the Congressionally Mandated Mobility Study (CMMS-1981) which was sent to the Congress on May 21, 1981. The capability of the C-17 offers the RDJTF a high mobility platform for use in an intratheater role, i.e., it can be used in 70 per cent of the available airfields in SWA [deleted]. The 747 is extremely limited in this regard. Used in this role, the C-17 provides a major combat power mutlitiplier for executing national strategy in the SWA region. Consequently, more airlift is still needed. We are endorsing the C-17 aircraft to fill this void. MARITIME PRE-POSITIONING SHIPS FLEET QUESTION: The Comptroller General has recommended that substantial savings may be realized if the Navy were to acquire and convert existing Roll-on/Roll-off ships rather than building new ships for the Maritime Prepositioning Ships Fleet. Have you examined this alternative, including the life-cycle costs for each and plans for effectively supporting the ships when acquired? Το ANSWER: The alternatives were examined early in the program. There is a sizeable number of special purpose ships involved. meet ship requirements in the time required, a decision was made to pursue a convert and charter approach. The convert and charter approach is expected to be more cost effective than direct procurement when total costs are viewed over the term of the charter period. Definitive cost data will not be available until receipt of "Best and Final" cost proposals. QUESTION: Would you comment on the major elements that are currently assigned to the Rapid Deployment Force? ANSWER: I currently have operational control of Army forces consisting of XVIII Airborne Corps Headquarters (Headquarters, Rapid Deployment Army Forces) and two divisions--the 82d Airborne and the 101st Airborne (Air Assault). In addition, two other major army units, the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and the 6th Cavalry Brigade (Air Combat), [deleted] [deleted] are available for contingency planning. Air Force Forces under my operational control include Rapid Deployment Air Force Forces Headquarters provided by the 9th Air Force and [deleted] tactical fighter squadrons with an appropriate mix of air defense and attack type aircraft. I have a Navy headquarters element, Headquarters Rapid Deployment Navy Forces, collocated with Pacific Fleet Headquarters in Hawaii. Forces have been earmarked from Navy and Marine assets for contingencies. A Marine Amphibious Force, with its own air support and logistics capabilities has been designated by the Marine Corps. The Navy has made available for contingency planning three Carrier Battle Groups, one Surface Action Group with auxiliary ships and five Maritime Patrol Aircraft Squadrons. A Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force Headquarters has been placed under my operational control. Unconventional warfare forces are also designated for planning. [Deleted] Additionally, the Strategic Air Command provides support with its Strategic Projection Force (SPF) consisting of bombers, aerial tankers and reconnaissance platforms. [deleted] QUESTION: Assuming a worst-case threat, what size Rapid Deployment Force would be necessary to execute Southwest Asia contingency plans? ANSWER: This is a complex question. [Deleted.] This is the major reason why your support is needed for the FY 84-88 program. QUESTION: I assume the size force required would be in excess of your current capability. Have you planned to expand the RDF to the size necessary to counter the worst-case scenario? ANSWER: Yes. Additional forces are included in the FY 84-88 Program. I would appreciate your support of this Program. QUESTION: Are a number of the forces assigned to the Rapid Deployment Force also committed to reinforcing NATO or Northeast Asia? Do you consider this a major problem? ANSWER: Yes. problem. [Deleted.] [Deleted.] Yes, it is a major QUESTION: Many of the ships located at Diego Garcia have been there since 1980. What has been our experience regarding the condition of the equipment and cargo prepositioned aboard these ships? ANSWER: The results of four equipment maintenance cycles indicate that the preventive maintenance program exceeded our expectations (d). There has been virtually no degradation or deterioration of equipment or supplies during the extended periods of maritime storage. Contractor Services for Maintenance QUESTION: What are the cost implications of shifting work to contractor services under the Commercial Industrial Services (CIS) program when Navy Intermediate Maintenance Activity facilities are overloaded? How does this compare with the cost of premium or overtime compensation at the in-house facilities? ANSWER: The shifting of work to contractor services under the CIS program is generally less expensive than other types of contractor maintenance. The CIS workload is typically small and repetitive and thus involves lower overhaul rates than with private ship overhaul contractors. Navy intermediate maintenance activity personnel are military and therefore do not receive overtime or premium compensation. Public shipyard personnel perform more complex tasks typical of a depot maintenance activity. The CIS and public shipyard workloads are thus distinct and different from each other. The cost of CIS vice the cost of premium or overtime compensation at in-house