not apply. I refer to those cases where the family has but one room and the mother dies. There are hundreds of thousands of these in the United Kingdom. There are 27,000 such in Glasgow alone. The mother dies: the children must have a woman to care for them, who must live in the room with them: the mother's sister is first thought of. We cannot shut our eyes to what must and does follow. It cannot be denied it would be well if the man and woman could marry. These people may be blamable, but the law drives them to that for which they are blamed.

It must be admitted that I have shown objections to the present state of the law; that the burden of proof is on those who maintain it. Let me say at the outset that it is maintained with most perfect sincerity by many for whom I have the sincerest esteem and respect -for their learning, ability, and truth.

The arguments are theological or religious and social. I will consider first the theological. I do so reluctantly, because, strive as one may, it is impossible to avoid giving offence. An argument against a man's religious opinions is almost sure to be resented, however respectfully it may be stated. First it is said by those who object to these marriages that they are opposed to the texts which say that a man and his wife are one flesh. The way in which it is generally put is, that if a man's wife is his flesh then her sister is his sister, and so her marriage with him would be the marriage of brother and sister. Now the first remark to be made. on this is that the expression is a metaphor. That it is not a statement of an absolute or physical fact is certain. I desire to avoid anything like a ludicrous illustration, but what of a marriage between people of different colour? What happens if a marriage is dissolved? Is there then more than one flesh? It is impossible, it seems to me, to suppose that a command not to do that which is not forbidden by reason or instinct can have been given by the use of this metaphor. Further, those who say it is are not consistent. For if A by marrying B becomes one flesh with her, and thereby becomes brother of her sister C, so also does his brother D become B's and C's brother, and ought not to be able to marry C; yet that he may is allowed on all hands. man may marry his deceased wife's deceased brother's wife. But, I repeat, to my mind it is impossible to suppose that, instead of a direct and intelligible command, a divine and benevolent Being would express only by an uncertain metaphor a prohibition to do that which is contrary neither to reason nor instinct.

So a

I now come to the argument derived from the Old Testament, and I venture to say that, so far from prohibiting these marriages, by implication it plainly authorises them. But first it may be useful to see how far, if at all, and on what grounds the Jewish law is binding on Christians. In terms it is addressed to the people of Israel alone. And

3),

the Lord spake unto Moses and Aaron, Speak unto the children of Israel and say unto them' (Leviticus v. 14-17), and especially at the commencement of chap. xviii., on which the questions arise (vv. 2, 'Speak unto the children of Israel and say unto them, I am the Lord your God. After the doings of the land of Egypt, wherein ye dwelt, shall ye not do, and after the doings of the land of Canaan, whither I bring you, shall ye not do.' This looks very like a command to the particular people only. And it is to be remembered that the Jews were an exclusive race. I do not say that a man not a descendant of Jacob could not be admitted among them; the contrary is the case; but they were not a proselytising people. The contemplation of the lawgiver was that they would be and remain a separate race from the Gentiles. It seems strange that to such a people a command was given which was to bind the whole of mankind; which was unknown to other nations than the small community addressed, till the time of Christianity, and which is still unknown to half the world. I know it is said that the command is not in itself binding-that it only shows what is the law of nature. I will address myself to that presently, contenting myself with observing meanwhile that if these marriages were forbidden, and forbidden to others than Jews, it would be hard on the mass of mankind that they should have been left with no guide but reason and instinct, which prompted rather than forbade them. This makes me approach the question with a strong feeling that no such prohibition will be found in the Jewish law.

But let us suppose that either as a direct command or as a model or warning the Jewish law, or some part of it, should be followed by Christians. Then what part? Certainly not the ceremonial; nor all which, as distinguished from the ceremonial, may be called the moral or social (Leviticus xviii. 19, where a command is given, the punishment for the breach of which is death, xx. 18). It is impossible to suppose, and indeed it is not said, that the command there mentioned, with the penalty for its disobedience, is binding on Christians. So of many others. I ask again, then, what part is binding? Now it is said, as I understand, that that part is binding on Christians for the non-observance of which the land of the Canaanites was taken from them and given to the Jews, and they were destroyed. It is said that to have punished them for disobedience of laws not revealed to them would be unjust, unless they knew without revelation that they should act as though the law had been given to them expressly-in other words, that reason and instinct would guide them rightly to do what they (the Canaanites) were punished for not doing, so that their punishment was for disregarding reason and instinct. Be it so. But we have the highest authority for saying that reason and instinct do not teach us that a man is not to marry his deceased wife's sister. Further, Jacob

married two sisters, the first living at the time of the second marriage. That this was afterwards forbidden by the Mosaic law is certain during the life of the first wife. But it is difficult to suppose that nature and instinct would have forbidden what the patriarch did apparently without reproof, and indeed with approbation, seeing the high position and importance of the progeny, Joseph. It may well be that the pain this second marriage gave to Leah, the first wife, caused the prohibition of the marriage of a sister, living her sister as the first wife.

One may, therefore, as I say, approach the consideration of the question with a strong presumption that, as the Canaanites were punished for doing what reason and instinct forbade and reason and instinct do not forbid these marriages, especially as shown by the marriage of Jacob with Leah and Rachel-so it was not for such marriages that the Canaanites were punished. Therefore either such marriages are not forbidden at all, even to the Jews, or if at all, they are forbidden to the Jews in particular. Their prohibition is not binding on Christians. Let it not be said that this reasoning would set aside the decalogue. Certainly not; reason and instinct both go along with the last six of the commandments. Society could not exist without the observance of what is ordered and forbidden by them.

