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DOD OUTSIZE CARGO AIRLIFT
REQUIREMENTS VS CAPABILITY - 1986
(CMMS SCENARIO IV)

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DAYS OF DEPLOYMENT TO THEATER (C-DAY PLUS)

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OUTSIZE CARGO PERCENTAGES

Senator ANDREWS. That is fine and it is most intriguing. The only thing is it doesn't fly with the disinformation or misinformation you gave us before because we asked for outsize stuff and you come back and say [deleted] percent. You give an answer like that and it is logical to assume that you can do it with a mixed fleet. Mr. CARLUCCI. We answered the question directly. You asked how much, and I think it was by weight

Senator ANDREWS. No, we did not. We said what percentage of flights or cargo would be considered outsized? And outsized by our definition is the stuff that you have to have the C-5 to fit it in rather than the 747. We asked it as a direct question. We got a direct answer back from your people that said approximately [deleted] percent. Now either that answer was right or it wasn't right. Mr. CARLUCCI. All right. If you want to pursue that line, then we don't have the capability to carry that [deleted] percent.

Senator ANDREWS. What are you going to do with your C-5's? Mr. CARLUCCI. The C-5's do not give us the capability to carry that [deleted] percent.

Senator ANDREWS. The C-5's can't carry outsize cargo?

Mr. CARLUCCI. Yes, they can carry outsize cargo, but they can't get all that [deleted] percent to that particular scenario on time and meet the commander's needs. That is the point.

Senator ANDREWS. Well, you are going to have 77 of these C-5's, and that is not enough to carry [deleted] percent?

Mr. CARLUCCI. No, sir.

Senator ANDREWS. How are 50 more going to help you?

Mr. CARLUCCI. As I indicated, [deleted]. It is very important, for example, to get things like helicopters on scene right away and the Marine Corps so testified.

Senator ANDREWS. We talked about a 1-week deployment scenario. What percent would be outsize? The answer came back [deleted]. So we assumed that during the initial week [deleted] percent of the stuff that you wanted to run in there if asked is the outsized stuff that would need a C-5——

Mr. CARLUCCI. We would not have the capability to carry that because that [deleted] percent occupies more bulk than the [deleted] percent would represent.

Senator ANDREWS. Well, fine, but you get into some pretty interesting definitions. Let me suggest that you might expand on that one for the record.

Mr. CARLUCCI. I would be delighted to submit all kinds of materials for the record because I think this is a most serious issue.

Senator ANDREWS. Well, it is a serious issue. When we get answers like that that don't, you know, fit what you are saying now it gets intriguing.

[The information follows:]

OUTSIZE Cargo Delivery

The amount and percentage of outsize cargo that must be delivered in the early days of a conflict, i.e., before sealift can arrive, varies among scenarios. Unfortunately, the answer provided earlier-[deleted] outsize cargo in the first week-was not based on any of the scenarios in the Congressionally-Mandated Mobility Study (CMMS), from which our airlift recommendations were derived. The table below

shows the tonnage of outsize cargo (and its percentage of total tonnage) required to be delivered to the theater in the first 15 days of each CMMS scenario.

REQUIREMENTS FOR DELIVERY OF OUTSIZE CARGO TO THE THEATER IN CMMS SCENARIOS

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In each of these scenarios, we must depend on airlift and prepositioning for at least 15 days. The percentage (by weight) of outsize cargo ranges from 12 to 27 percent among the scenarios during that period. If the existing C-5 fleet were dedicated to moving outsize cargo, capability to move outsize cargo over the first 15 days would be about 20,000 tons compared to requirements that range between 29,000 tons and 128,000 tons. Obviously, the existing fleet cannot meet the CMMS require

ments.

MISSION CAPABILITY OF C-17

Senator ANDREWS. Along the same line, if you had C-17's, would the mission capability of this task force be better served than with the C-5's?

Mr. CARLUCCI. Probably, but we can't get C-17's anywhere near the time frame that we can get C-5's.

Senator ANDREWS. Although we had a report from GAO that pointed out that the C-17's, we would get the first 42 or 48 C-17's in the same time frame we would the C-5's, given the same amount of dollar input.

Mr. CARLUCCI. That does not correspond with anything that we

know of.

Senator ANDREWS. Well, again, let me put that back in the record from an old hearing and you can look at it and you can give us your answer on that.

Mr. CARLUCCI. We think there is probably a 3-year gap between the two aircraft, and we would get a larger aircraft than the C-178 sooner so you get more airlift capability.

Senator ANDREWS. We were told on the C-17, and there was also a note from the head of NASA, which has done great work in keeping in schedules, that the C-17 is within the state of the art and putting it together and getting the first unit delivered I think was in, what? In a 48-month or 60-month time table they would be right on stream with what we would do with the C-5's, and there is a GAO report that I think I put in the record in that hearing. We will dig that one out for you.

[The information follows:]

DELIVERY SCHEdules of Airlift Aircraft

At the time the decision was made to buy C-5B's and postpone C-17 development, the Congress had specifically denied fiscal year 1982 funds for the C-17 (C-X), which meant that a fiscal year 1983 start was the earliest possible start for a C-17 full scale development program. The Air Force assessment of Congressional intent was

that the $50M appropriated in fiscal year 1982 for procurement of "wide-bodied cargo airlift aircraft" would allow a fiscal year 1982 start for the C-5B. This meant a 6 to 8 month earlier contract award for the C-5B vice C-17.

