The acquisition cost for 50 of these aircraft, which is equivalent to 50 C-B's, is $3.2 billion in then-year dollars. These aircraft could also be delivered 3 years prior to the delivery of the 50th C-5B according to the Defense Department plan. The operational and support cost estimates for the used aircraft are essentially equal to the operational and support costs of the new aircraft. Now, in addition, because there has been some question raised as to the remaining service life of these modified aircraft once delivered to the Air Force, the Boeing Co. has guaranteed a structural service life of 10 years or 20,000 flight hours, whichever occurs later. That means with the Air Force operating airplanes about 1,000 flight hours per year in peacetime, the structural service life is actually guaranteed for 20 years. That, gentlemen, is a summary of our proposals. I would like to state at this time that Boeing believes the firm fixed-price offering including initial acquisition, the guaranteed performance, structural life and not-to-exceed operating and support costs for 20 years is quite unique in the history of the Government's procurement of airplanes. Furthermore, we believe this would be the first time in history the Congress and the taxpayer could be assured of a not-to-exceed 20-year cost of an important military system. We have essentially guaranteed to the Air Force a price and an operating and support cost which can save the taxpayers at least $8 billion relative to the stated costs of the C-5B. As depicted here, the acquisition costs of the 747, 3.7 versus 8.1. Operational costs getting it up to 12.6 versus the numbers of 20.5 billion. The right-hand side of this chart is firm. Boeing is guaranteeing it. Next I would like to address several issues which critics of our proposal have brought to the surface about the 747. Strategic Airlift Capability Rapid Deployment Force to the Middle East 747 CAPABILITY OF CARRYING OUTSIZE CARGO First, the critics say the 747 cannot carry outsized equipment (the standard DOD definition of "outsize" is equipment that will not go in a C-141, but will go in the C-5). It has always been our position that the 747 has only a limited capability at best for carrying outsize equipment. We have never stated that the 747 is capable of carrying the large cargo helicopters, the main battle tank and the self-propelled artillery included in the defined forces of the Rapid Deployment Force as per the CMMS. Our analysis, summarized on this chart, concludes that the 747 will carry oversize and bulk equipment and the existing C-5's can adequately carry all of the outsized equipment as defined in the CMMS requirement. So we therefore believe that the outsized issue is really not an issue. The airlift shortfall as shown here is in the SOUTHWEST ASIA AIRLIFT LOADABILITY OF 747 This chart shows the precentage by weight on the left and on the right the percentage by quantity, of equipment defined by the CMMS for airlift to Southwest Asia that is loadable and not loadable in a 747. Please note that the actual combat vehicles which are not loadable in the 747F are only a small fraction of the outsize requirment. The noncombat outsize equipment are such things as trucks and vans, cargo helicopters, bakery trucks, portable asphalt plants, and engineering equipment. However, the combat vehicles include all the main battle tanks from an armor brigade. The Boeing analysis is based upon airlifting this armor brigade because DOD includes it in their analysis of CMMS scenario one. You should be aware that the CMMS specifically designates the armor brigade, including the main battle tanks for sealift, not airlift, at the DOD recommended level of additional airlift. This was confirmed by Brig. Gen. Don Vogt, CMMS study director, in testimory before you committee on May 6, 1982. The inclusion of the armor brigade for airlift significantly increases the outsize job. Even so, the existing C-5 fleet can move all of the outsize equipment in the 27-day deployment time including the main battle tanks. |