refugees in all states and the furtherance of the general and specific object of the scheme.

The United Nations Agency has agreed:

Pending the completion of the surveys referred to, to preserve up to $40 million to the period December 31, 1953:

(B) If it then be decided to proceed with the plan, to negotiate project agreements entailing the definite commitment of funds; and

(C) The amounts to be reserved or committed will be related to the number of refugees to be removed from the ration rolls in accordance with the project agreements.

Mr. SMITH. Negotiations for this project have not been completed to this time?

Mr. GARDINER. The negotiations have not been completed, no; and we have not yet come to grips with this very vital problem of the water, and we will be informed, and fully informed, during the course of the summer. The Secretary expressed his interest in working out a joint proposal which would be in the best interests of all concerned, and which would, we hope, be most economical under all the circum

stances.

Mr. SMITH. And yet you are asking us to make this authorization, notwithstanding that there have been no definite agreements worked

out.

Now, of course, we would have to go along on faith, would we not? Mr. GARDINER. Mr. Smith, we are between the devil and the deep blue sea as we are asking you to go along on faith and we are hopeful that there will be still further projects beyond those which I detailed to you when I set forth the total financial position.

I do not want to repeat my testimony, but suppose we go out to some other country, for example, Iraq, and there is an $80-million project and they really will talk turkey to us: Can we negotiate that project without the blessing of the Congress? I am afraid we cannot. afraid we cannot encourage UNSWA to go ahead with that agreement unless we are at a point where we are much closer to our money. As I observe this thing, the whole legislative process, as you know it, is on an annual basis here but there is a further complication because of our General Assembly legislation which is part of this U. N. process, and the time table stretches out to very great lengths. Yes, we are asking, please, for a grant of authority, for faith in the executive branch, to help the United Nations conduct this program in such a way that progress in solving this great problem will not be retarded.

Mr. SMITH. Of course, we have been doing that for a good many years and I for one would like to see a change in approach, because it has not gotten us too far.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman CHIPERFIELD. Mr. Bentley, do you want to ask a question? Mr. BENTLEY. Mr. Chairman, I apologize for getting here late but did I understand the gentleman to say that he is talking about a United Nations project?

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. GARDINER. Well, my point was this, sir. I think unless the program is conducted as it is now, on a voluntary basis, with the United States contributing a fairly substantial percentage, we might as well drop it altogether, because if you did limit the United States contribution to a given percentage, it would cease to be a United Nations pro

gram and you would be left either with two alternatives-drop it, or go it alone. I think it is better to work on the United Nations basis and get as much support as we can from our friends in the United Nations.

(Discussion off the record.)

Chairman CHIPERFIELD. Mr. LeCompte.

Mr. LECOMPTE. Mr. Gardiner, you contemplate a 70-percent contribution from this country?

Mr. GARDINER. Mr. LeCompte, we have contemplated we would not furnish more than 70 percent and we have now contributed only 61 percent. If we can hold this to 50 percent, we will do our best to do so.

Mr. LECOMPTE. Of course, you realize there are billions of dollars worth of authorizations right in the United States for flood control and power and reclamation, for which the Congress has not been able to find a dollar-projects that have been recommended by the Army engineers?

Mr. GARDINER. I understand that, sir, but I also conceive that we have a stake in the Middle East, which can be related to commercial interests and the supply of oil; which can be related to strategic interests in airbases; which can be related to transport interests; which can be related to the defense of the whole area.

I also know that we are held to blame for this seething problem of humanity.

Mr. LECOMPTE. Are we altogether to blame?

Mr. GARDINER. Well, I do not know whether we are or not, sir, but I do know that it has been the decision of the United States Government for at least 30 years to establish a Jewish National Home in Israel and it is partly the result of those decisions. You have introduced into the area another 800,000 people, and it is a poor area, and these people will not be able to make their living unless there are reclamation and irrigation projects.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. LECOMPTE. Of course, I was of the opinion that the same amount of money in certain places in the United States would produce lots more food. I have seen that area you are talking about. As you say, it is partly salty.

Mr. GARDINER. Well, we do know, sir, that the Arab is a good and hard-working farmer. I do not know whether it would be better to spend the money in growing the food in this country and shipping it abroad to the refugees-if that were the alternative. I think I would decide, not on the basis of dollars and cents, but on the basis of wisdom, that it is better to have those people working and producing their own food than depending on supplies of food from abroad, and not rotting out their souls in camps.