Air Force estimates of comparative schedules were based on several factors: (1) The McDonnell Douglas best and final contract offer; (2) discussions conducted with the McDonnell Douglas, Boeing, and Lockheed on development schedule acceleration during C-X request for proposal formulation; (3) an assessment of the Lockheed C-5B fixed price proposal; and (4) an evaluation of the time required to introduce a new system verus increasing the inventory of an existing system.

As part of the final review of the 1983 budget request, the Air Force was asked to examine alternatives for earlier delivery of airlift aircraft through increased funding. Because the C-5B program would start with an established production base (the wing modification and spares production are on-going efforts), the Air Force believed that it could be more readily accelerated than a program requiring significant RDT&E. Under the assumption that either program could be funded at the fastest prudent pace, the Air Force believed that 12 C-5Bs could be delivered up to 2 years earlier than 12 C-17s. On the delivery end of the production program the C5Bs would be introduced directly into existing C-5A squadrons and would provide initial capability as soon as accepted. Conversely, the C-17 program called for a mini-squadron evaluation and operational test program which would last over a year from the initial deliveries. During this time period, no worldwide support system would exist for C-17.

The combination of all relevant factors meant that the 2 year difference in raw delivery schedules must be added 18 to 24 months to make a realistic comparison. The resulting comparative schedules showed a 3-to-4 year difference in C-5B and C17 operational availability and a 2-to-3 year difference in achieving full capability. The NASA review cited by the GAO confined itself to a general technology assessment which addressed maturity of technology, the associated technical risk, the likelihood of achieving the claimed performance, and the identification of potential problem areas requiring particular attention during development. The NASA review did not assess cost and schedule.

The C-17 delivery schedules cited by the GAO were provided to them by McDonnell Douglas. McDonnell Douglas states that if the entire C-5B funding request were made available to them, they could deliver the 12th C-17 56 months after contract award. If 10 percent of the funding request is withheld for other government costs associated with the program, they could deliver the 12th C-17 62 months after contract award.

The actual portion of C-5B budget authority allocated to flyaway costs (less engineering change order/management reserve funds) is lower than the amounts McDonnell Douglas estimates is required in the third and fourth years of their 62 month C-17 schedule. This would likely extend the delivery dates offered by Douglas. Further, delivery of the 12th C-17 does not represent the same operational capability as delivery of the 12th C-5B, since C-5Bs will go directly into operational service along with the C-5As already in the inventory.

INTERTHEATER/INTRATHEATER AIRLIFT CAPABILITY

Mr. CARLUCCI. The Air Force disagrees most strongly with that assessment.

Senator ANDREWS. Well, the Air Force are the ones that said they preferred the C-17 to the C-5.

Mr. CARLUCCI. These are not either/or, Mr. Chairman. Let me emphasize that we need intertheater airlift capability immediately. The C-5 gives us that. Now we will also need more intratheater capability, but that is not as urgent a requirement as the intertheater capability. When the C-130's and the C-141's begin to phase out in the 1990's the C-17 would make an excellent replacement. So we would have a program where we would get the C-5s now and we would continue the R&D effort on the C-17. There is nothing incompatible between the C-5 and the C-17.

Senator ANDREWS. Well, the testimony that we have gotten from GAO and others is that the gap betwen the two planes would not

be 3 years. In fact, GAO did a study and said it would be at the same time. Other people say it is 1, year or so.

Mr. CARLUCCI. The Air Force just testified yesterday that it would be 3 yerars.

Senator ANDREWS. We will give that another airlift hearing. Senator Stevens suggested a couple of questions I want to put in the record and then turn it over to Senator Schmitt.

DEFENSE GUIDANCE

A recent article in the Washington Post quotes an internal Pentagon document concerning global priorities of military readiness. Although the defense guidance outlines the force structure planning for the Persian Gulf region and NATO, I understand that this document isn't available to the committee. Why not?

Mr. CARLUCCI. This is our defense guidance, Mr. Chairman. I think the leak is most deplorable, and I would very much like to know who did it. We do not make that guidance available outside the Pentagon, even to other departments of Government.

Senator ANDREWS. Then the only way we have of getting this information is by reading it in the Washington Post――

Mr. CARLUCCI. No, sir, we would be glad to provide you with a full briefing.

Senator ANDREWS. The Post story also claims the defense guidance assumes the same forces can be used in the defense of NATO as well as the Persian Gulf. Is this true?

Mr. CARLUCCI. [Deleted.]

Senator ANDREWS. We got into this deployment when we have to go back to the other planning group to do the deploying. Your statement also asserts that forces assigned to the RDF could be used in other regions as well as your testimony just a few minutes ago. How would you deploy these forces assuming a simultaneous conflict in Africa and Southwest Asia?

Mr. CARLUCCI. Simultaneous in Africa and Southwest Asia?
Senator ANDREWS. Or Europe and Southwest Asia.

Mr. CARLUCCI. [Deleted.] Assuming we get the program we have laid out before the Congress, our medium term goal is to have the capability to deploy forces in both areas.

[Deleted.]

Senator ANDREWS. [Deleted.]

Mr. CARLUCCI. Again, it is highly scenario-dependent, but in the scenario you postulated you might have to make that choice.

Senator ANDREWS. We get back to the basic question though of how can you deploy this RDF to other regions if current planning is restricted to Southwest Asia. I am now under the impression that the planning that you have under REDCOM is inadequate to deploy this group to other areas.

Mr. CARLUCCI. The planning for other areas is being done by other CINC's. The planning for Europe is being done by CINCEUR. The planning for Southeast Asia would be done by CINCPAC. The Western Pacific would be done by CINCPAC. The planning that REDCOM is charged with includes planning for the land defense of the continental United States, disaster relief and evacuation of U.S. nationals from Africa south of the Sahara, defense of Alaska,

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