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ground for writing to Alexander after Waterloo in exculpation of her part in the Hundred Days: ‘Enfin, . . . je vous croyais pour nous.' Jaucourt even suspected Talleyrand's participation in the intrigue, as is seen by the question. Whether there is not some devilry of yours at the bottom.' Each of the allies of 1814 was indeed threatening the others with Napoleon. Castlereagh used him only to scare the Bourbons, Piedmont, Tuscany, and the rest, into granting or maintaining constitutional rule. The safeguard against a descent from Elba lay, it was repeatedly declared, in the contentment of the peoples.

The famous defence of Castlereagh's foreign policy in the Quarterly Review' of January 1862 had to be written without knowledge of the documents now before us. The writer guarded himself by these words: The obscurity in which diplomatic transactions are necessarily shrouded will conceal from the public eye the circumstances upon which his justification rests.' He dwelt on 'the necessity of sparing the feelings' of powerful monarchs or ministers elsewhere, and of hiding the faults of men whom it would be injurious to English interests to offend.' The events of 1814-15 were passed over-with a hint, however, of the true view of the similarity of Castlereagh's policy to that subsequently pursued by British statesmen, and the expression of well-founded doubts as to his affection for the Bourbons. So, too, Lady Londonderry, in her brief sketch of Castlereagh's life, writes that in foreign affairs Castlereagh was 'far from being the old-fashioned Tory that ignorant opinion supposes.' He was, indeed, 'in advance of his time.' But here again the most memorable period is treated in four lines, of which, it is now necessary to add, the apparent effect is negatived by the discoveries of 1909.

It is useless in this respect to turn to the tenth and eleventh volumes of the Castlereagh Correspondence. What is now conspicuous in them concerns the 'many chasms and losses' mentioned in the introduction. But the writer, Castlereagh's brother, goes too far when he asserts of 1814 that the safety of Europe' was inseparably connected with the restoration of the House of Bourbon. That was the opinion of Wellington, even before the decision of Talleyrand and Alexander. It was

a decision, accepted by Castlereagh with hesitation, and with doubts that deepened rapidly when Louis XVIII defied our representations. It must be borne in mind that Wellington, a more old-fashioned Tory in continental politics than Castlereagh, was influenced by his Bourbon surroundings.

Castlereagh, whose despatches only profess to 'hope' that he had met 'the wishes of the Genoese people,' wrote to Bentinck in the same tone of apology on December 17 and 18, from Vienna. Unable, under the new development of policy, to meet a desire to preserve a separate existence,' Castlereagh could assure Bentinck that the wishes of the Genoese people' had 'in all their arrangements gone before the wishes of the Powers.' The King of Sardinia had promised him to conduct his government 'upon liberal principles.' The Welbeck correspondence shows that the disobedience of Dalrymple harmed Bentinck. Dalrymple explains from Genoa, on January 28, 1815, his reasons for taking into my hands the government here. . . . Had Lord Castlereagh's intention been really what his letter expressed, my passively seeing the Piedmontese act otherways would have exposed me to great blame.' Blame from all sides Sir John did not avoid. Charles A Court charged him with using language 'indecent and disrespectful' with regard to Bentinck and to Castlereagh; while Hill thought Dalrymple 'crazy in his ingratitude.' Finally come two letters in which Dalrymple withdraws everything that he had written, with special 'regret at having incurred Lord William's displeasure.'

So far was Bentinck from being prejudiced against the restoration of the King of Sardinia, and in favour of the retention at all hazards of 'Genoese liberties' under the Most Serene Republic,' that his earlier letters to private friends accept the loss to Piedmont 'of a part of Savoy' with indemnity in the Rivière de Gênes.' In one of June 20, which has now been communicated by Signor Gallavresi from Italy to Welbeck, he added that the King

'will have the satisfaction of proving to the Genoese the injustice of their prejudice to the Piedmontese connection. If he acts wisely he will employ . . . Genoese in Genoese territory, and begin mixed employment by first employing

Genoese in Piedmont. Much management will be required to remove the natural animosity.'

Meanwhile confusion and uncertainty were spreading over a wider field. In November Castlereagh had been driven to use language of menace to the Emperor Alexander. The Duke of Wellington had described 'the danger at Paris-so many discontented and so little to prevent mischief.' On Christmas Day the Duke wrote to Vienna that the combination of Murat at Naples with 'Bonaparte in Elba' made the latter an object of great dread.' But, answering his own suggestion on the next day, the Duke admitted that the removal of Murat from his throne was a matter too 'delicate' for his policy to be approved by his colleagues. Nevertheless the Duke maintained that Murat's kingship, thus unavoidable, 'increases the chance of disturbance in France.' Also, in December, Burghersh had reported from Italy that the Italian party of independence looked with hope of assistance to... the island of Elba.' Fagan had already informed Bentinck that 'It may be expected, should Murat disappear, that we may soon see the Emperor of Elba at the head of Murat's army.'

