority within the combat theater. As a tanker in support of airlift refueling missions, the KC-10A will increase the flexibility and productivity of our intertheater airlift fleet by reducing reliance on en route basing and eliminating some takeoff limitations now experienced by the C-5. The KC-10A's refueling capability has the potential to increase C-5 average payloads by up to 20 percent from airfields which have takeoff gross-weight restrictions. In the cargo-only role, the KC-10A will airlift significant quantities of bulk (and some oversize) cargo over long ranges and can add approximately 4.9 MTM/D of capability. The proposed C-5B and KC-10A aircraft will provide an important and welcome addition to our overall airlift capability; however, these additional assets will not satisfy the 25 MTM/D intertheater airlift capability recommended by the CMMS. Also, the C-5Bs and KC-10As do not alleviate serious shortfalls in our intratheater capability. In my judgment, a new aircraft will be required in the latter part of this decade to provide necessary additional capability to our intertheater airlift force, to supplement intratheater airlift capability, and as an eventual replacement for the C-141s and C-130s. The C-17 was designed to meet these requirements, and I strongly urge your support for continued research and development funding for this effort. In addition to the above, we should continue to pursue a Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) Enhancement Program that will allow us to incorporate cargo convertibility features in all purchases of new wide-bodied aircraft and to modify existing widebodied aircraft. A viable enhancement program could assure the growth of our current CRAF, a program that has been an integral part of our Nation's strategic airlift capability for the last 30 years. It represents approximately 50 percent of our wartime airlift capability, and the Nation's carriers continue to be supportive of this cost-effective program. In conclusion, your Congressionally Mandated Mobility Study clearly indicates this Nation's critical shortfall in airlift capability. The proposed acquisition of C-5B and KC-10A aircraft will satisfy approximately one-half of the added capability recommended by the study. This is a positive step in the right direction; however, it does not solve the entire intertheater problem nor does it address existing shortfalls in intertheater airlift. In fact, the added cargo volume generated by the C-5B and KC-10A will place an even greater burden on our primary intertheater airlift aircraft--the aging C-130. As a result, the intratheater airlift deficiencies that currently exist will become more acute and potentially a major limiting factor in a protracted contingency. To address both the intertheater and intratheater shortfalls in the late 1980's, we urgently need to continue with research and development of the C-17. As we work together to fill our Nation's mobility needs, the importance of responsive airlift cannot be exaggerated. The chronic, well-documented airlift shortfall is a matter of serious concern. Our Nation needs a manifest capability to project military power rapidly to any area of the world where America's vital interests may be challenged. If the challenge does occur, we must have the ability to confront it. PREPARED STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. DONALD A. VOGT, USAF MILITARY ASSISTANT STRATEGIC AND THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES appreciate the opportunity to discuss airlift requirements today. There have been many studies of mobility requirements over the years. In particular, there have been many evaluations of airlift requirements. However, there has been concern that the capabilities of airlift, sealift and prepositioning were not properly considered in the total context. The Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1981 required the Secretary of Defense to conduct a study to determine overall U.S. military mobility requirements including the total mix of airlift, sealift and prepositioning required for contingencies in the Indian Ocean and other areas of potential conflict during the 1980's. The resultant study was titled the Congressionally Mandated Mobility Study and was forwarded to Congress on 30 April of last year. The study focused on the problem of determining the proper mix of airlift, sealift and prepositioning without doing the detail decision analysis of what specific airlift or sealift types should be procured. This was done for several reasons; first, it seemed the proper step from an organizational perspective leaving the Service prerogatives intact and using to the fullest their capabilities. Second, many of the detailed systems capabilities can be efficiently refined during procurement. In particular CX procurement was underway and the details of design were sensitive. Therefore, while we did attempt to add some understanding of the differences in airlift capability between various classes of airlift e.g., outsize vs oversize, small austere vs major airfield capabilities, we did not attempt to justify any particular solution. One of the major problems of any mobility analysis is that the results are very heavily influenced by assumptions. particularly strong effects result from assumptions on use of warning, possibility of restriction on supply routes both through closure of the Suez Canal and attrition. For these reasons the assumptions were very carefully considered by both the Services and OSD. Another problem of mobility analyses is that they tend to