By contrast, European RO/RO's are not compartmented and if the main hull were broached by torpedo attack, the ship would sink. Current thinking reduces emphasis on some characteristics which previously were required national defense features. The Navy has concluded, for example, that the upkeep of atomic, biological, and chemical washdown systems is beyond the capability of merchant ships and that radiation monitoring equipments should not be provided for merchant ships. The Navy's intention is to have naval control of shipping officers include washdown instructional material in sailing instructions to masters, and, as far as possible, to have Navy ships escorting or in the vicinity of merchant ships provide guidance and assistance. In addition, the state of the art in mine warfare has developed sophisticated weapons which have negated the effectiveness of degaussing merchant ships, and degaussing is no longer provided for. Perhaps the most important standard national defense feature is speed. OPNAVINST 4700.13B states that cargo ships should have a minimum sustained speed of 20 knots and that 20 knots is desired for tankers, with a lower limit of 16 knots if, for use as a naval auxiliary, the proposed tanker can maintain a sustained speed of 15 knots while pumping two products with ensured separation simultaneously at 3,000 GPM. Possible benefits associated with major additional speed increments are discussed below.

2. Possible advantages of large increases in ship speed

In the past, high ship speed has generally provided a significant measure of security from submarine attack. With sufficient speed, it has been possible for very fast ships to move without escort in submarine-infested waters. The unescorted sailings of the Queen Mary and the Queen Elizabeth during World War II represent cases in point. However, the great increases in submerged submarine speed since World War II have greatly increased the risks attendant to unescorted sailings even for relatively fast ships. As a result, current thinking is tending in the direction of convoy protection, with concomitant reduced speed, even for ships capable of moving at speeds over 25 knots. This effectively increases requirements for costly escort vessels, and, by restricting merchant ship speed, reduces the delivery capability of the merchant fleet.

In this situation, it is appropriate to investigate the possibility that a significant step increase in surface ship speed might offset the new submarine advantage. Benefits in terms of increased delivery capacity and reduced escort requirements could conceivably offset the cost of the necessary speed increment. Furthermore, with some commercially viable cargo ships now in speed ranges over 30 knots, the step to potentially secure speed is much smaller than it would have been only a few years ago. If a significant advantage can be demonstrated, it should be possible to take the necessary steps to provide for increased merchant ship speed in the expected interim before liner fleet renewal is initiated in the late 1970's (see section III).

It cannot be assumed that ship speed increases, even to the vicinity of 40 knots, would necessarily assure an increment of security adequate to justify the high cost of the necessary additional power and fuelalthough in the indicated speed range nuclear propulsion would probably be relatively economical. At higher speeds, for instance, ships are much more noisy and hence more readily detectable by submarines.

Furthermore the loss of only a few big, high-speed vessels would entail a greater reduction in total delivery capacity than the loss of a larger number of smaller, less productive ships. On balance, however, the possible advantages of large increases in ship speed appear sufficient to justify intensive investigation.

On the basis of the foregoing considerations, MarAd has asked that the Navy undertake a study, to be jointly funded by MarAd and the Navy, to investigate the potential benefits of ship speed increases to the range 35-40 knots. The study is now in its formative stage. 3. Other potential new features

The potential military requirement for emergency offloading of non-self-sustaining container ships in undeveloped areas presents a new national defense feature problem area. Proposals have been made that all non-self-sustaining container ships be built with decks strengthened to accept the installation of crane rails and gantry cranes, or that deck spaces or hatch covers be designed to support large mobile cranes which might be embarked for emergency offloading. While these ideas reflect a possible military operational need, they have not been developed into concepts of the total systems required to deliver cargo under the projected conditions. There is little point, for example, in strengthening decks and installing crane rails unless gantry cranes are brought and stockpiled for installation in emergencies, and the Defense Department has not yet concluded that a large investment in a gantry crane stockpile would be justified.

D. NATIONAL DEFENSE RESERVE FLEET

There are presently 138 merchant type ships in the NDRF considered available for activation, including 130 Victory ships of World War II vintage. The Victory ships were built in 1944 and 1945, but they have been operated only during the relatively brief callup periods incident to the Korean and Vietnam wars, and their condition at the time of layup after Vietnam service was better than when they were broken out. There are now spare parts problems and potential crewing problems that will affect future operation of these old ships, but there is no reason to assume that most of them could not be used effectively in contingency operations as late as the early 1980's.

At the present time there is no firm phaseout schedule for the NDRF Victory ships, "but it seems likely that they will be retained through the 1970's and possibly into the early 1980's. Uncertainty on this matter stems primarily from difficulty in predicting when it will become possible to acquire additional ships for the private sector suitable for retention in defense reserve status." 1

The House of Representatives recently acted favorably on a bill which would permit acquisition of Mariner ships by MarAd. This bill would authorize MarAd to trade out for scrapping ships that have been declared excess to reserve fleet needs in return for Mariners, with the number of ships traded out to be determined on the basis of equivalent scrap value. At present it is not anticipated that more than a few ships would be acquired under the provisions of this bill. Suitable

1 July 3, 1974 letter from the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Martime Affairs to Rear Admiral W. F. Clifford, USN, Director, Logistics Plans Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

ships are not becoming available at the rate anticipated 2 years ago when the SPANS study recommended Victory ship retirement and NDRF renewal as of 1977. In fact, it now seems unlikely that more than a maximum of 20 to 30 suitable ships will become available (not counting possible MSC redeliveries) before 1980, and there is reason to believe the number will be much smaller.