Napoleon had fixed his eye upon the larger field. His enlistments had convinced Metternich that Paris was in his mind. Commandant Weil has brought together the accounts given by the Austrian and papal spies of conversations which reveal what the Emperor knew. A despatch from Burghersh, and the report of Sir N. Campbell, dated from Elba on Christmas Day, set forth the confidences' made by Napoleon in view of the division of 'the Four' Powers into two twos. Hoping for the outbreak of a war which could not but improve his chances, Napoleon thought it best for him to say so.

Count Litta, who had spent part of December with Napoleon, had been 'foolish and extravagant' enough to repeat Napoleon's secrets day by day to the spy through whom they reached Louis XVIII, Metternich, and our Foreign Office. We thus became aware of the details of his preparations for a war. This spy, however, when he made enquiries of others, showed over-great facility in belief. He relates in his report of December 26 that Bentinck had spent two hours with Napoleon. We now know from Bentinck's diary that this statement was, as Vol. 212.-No. 422.

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Commandant Weil suspected, totally untrue. The substance of police reports from Elba was the same as the opinion given by Campbell to our Foreign Office, that the Emperor, failing war among the Allies, would land in Italy. Metternich alone seems to have known better. On December 29 the possible alternative of a landing in France was reported to us. Litta had left for Naples before Christmas to inform Murat of 'Napoleon's intentions'-without knowing them himself.

It is doubtful how far Metternich departed from his attitude of expectation when he bound himself to Castlereagh 'never to establish the son of the Empress Marie Louise and of Napoleon as a king.' An eventual temptation to establish Napoleon II in France was, with Metternich, secondary to his firm resolve not to let us establish him in Italy. Metternich continued to use his habitual threat to Louis XVIII, conveyed in the question 'Quel rôle Napoléon jouerait-il dans tout cela?' Louis XVIII replied, through the same most secret channel, that unless Napoleon were sent to Africa 'on verrait un jour l'homme de l'île d'Elbe paraître en Italie.' On February 17, Saint Marsan wrote directly to Victor Emmanuel from Vienna, that Metternich had told him the difficulties of pursuing a common policy with England, and again adds, for himself, that Vienna' saw the risk of Napoleon reappearing on the scene.'

Castlereagh was given to respect, even under the most difficult circumstances, our foreign engagements of all kinds. His apologies to Bentinck about Genoa reveal a conscience more uneasy than was, perhaps, usual in such times. The removal of Murat from his throne seemed to him impossible for Austria to undertake in face of her treaty with that king, unless there were clear violation of its conditions. Now the treaty with the Emperor Napoleon was not of our making. It is often forgotten that the engagements of April 1814 were expressly between Austria, Prussia, and Russia, on the one hand, and his Majesty the Emperor Napoleon on the other. Elba had been adopted by his Majesty the Emperor Napoleon as the place of his residence.' Castlereagh undertook to accede to the Treaty,' with a person unnamed, so far as the same concerns the possession in sovereignty of the island of Elba.' Any

such accession was to be binding in respect of our own acts only, but not with respect to the acts of third parties.' The British Act of Accession,' long delayed, refused the Imperial title to 'Napoleon Buonaparte,' but acceded to the stipulations relative to the possession in sovereignty of the island. Castlereagh repeatedly placed on record his objection to the arrangements made, as he showed, by the Emperor of Russia in the absence of the Allies,' and his wish that there had been chosen 'another position in lieu of Elba for the seat of Napoleon's retirement.'

Historians continue to assert that the return from Elba came as a thunder-clap upon the Powers. But, there was not a Power, unless it were the France of Louis XVIII and Blacas, which had not regarded a descent from Elba as imminent after Christmas 1814. The proofs lay thick in the records of all their capitals.

Bentinck's reply to Castlereagh's 'private and secret' questions of December 18-differing from those in the Record Office-destroys the offer of Louis XVIII to dethrone Murat, on grounds which seem conclusive as to the existence of accurate knowledge at the time. 'The disposition of the French army' was such that 'it would be dangerous to assemble it anywhere or for any purpose.' Of the attempt' to attack Murat, 'the effect might possibly reach even to the throne of France.' A necessary first step would be the removal of Napoleon 'from his present residence.'

Though we had not bound ourselves to watch Elba, a different view of our responsibility was abroad and was not repudiated by us until too late. As Sir Robert Wilson wrote in 1814: The employment of a British commissary, a British frigate, etc., to carry into execution the articles' of Alexander's treaty, appeared to constitute a moral guarantee to Europe on the part of the British Government. Wilson had not seen Castlereagh's ambiguous letter of instructions to Campbell, and was in ignorance of the interpretation placed on it by Sir E. Pellew. Bentinck had pressed his friend Pellew, now become Lord Exmouth, to treat 'attending' the 'person' of Napoleon as implying a blockade. Exmouth wrote from Genoa, where my presence had been requested by Lord William Bentinck.' The naval com