But we are not driven to speculate what would be the law; we have it. Let us examine the texts and very passages which decide the question. Leviticus xviii. 16 is relied on. It says, 'Thou shalt not remove the nakedness of thy brother's wife; it is thy brother's nakedness.' Now it is said, as I understand, that a wife's sister is as near in affinity as a brother's wife, and so by implication such a marriage as that is forbidden. I say, and I say it with all sincerity, that I am by no means sure that this does not extend solely to the case of the brother's wife, living the brother. It is the natural meaning of the words it is thy brother's nakedness.' In the case of a mother the expression is indeed thy father's nakedness,' but it proceeds 'even the nakedness of thy mother shalt thou not uncover; she is thy mother.' Another instance is the nakedness of thy son's daughter is thine own nakedness.' It is true that adultery generally is specially prohibited. But the prohibition is addressed to the male. It must be remembered that concubinage was not prohibited by the Jewish law except as within the prohibited degrees; and what confirms this opinion is, that if a man died childless it was the duty of a brother to marry the widow and raise up issue to the deceased. It has been said that these were not marriages between the widow and surviving brother, but it is manifest they were. If proof were wanting it would be found in the question, 'What if a woman marries seven brothers in succession?' and in the answer, not that the marriages were not marriages or

were wrong, but that 'in heaven there is neither marrying nor giving in marriage.' And it is a fact that at this day among Jews who observe the law a childless widow will not marry other than her late husband's brother till that brother has formally refused to marry her. It may be as well to add that it does not follow that because marriages were prohibited between a man and his brother's widow that they would be with a deceased wife's sister.

But let us assume that verse 16 applies to a brother's widow. Let us also assume that if a man might not marry his brother's widow it would be a fair conclusion that, if there was no other consideration, he could not marry his deceased wife's sister, and so the case against their marrying would be made out. But there is another and decisive consideration; for whatever consequence might be deduced from verse 16, if it were not followed by verse 18, there is that latter verse, 'Thou shalt not take a woman to her sister to be a rival to her, to uncover her nakedness beside the other in her lifetime.' This is the Revised Version. The Authorised Version is to vex her,' instead of to be a rival to her.' This is the text, and it seems to me that no man, not merely as a lawyer, on legal consideration, can do otherwise as a matter of ordinary reasoning from the text than say it is a limited prohibition, and therefore by implication a permission out of the limits. Expressio unius, exclusio alterius. To say that it shall not take place in the joint lives, is by implication to say that it may when both lives do not exist together.

6

So thoroughly has this difficulty been felt that the greatest efforts have been made to get out of it. A venerable archdeacon of the Church of England has said that the text ought to have been translated in the Authorised Version, Neither shalt thou take one wife to another to vex her, to uncover her nakedness beside the other in her lifetime;' but that, out of deference to the Septuagint, the translator in the Authorised Version gave this rendering in the text, making, however, amends by placing the alternative rendering in the margin, which no doubt,' says the archdeacon, 'is the true one.' This really seems very strange. It is a charge on those who are responsible for the Authorised Version that out of deference to the Septuagint they knowingly put a wrong meaning on this allimportant text in the body of the book, contenting themselves with putting the right meaning in the margin. What makes this the more remarkable is that ninety-nine Bibles out of a hundred are without marginal notes. This, inasmuch as those books are printed by institutions governed and controlled by clergymen, is a strong imputation on them. But having adopted the translation in the margin, the archdeacon had to give it an object. He says it was directed against polygamy, which is a breach of the moral law. it possible that he can have forgotten the cases of David and Solomon in particular? It is incorrect to say that polygamy was pro

hibited to the Jews. They recognise its lawfulness, though they do not now practise it. However we need not trouble ourselves about what would have been the meaning of the text if translated as the archdeacon would have it. The matter is set at rest. The marginal translation was wrong, that in the text right. Those who prepared the Authorised Version had not put a falsity in their text. The Revised Version, the authority of which the archdeacon will not dispute, gives the translation I have quoted, and does not even notice the other in the margin or otherwise. It ought to be conclusive. The archdeacon says it is strange that a permission should occur in a chapter which is otherwise wholly concerned with prohibitions.' Now this is very remarkable. I am sure that the archdeacon is incapable of saying anything that he has not considered and does not believe. Otherwise I should say this was inconsiderate or uncandid. There are two answers to it: one that there is nowhere a list of permissions in which it could find place. Another and better answer is that it is not an express permission, but one by implication. The matter stands thus: all marriages are lawful which are not prohibited expressly or by implication; this marriage is not expressly prohibited, and cannot be by implication, as by implication it is permitted. The meaning I find in the text of verse 18; the implications from it are those of the Jews themselves. They interpret in the same way. With them these marriages are lawful. They refrain from them in England, because they know they are null by English law, not by their own. Foreign scholars are universally of the same opinion. Indeed, I do not know that since the Revised Version anyone here in England contests the interpretation it gives to verse 18. But in some way, which in all honesty I declare I do not understand, it is said that, though the particular text in verse 16 is given up, yet these marriages are prohibited by the Old Testament.

But, it is asked,' by one of the archdeacon's correspondents, Were counsel to argue upon any other subject before Lord Bramwell, by using an inference of this kind against a distinct enactment, what would he not say against it?' I should say a good many things. But where is the distinct enactment? The archdeacon's statement of it is this: So it is said a man may not marry' (that is not the word) 'his brother's wife.' 'Conversely' (qu. conversely) a woman may not marry her husband's brother, and analogously, a man may not marry his wife's sister.' This is the distinct enactment,' conversely and analogously, every step being questionable, or, as I think, wrong.

This brings me to another argument. I have said, and repeat, if by common consent there is a divine command against these marriages, that command should be obeyed. But if some find the command, and others do not, and on the contrary find a permission, 1 Hessey's Six Grand Objections, p. 2.