advanced at an appalling rate, till the armed forces available at the call of any one of the great European powers are to be numbered by millions. We are extraordinarily fortunate in being able to dispense with the conscription and all its attendant expenses and dangers, but it is simply folly to shut our eyes to the consequences of our choice. The wealth, strength, and intellect of European nations have for twenty years past been organised for the one purpose of making successful wars. The wealth, strength, and intellect of England have been directed into other channels. An immense advantage no doubt, but it is useless to ignore the consequences of our choice. We are no longer in a position to engage with any prospect of success in a contest with any of the military powers of Europe. We may possibly render some effectual aid by means of a small contingent to the chief combatants in any future struggle; but in such a case we must at once consent to abandon the position of principals for that of not very important subordinates.

I do not mean to say for a moment that our power as a military nation has gone, or that under certain conditions and in certain directions it may not be as great as ever; but the idea of our competing on land with the great armies of the Continent is ridiculous, and when people discuss the part to be taken by us in solving the Eastern question, they will do well to lay this fact to heart.

But the military difficulty is by no means the only or the most important reason why we should abandon all thoughts of mixing ourselves up in European quarrels. Fortunately there are other and much stronger motives for abstention, which make it as desirable for us to avoid a quarrel, as it must be disastrous for us to enter upon

one.

In a certain very limited number of years from the present timeit may be two or it may be twenty-Constantinople will have changed hands, and the hands into which it will have fallen will not be those of England. As to the change, there can, humanly speaking, be no doubt whatever. Two centuries ago the backward movement of the Turks began. Things moved slowly then, they move quickly now, but not for a single day has there been a check in the movement. Hungary, Servia, Roumania, and last, but by no means least, Bulgaria, have each in their turn been relieved from the presence of the Turk. Even now little more than Roumelia remains of the European provinces of Turkey. The last chapter has not yet come, but it has very nearly come. The teaching of history is uniform and conclusive, but it is not required to prove that the great city on the Bosphorus cannot much longer remain in the hands of the OttoTo see Constantinople and to see the Turks there is enough. The continuance of such a régime in the central point of modern Europe is inconceivable, incredible. As to who will be the successors of the Sultan, that must always be a question of deep interest for

mans.

England. Whether it is a question which is worth fighting about is an entirely different matter. At present Russia and Austria are racing for the goal. The forthcoming completion of the Bulgarian section of the railway to Constantinople, the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the commencement of a new line of railway under Hungarian control, giving a second communication further to the west, are all points which seem to favour Austria at the present moment. On the other hand, the divided nationality of the Austrian army, the unprotected nature of the northern and north-eastern frontier of Hungary, combine with many other circumstances to fortify the position of Russia. This is not the place to go into a discussion of the probabilities of a Russo-Austrian campaign, or the enumeration of the strategic advantages of either power might be prolonged and would form a most interesting study. But one great fact remains clear above all details, namely, that if ever the unaccomplished can be foreseen, and the unknown deduced from the known, an early conflict between Russia and Austria is among the most absolute certainties of the European situation. As to the result, it is of course idle to prophesy, though there can be hardly any doubt that English sympathies would lie and ought to lie on the side of the Kaiser as against the Czar.

But to whichever side the victory for the time being may incline, the mainspring of action on the part of one, at any rate, of the combatants must remain absolutely intact. It is well that English people should realise fully what is the strength of the idea which is behind the descent of Russia to the sea. Looked at from the outside and without prejudice, the situation is a very striking one; the forces at work are enormous. A nation of one hundred millions is shut up against the north pole with no outlets save the Arctic Sea and the shallow and often frozen waters of the Baltic. To all intents and purposes this vast nation is one peoplea Russian can be understood from Archangel to Odessa. The imperial ukase is obeyed from Wilna to Vladivostock, and, what is still more important, a single idea can penetrate, and has before now penetrated, the whole of this enormous population. Southward there is the sea, the sun, and free intercourse with the world, but from the sea and all that it implies Russia is practically shut off. There are ports on the Black Sea, it is true, but let us conceive ourselves for a moment in the position of a Russian at Odessa or Sebastopol. Imagine the position of English merchants if every vessel leaving Liverpool were compelled to navigate the Seine for sixty miles under the guns of French forts before reaching the sea, and to accomplish a journey of more than a hundred miles in an inland lake locked up at either end by powerful fortifications. Such is precisely the position

The fact that there are one or two posts on the edge of the North Pacific does not appreciably affect the situation.

of owners of Russian shipping passing through the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmora, and the Dardanelles. The situation is an aggravating one beyond doubt, an unavoidable one, it will be said, in view of the facts of geography. But we can hardly expect Russia to take this view; as a matter of fact, she does not take it, and never will.

That the irresistible pressure of a hundred million people speaking one language and moved by one idea will break a way to the sea I firmly believe. There are two points at which the sea may be reached the one is Salonica, the other is Bassorah. Granting that one of these two points for the moment will ultimately be reached, there can hardly be any doubt as to which can be occupied with the least disadvantage and danger to England.