The primary utility of the NDRF is now seen in terms of needs associated with limited war rather than major war, when the entire merchant marine can be requisitioned, although the NDRF contribution in the latter case is potentially significant. At present, there are two potential sources of shipping to augment the MSC controlled fleet in nonmobilization contingencies when merchant shipping cannot be requisitioned. These are the MSC sealift readiness program (SRP) referred to above and the NDRF. Under the SRP, carriers who wish to move DOD cargo in peacetime must commit half of their ships to military support operation in the event of a contingency, with specific commitments time-phased after an initial callup.

Because it is fully operational in peacetime, the SRP fleet can be marshalled more quickly for nonmobilization contingencies than the NDRF. However, in a contingency of long duration, with businessas-usual except in the contingency area, as in the Vietnam case, the diversion of berth-line ships from their regular trade routes would create a vacuum likely to be filled by foreign-flag carriers. Postcontingency reentry into trade on these routes would probably be slow, and, in some cases, impossible. With loss of trade, ships would be dropped, and the shipping mobilization base for major war would be thereby reduced.

The NDRF is thus needed to meet military support shipping needs in potential long-term nonmobilization contingencies. It is also a source of shipping to help meet nonmilitary emergency requirements, and it has been used extensively in the past to accommodate nonmilitary needs. In some cases it would be possible to charter foreign-flag ships to meet emergency nonmobilization requirements, but the foreign-flag fleets are not an inherently reliable resource, particularly in emergencies where U.S. policy is not supported by countries upon which the United States would depend for needed shipping assistance.

It would be dangerous to underestimate the significance of the current and future requirement for a national surge shipping reserve. The need is now critical in a sense that it has not been before because the vast reserves of war-built shipping represented in the tramp fleet as well as in the reserve fleet have all but disappeared.

Up to the end of the Vietnam war, MSC was able to expand its chartered fleet as necessary without drawing to any great extent upon ships operated in regularly scheduled berth-line trade. Now there are only 9 ships remaining in the tramp fleet. Although the MSC controlled fleet could probably be augmented at any given time by a few underutilized or laidup berth-line ships, the 37 chartered dry-cargo vessels that are now in the controlled fleet comprise the better part of the U.S.-flag dry-cargo charter fleet. Furthermore, since few of the controlled fleet ships are commercially viable, it may be expected that most of them will be converted, scrapped, or offered for foreign sale if and when they are redelivered-if they are not acquired for the national reserve.

In short, the slack in the U.S. fleet that has been drawn upon in military and nonmilitary contingencies since World War II has now dwindled essentially to the small remnant represented in the current NDRF. Unless this reserve is maintained and eventually reconstructed there will be no alternative but to draw upon the active berth-line. fleet in nonmobilization emergencies, which could severely damage that important national asset.

CONCLUSION/RECOMMENDATIONS

Under the influence of the Merchant Marine Act of 1970, U.S.commercial shipyards have experienced significant growth and modernization. The expansion of the CDS program, the liberalization of vessel types eligible for subsidy assistance and mortgage guarantees, as well as an increase in the mortgage guarantee ceiling have all produced extensive capital investment programs in shipyards throughout the Nation. In the past 4 years over $371 million of capital improvements have already been made with another $342 million planned. These improvements range from the construction of a new shipyard at Newport News, Va., for commercial ship construction to a general upgrading and replacement of equipment occurring at most yards.

These improvements are providing and must continue to provide sufficient U.S. shipyard capacity to meet U.S. Government and private ship construction goals over the next several years. However, to assure the implementation of plans for shipyard modernization and to gain full productivity benefits of series production, violent fluctuations in the ship construction program must be avoided and an assured order book must be maintained so that shipyards can be induced to make needed investments and can plan for a stable productive work force.

The Maritime Administration and the Navy has continuously maintained close working relationships on both formal and informal levels. As a provision of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, the Maritime Administration must acquire the approval of the Secretary of the Navy for each ship design proposed for subsidy. In 1970, the two agencies created the MarAd Navy Shipbuilding and Repair Committee to provide coordination and cooperation for all Government and private shipbuilding programs. In addition, there is the joint DOD/DOC Office of the Coordinator for Ship Repair and Conversion, which was organized in 1955.

This broad base of cooperation and joint problem resolution has produced a remarkable level of program compatibility. There are no current conflicts between the Maritime Administration and Navy shipbuilding programs that I am aware of today, nor have there been any in the last several years. I am confident that the existing machinery can deal on a case-by-case basis with any problem that may arise.

This program harmony is an essential element in the strengthening and preservation of the U.S. fleet and the shipyards that produce it. Title I of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 outlines the need for the United States to maintain a merchant marine capable of serving as a naval and military auxiliary in time of war or national emergency. In all the wars of the United States, including the most recent, the Southeast Asia operations of 1965-72, ships have transported not less than 95 percent of the tonnage required to support combat forces

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it has be shortage of labor for ship construction is also becoming a probEven though shipyard manpower is now at low levels there is tain planned production scheduled in the next year. Some of the critiSome concern that it cannot be expanded at a sufficient pace to main12 percent a year in the demand for skilled shipyard workers from over. To alleviate these difficulties affecting manpower shortages, in June 1973 to June 1975, (b) inadequate training, and (c) high turnalternatives to increase the availability of shipyard manpower hort term, I propose that serious consideration be given to examinskills in short supply. Shipyard employment is particularly important during our current economic crisis. There will be a continuing need over the next several public service employment proposals have recently been discussed and years to bolster employment. In response to this need a number of more should be expected. Programs to bolster shipyard employment, however, should prove to be the most effective in this area. Not only do such programs produce jobs building vitally needed ships but the skills gained in shipyard occupations are readily transferable throughout