focus on the scenario. This is necessary to do the analysis but acts to obscure the military requirement for flexibility. For this reason we considered four scenarios and tried to construct mobility force alternatives which best fit all of the scenarios. We found in the study that there are synergistic effects between the three modes of mobility. Sealift is necessary to meet the heavy sustaining lift requirement, prepositioning is necessary to provide the heavy early requirements prior to sealift closing, and airlift is required to deliver the people and cargo that are necessary in the early days to round out a combat force. An often overlooked fact is that it is presently not practical to preposition all the equipment needed for combat capability of our units. Items like helicopters and communications gear must be maintained too often to allow that. They also tend to be high dollar per pound items. We found a strong relationship between prepositioning and airlift. The conclusion of the Mobility Study was that, along with sealift and prepositioning improvements 20 million ton miles per day of additional outsize/ oversize airlift capability is needed in addition to the 1986 baseline that existed at the time of the study. The Air Force used the data and results of this study as it was in progress in the evaluation of options for airlift programs. AIRLIFT FORCE OF TODAY General BURKE. I would like to very quickly run through a discussion of where we are today in airlift and where our plans would take us. LONG-RANGE INTERTHEATER AIRCRAFT As a reminder, this is today's airlift force. We have a large number of the C-130's, about 550, and those are the short-range intratheater aircraft. Today we will not be talking about them, although they certainly deserve attention in the future, but we will be talking about the aircraft that have the long-range intertheater capability which is generally called strategic airlift. That is the makeup of the remaining five here. Owned and operated by the Air Force, the Military Airlift Command, are the C-141's, of which we have 270, and 77 C-5's. Additionally, the Air Force has 16 KC-10's and proposes to buy more. The KC-10 of course can carry cargo and also very effectively refuels C-5's and C-141's or for that matter tactical fighters. A very important element and a very desirable element of our country's airlift is the CRAF, the Civil Reserve Aircraft Fleet, divided into cargo and passenger. In years gone by the Air Force flew passenger airplanes of this type side by side with Pan American and TWA. A decision was made by the Department of Defense jointly with Congress that we would get out of that business and rely to the extent possible on the civilian airline industry to provide for those needs. I think that was a very good decision and one that we have stuck with since then. Passengers are not a problem. There are over 200 American passenger-carrying airplanes in the CRAF and that is adequate to our needs. Cargo is a problem. There are something over 100 air freighters in the American airline inventory today which, if we expressed in terms of 747 equivalents, would be 67, 747 equivalent aircraft. For that size body in the civilian marketplace, the airlines buy as many as they think they can make a profit by carrying commercial freight loads. That comes to us for essentially no cost. We have access, General Allen does in times of emergency, by providing the incentives through the form of contracts to carry normal peacetime loads. So to the extent we can rely on this, obviously we wish to continue to because it is much cheaper than anything that we might own ourselves. CONGRESSIONALLY MANDATED MOBILITY STUDY There have been a large number of studies that have sought to answer the question of how much airlift does the country need. I might say that nobody has ever done a study that didn't show that there was a substantial need, particularly for the long-range airlift and particularly to carry outsize cargo. Directed by Congress in fiscal year 1981 Defense Authorization Act Analyzed Four Scenarios Major conclusions: Additional airlift, sealift, and pre-positioning required: Recommended airlift increase of 25 MTM/day, 10 MTM/day to be outsize capable. (CHART 2) FOUR SCENARIOS OF CMMS But the most recent and I think the most authoritative study was the congressionally mandated mobility study which we will call CMMS which Congress asked us to do as part of the 1981 bill. It was done by the JCS and the Office of the Secretary of Defense with support from the Air Force and the other services. It analyzed four scenarios that had been included in the Congressional bill language, and then the scenarios were developed fully by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and related as closely as possible to real world planning; although no one would hold out that any scenario will predict exactly what will happen where and when. A lot of work went into that. The major conclusions were that we were short of all forms of mobility: airlift, sealift, and pre-positioning. With specific regard to airlift, the recommendation of CMMS was an increase of 25 million ton-miles per day of which at least 10 million should be outsize capable. PRESENT AIRLIFT CAPABILITY I will get to a definition of outsize capable a little later in the briefing. But to illustrate graphically the recommendation, this is the airlift that we have today. It is going up if we do the things that General Allen spoke of, buy the spare parts, train the additional crews, stretch the 141 and rewing the C-5. That will get us |