(d) The matrix below was a strawman that was finalized by the DAIG Team POC and the local IG for the CONUS inspection. 2 UNIT PLT LDR INVOLVED WITH CAPTURE OF UNIT SOLDIERS UNIT SOLDIERS PERSONNEL (E5- d. Administrative Support Requirements. The DAIG Team conducted this inspection with minimal disruption to ongoing unit missions. The Team required special arrangements from the field Inspectors General (IGs), including assistance with country clearances, travel in the AOR, in-country travel, sleeping arrangements, convoy security arrangements, body armor, weapons and ammunition, communications, scheduling of inbriefs and outbriefs, interviews and sensing sessions, and an appropriate work space for up to nine personnel conducting DAIG business. e. Documents Reviewed in Advance (OCONUS Only): (1) All inspections related to detainee operations, including command products, Inspector General products, Criminal Investigative Division(CID), legal, etc. abuse. (2) All case histories of punishment (judicial and non-judicial) relating to detainee (3) Past and current Rules of Engagement (ROE). f. Documents Reviewed on Site (OCONUS Only): (1) Unit TACSOPs relating to detainee operations (e.g., 5Ss and T, collecting point procedures, and inventorying EPW belongings). (2) U.S. Armed Forces-controlled I/R facility SOPs. (3) I/R BDE/BN/CO unit manning documentation. (4) DD Form 2745 (EPW Capture Tag) log. (5) DD Form 629 (Receipt for Prisoner or Detained Person) log. (6) DA Form 4137 (Receipt for Evidence/Property Custody Document) log. (7) DD Form 2708 (Receipt of Inmate/Detained Person) log. (8) DD Form 1594 (Duty Logs). (9) U.S. Armed Forces-controlled I/R facilities reporting system database. (10) Facility maintenance and repair documentation. (11) Facility security SOP. (12) Detainee in/out-processing documentation. g. Documents Reviewed During Inspections (CONUS Only): (1) Unit Tactical Standing Operating Procedures (TACSOP) relating to detainee operations (e.g., 5Ss and T, collecting point procedures, and inventorying EPW belongings). (2) U.S. Armed Forces-controlled I/R facility SOPs. (3) I/R Brigade (BDE)/Battalion (BN)/Company (Co) unit manning documentation. h. Inspection Itineraries. DAIG requested each coordinating agent develop a draft itinerary that met the requirements listed in paragraph b. DAIG requested the coordinating agent include the necessary travel time between scheduled locations. The DAIG Team POC and the coordinating agent developed an itinerary that allows the DAIG Team to meet the objectives listed in Chapter 1 paragraph 2b. The DAIG Team conducted an inbrief with the senior commander/representative at each location. [Next page intentionally left blank] Chapter 3 Capture, Care, and Control of Detainees 1. Summary of Findings: Army forces are successfully conducting detainee operations to include the capture, care, and control of detainees. Commanders and leaders emphasized the importance of humane treatment of detainees and, currently, leaders and Soldiers treat detainees humanely and understand their obligation to report abuse. In those instances where detainee abuse occurred, individuals failed to adhere to basic standards of discipline, training, or Army Values; in some cases individual misconduct was accompanied by leadership failure to maintain fundamental unit discipline, failure to provide proper leader supervision of and guidance to their Soldiers, or failure to institute proper control processes. For the purpose of this inspection, we defined abuse as wrongful death, assault, battery, sexual assault, sexual battery, or theft. As of 9 June 2004 we had reviewed 103 summaries of Criminal Investigative Division (CID) reports of investigation and 22 unit investigation summaries conducted by the chain of command involving detainee death or alleged abuse. These 125 reports are in various stages of completion. No abuse was determined to have occurred in 31 cases; 71 cases are closed; and 54 cases are open or undetermined. Of note, the CID investigates every occurrence of a detainee death regardless of circumstances. While recognizing that any abuse incident is one too many, we conducted a review and categorization of the summary reports of the 125 investigations. Based on our review and analysis of reports and case summaries of investigations and our observations and interviews conducted throughout this inspection, we could not identify a systemic cause for the abuse incidents. The DAIG uses the term "systemic" specifically to describe a problem if it is widespread and presents a pattern. As defined by the DAIG in this report, a systemic issue may be found either horizontally across many various types of units, or vertically through many command levels or within systems. The