facilities is not comparable. Mission Capable Rates QUESTION: Your statistics on mission capable rates indicate that the Air Force apparently achieves a relatively higher rate than the Navy even after the projected additive funding. Why is this? - ANSWER: The impact of increased funding in the readiness accounts does not occur instantly. Procurement leadtimes of about two years have a significant impact on being able to fix quickly our readiness problems. The more immediate impact can be seen from maintaining a zero backlog of depot maintenance for the repair of engines, airframes, and components. Navy MC rates remain relatively lower than Air Force rates because they start from a lower readiness state, and in some cases, the inherent reliability of the weapons system is less. Also we must recognize that our ability to project mission capable rates is in its infancy. Thus mission capable rate projections serve more as an indicator of the health of the logistics and support system. Even more important than the absolute numbers during any one time period, historical and projected trends in MC rates warn us of problems or satisfy us that the support systems are working as they should. QUESTION: Would you comment on the difference between an aircraft being mission capable and fully mission capable? ANSWER: The definitions of full mission capable rates and mission capable rates are as follows: - Full Mission Capable (FMC): A system or equipment is considered FMC when it is safely useable and has all missionessential sub-systems installed and operating as designated by a Military Service. For equipment with a single mission FMC is synonomous with MC, and therefore not used. Mission Capable (MC): A system or equipment is considered MC when it can perform at least one (and possibly, but not necessarily, all) of its assigned missions. MC is used as the sole rating indicator for single mission equipment. A more detailed explanation of these and other materiel conditions indicators is found on pages B-7 and B-8 of Volume II of the DoD Force Readiness Report submitted to the Congress on February 15, 1982. Improved Reliability and Maintainability QUESTION: Only three aircraft types of the Air Force are projected to meet their mission capable rates by FY 1985. This is after substantial sums are programmed for improved reliability and maintainability. What more is required? ANSWER: This answer assumes that the question refers to Volume II: Materiel Readiness Report of the DoD Force Readiness Report February 1982 (SECRET). The amounts the Air Force has been able to program for reliability and maintainability modifications represent only 76.0%, 41.1%, 26.7%, of the requirement in FY 81, 82, and 83, respectively. It must be recognized that the reliability/maintainability improvement area is a relatively small, yet significant factor in the capability equation. Many other factors also influence mission capable rates (MC). These include such factors as the FY 83 appropriations requests for enlistment/reenlistment bonuses, procurement of secondary items, and depot level end item and component repair. In essence, any factor which influences the people, facilities, and resources necessary to maintain aircraft must be funded to achieve higher MC goals. SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS [Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., Wednesday, May 12, the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Thursday, May 13, 1982, in room 1318, Dirksen Senate Office Building.] DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1983 THURSDAY, JUNE 10, 1982 U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met at 9:07 a.m., in room S-407, the Capitol, Hon. Ted Stevens (chairman) presiding. Present: Senators Stevens, Garn, Schmitt, Andrews, Kasten, and Rudman; also present, Senator Specter. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK C. CARLUCCI III, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ACCOMPANIED BY: LT. GEN. JAMES E. DALTON, USAF, DIRECTOR JOINT STAFF, OFFICE OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MAJ. GEN. ROBERT C. TAYLOR, USAF, DEPUTY COMMANDER, RAPID DEPLOYMENT JOINT TASK FORCE GEORGE W. BADGER, DEPUTY PRINCIPAL DIRECTOR FOR EUROPEAN AND NATO POLICY, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY RAPID DEPLOYMENT JOINT TASK FORCE READINESS COSTS, MISSION, AND CONCERNS ABOUT RDF Senator STEVENS. Gentlemen, we are here to continue our inquiry into the various appropriation requests directed to the Rapid Deployment Force [RDF] concept. We were unable at our initial hearing with General Kingston to pin down the costs of the RDF. We also did not receive satisfactory answers to our questions on the need for the creation of yet another military bureaucracy for this program and all related information. There was, in our opinion, confusion over the precise mission of the RDF and why that mission had been changed from its original global concept to one restricted to Southwest Asia. We were particularly concerned about the concept that we were forming a new static theater to which the RDF would be attached. With us today is Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Honorable Frank Carlucci. It is our hope that Secretary Carlucci will be able to address the concerns raised by the committee and to help us |