It must not be supposed for a moment that I desire to see a further extension of Russian influence, or an aggrandisement of Russian power. I have seen something of Russia, and I have learnt. what I could as to her history and her present condition. A deeper acquaintance and a wider study might alter my views; but at present I must confess that the extension of Russian authority over any portion of the earth's surface seems to me an unmitigated curse and calamity to the spot so afflicted. With such a political system I do not see how any other result could be anticipated. If England had the commission of a knight-errant to fight perpetually against evil-doers wherever found, no doubt a crusade against the Russian Government would be a fitting and useful exercise of her functions. But, as I am very strongly of opinion that we have no such commission, and have quite enough to do in protecting our own inheritance, and in providing for the happiness of our own people, I see no reason for buckling on our armour against Russia merely because of her general iniquities, or because of any action on her part in Eastern Europe, unless and until our own interests are really threatened. At that point I would have us fight instantly, choosing our own ground and our own method, for I have a sufficiently strong belief in the value of England and our Empire to resent at once anything which might seem likely to interfere with our progress. But does Russia on the Mediterranean, or still less Russia fighting in Eastern Europe in order to get to the Mediterranean, interfere with us at all, or at any rate to such an extent as to make it worth our while to spend a man or a shilling in preventing her?

I do not think so. Assume the worst, and picture Russia seated on the Bosphorus with the control of the Dardanelles. According to all the accepted traditions of English statesmanship, such a consummation would be equivalent to the end of the British Empire, the one great and awful calamity to avoid which all our resources should be expended and the four quarters of the world involved in war. But is this so? It would be unfortunate certainly. Constantinople is a

wonderful city, the Bosphorus is a magnificent port. But Marseilles is also a great city, Venice is a great city; Toulon, Spezzia, and Fiume are great ports; and yet in the face of all of them the work of the British Empire goes on and prospers. Why is it so self-evident that the existence of one more great military power upon the Mediterranean could conjure up a danger which the presence of the great French, Italian, and Austrian strongholds has not yet created? To Austria, doubtless, the establishment of Russia at Constantinople may be death; that is owing to the internal constitution of the Austrian Empire, which no power can alter. But for England there is no such danger, and consequently no such need for a conflict.

But it will be said there is the Suez Canal-the Suez Canal is the key to India. Russia on the Mediterranean will threaten the Canal, and will have it in her power to seize the key of India. Now, in the first place, I say that the Suez Canal, save in time of peace, is not the key to India, but that, on the contrary, it is a dangerous temptation laid before our eyes to lead us to neglect the real and only true key to our Indian Empire. The road to India in time of war is round the Cape, and not through the Canal; and if a hundredth part of the money which has been spent in securing us from imaginary dangers in North Africa had been expended upon fortifications and docks at Simon's Bay and Cape Town, the terrible dangers of the present situation would have been reduced to a minimum. I am content to take the judgment of almost any military expert as to the fact that in case of a war with Russia in India we could not rely for a day upon the Suez Canal for the security of our military communications. The detention of a single ship in the waterway might mean a month's delay and the loss of invaluable stores. The uncertainty would paralyse every preparation, the danger would be too formidable to face.

I believe that this proposition is generally admitted among military men, and yet hitherto there seems to have been no adequate recognition of the fact in the disposal of our forces. We still lock up one-third of our troops and half our naval strength in an inland sea in which in time of war every ship must run the gauntlet of half a dozen possible enemies, all favourably posted for attack, with the reasonable probability of ending in an impasse if all other dangers be safely avoided. It may, I admit, be wise to fortify Cyprus, or better still to obtain possession of Rhodes; it is always well to have two strings to one's bow. And more important even than this is the strengthening of Aden and Perim. As long as we can shut up the eastern end of the Canal at will to other powers, we are by that very fact placed in a position of extraordinary strength.

The mere strategical advantage of abandoning our dependence upon the Canal route and concentrating all our energies upon the

to us.

protection and improvement of that by the Cape would be enormous. But it is absolutely unimportant as compared to the indirect but not less certain gain that such a change of policy would assuredly bring In some respects our power as the arbiter of European destinies has greatly diminished if it has not wholly gone; but in other respects it is, I believe, greater than ever, or rather, I should say, it will become so the moment we take the step to which every fact of our history points.

As a European power in competition with the armed states of the Continent, England is at a hopeless and permanent disadvantage. As a member of a confederated empire of sea-bordered Englishspeaking states, she will be in an absolutely impregnable position, in which the quarrels and bickerings of the European Governments will be absolutely without importance, and only interesting as a study of contemporary history in its smaller developments. So long as we give hostages to Europe by claiming an interest in its quarrels, and a right to participate in them, so long shall we be at their mercy. The day on which we declare once for all that we have no concern with the domestic politics of Europe, and inform our enemies, if we have any, that if they wish to quarrel with us they must take to the water to obtain satisfaction, we shall enter upon a new and brighter period of our history. At present the indiscretion of a Roumanian patrol, the ambition of a Russian colonel, or the intrigues of a Greek patriot, may drag us at a day's notice into a conflict in which we have nothing to win and everything to lose, and in which we must inevitably spend our blood and money in serving the cause of other

nations.

The material and immediate advantages of releasing ourselves from the false position in which we now stand are obvious; but the value of the new policy does not end with its immediate and concrete effect.

At present between England and her colonies there is a theoretical, but not a real equality of conditions. The traditions of our home history and the accident of our home position have bound us up with the continent to a degree of which we are scarcely conscious. The colonies are free altogether from any such trammels. They do not care for European politics, and do not wish to be mixed up with them. It might be that in case of our being engaged in a conflict arising out of some purely European and local question, the colonies, or some of them, would assist us. Probably they would do so. But the assistance would come as a matter of grace, and every occasion on which it was rendered would make a subsequent offer less likely.

It is the enormous privilege of the colonies to be free from all contact with old-world quarrels. If the chief result of our connection with them is to drag them back into the old circle, they not only will not thank us, but they will certainly be inclined to dissolve a VOL. XX.-No. 115. I I