DAIG determined that incidents where detainees were allegedly mistreated occurred as isolated events. In a few incidents, higher ranking individuals up to Lieutenant Colonel were involved; however, the chain of command took action when an allegation of detainee abuse was reported. Abu Ghraib had problems with deteriorating infrastructure that impacted the clean, safe, and secure working environment for Soldiers and living conditions for detainees. Poor food quality and food distribution, lack of laundry capability, and inadequate personal hygiene facilities affected the detainees' living conditions. Overcrowding, frequent enemy hostile fire, and lack of in-depth force protection measures also put Soldiers and detainees at risk. 2. Findings: a. Finding 1: (1) Finding: All interviewed and observed commanders, leaders, and Soldiers treated detainees humanely and emphasized the importance of the humane treatment of detainees. (2) Standard: See Appendix E. (3) Inspection Results: The DAIG Team conducted numerous interviews and sensing sessions with leaders and Soldiers that revealed most leaders and Soldiers have treated detainees humanely and would report detainee abuse if they became aware of it. For OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM(OEF), Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff(CJCS) Message dated 211933Z JAN 02, stated that Al Qaida and Taliban would be treated humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of the Geneva Conventions. Therefore, most detainees were classified as civilian internees (CIs) (sub-classified for OEF by the following non-doctrinal terms: Persons Under U.S. Control (PUC), Enemy Combatant (EC), and Low-level Enemy Combatant (LLEC)). Interviews, sensing sessions, and document reviews revealed that most Soldiers were aware of their requirement to treat detainees humanely. In most cases, the present level of treatment exceeded the Common Article 3 standard of treatment. Notwithstanding, while detainee abuse had occurred in OEF in the past, the DAIG Team observed that units currently conducting detainee operations missions treated detainees humanely. Many noncommissioned officers (NCOs) stated very clearly that the humane treatment of detainees was paramount to the success of the mission. Another group of junior enlisted Soldiers stated that they received substantial training on detainee treatment. They went on to specifically mention that they were taught to treat detainees with dignity and respect. In another sensing session, the NCOs stated that the minimum standard for treating detainees is protection, respect, and humane treatment. Some went on to say that violations are not tolerated by the command or fellow Soldiers. Consistent with these statements, the DAIG Team that visited Iraq and Afghanistan discovered no incidents of abuse that had not been reported through command channels; all incidents were already under investigation. The DAIG Team that visited units recently returning from Iraq did receive a total of 5 new allegations of potential abuse that occurred prior to January 2004. The DAIG Team immediately turned these over to the chain of command and Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID). There is no evidence of the cover-up of current detainee abuse by U.S. Soldiers. This is consistent with the results of the teams' sensing sessions; all currently deployed Soldiers were aware of their responsibility to report abuse and appeared to be willing and able to report any potential abuse. In OIF, U.S. Forces detained the full spectrum of classes of detainees, but most were classified as EPWS or Cls. Presently, Cls make up the vast majority of the U.S.-controlled detainee population. EPWS are entitled to all the protections in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW), and Cls are entitled to relevant protections in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC). The GPW and GC provide detailed levels and standards of treatment for EPWS and Cls that include treatment during armed conflict and occupation. Most leaders and Soldiers treated EPWS and Cls humanely and consistent with the Geneva Conventions (GPW and GC). The Army estimates that over 50,000 detainees have been captured or processed. While even one case of abuse is unacceptable, we conclude that given the volume of detainees and the potential for abuse in these demanding circumstances, the overwhelming majority of our Soldiers and leaders are conducting these operations with due regard for the detainees right to be treated humanely and properly. Detainee abuse does not occur when individual Soldiers remain disciplined, follow known procedures and understand their duty obligation to report abusive behavior. Detainee |