Mr. LECOMPTE. Only one more question, though, or remark: No matter how good your plan is, you do not have any plan for raising the money.

Mr. GARDINER. Well, we have already, sir, received support in the Congress for this program. It is not a new program. We have been plugging away as hard as we could, as you well know, for nearly 4 years now. We think we are getting to the point where things are turning our way and these governments will talk business with us in the way of rehabilitating refugees.

Unless we have the funds and the blessing of the Congress, we cannot go out and talk firm projects to these countries, and you would not want us to because that would be a usurpation of authority.

I am afraid we have a situation where to be effective we have to ask you for an appropriation of money although we are not going to spend it the next day.

Mr. LECOMPTE. Money that we do not have.

Mr. GARDINER. I can only say I am trying to explain as best I can a problem in the Near East which is of concern to our security interests. If we cannot afford to protect those security interests, that is a decision which I would leave to the Congress, who are my superiors and my bosses.

But my duty, sir, is to tell you what we think can be done, what we hope to do, if in your wisdom you decide it is in the American interests to do it.

Chairman CHIPERFIELD. I hope we can bring this part of it to a close so we can proceed. We have a number of matters we want to. take up this morning.

Mr. JAVITS. I will just take 2 minutes if I may, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Gardiner, you have placed a great emphasis on the problem of the Arab refugees and I think that is proper.

Is it a fact, however, that this is not the only problem which keeps the Near East in ferment and that the struggle between the Arab. states and Britain, as well as the whole ultranationalist agitation and extremely low standard of living and high disease rates there are keeping the area in the condition which it is?

Mr. GARDINER. I think this is a symptom of the other conditions. If it were a perfect area as well organized as the United States you would absorb the 800,000 and would have done it long since. But the refugee problem sticks out like a sore thumb, as you well know. I agree that this is not the only problem, but I think it is a big problem, and I do not think it is one from which we can disassociate ourselves.

Mr. JAVITS. Is it not the fact that the whole United Nations plan for Palestine collapsed in these respects: There was to be another state, an Arab state, in Palestine, and that state has not been organized. But that other Arab states, to wit, Egypt and Jordan, have actually taken the territory which was supposed to be that of the new Arab state. Is that correct?

Mr. GARDINER. It is true, sir, that Egypt and Jordan are now in control of those areas, and Jordan has annexed, if you like, Arab Palestine.

Incidentally, Mr. Javits, my research indicates that the Gaza strip was allotted to the Arab state.

Mr. JAVITS. I think the record should be clear that just as there have been armistice agreements which have extended Israel's borders to more than they were under the United Nations decision, so also has the whole United Nations decision been invalidated by the seizure and annexation of what was to have been the Arab state, and insofar as Jerusalem is concerned, as I understand it, it is completely up in the air.

Mr. GARDINER. We viewed that history, and I think the record of the hearing a week ago will indicate that I testified that the case of the Israelis was that this plan had been attacked by the Arabs.

33064-53-——66

Mr. JAVITS. The only thing I was adding is that what was to have been the Arab state in Palestine, that that territory, or a good part of it, has been taken by other Arab states, and that there is just nothing left of that proposed state now.

Mr. GARDINER. That is correct, sir, as is indicated on this map.

(The following statement has been submitted for inclusion in the record at this point:)

THE JUSTIFICATION OF IRRIGATION PROJECTS IN THE NEAR EAST

THE PROBLEM

For many years to come the Near East must depend largely upon agriculture. In the northern Arab countries, for example, the sole great resources are the rivers crossing vast stretches of arid land.

The first and basic need of the area is to feed its own peoples. This has been made vastly more difficult for the area by the 800,000 Jewish immigrants from abroad, and the displacement of a virtually equivalent Arab population. This has led to the need not only for the intensive development of Israel, but also to competition for the meager land resources and few employment opportunities in the Arab states. The region was able to provide only a bare subsistence for most of its former residents, and only the existence of the large-scale relief program administered by UNRWA has prevented widespread starvation.

Competent studies, such as those prepared by the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East, by private organizations, and by the governments themselves, are agreed that with few exceptions the soil and the climate of the area, together with the water available, are well suited not only to the coarse grains which are now grown out of necessity, but also to industrial crops that could make an effective contribution both to the area and to the free world as a whole. Eventually, a potential can be developed to create agricultural surpluses to help feed the deficiency areas of Europe, while at the same time generating the foreign exchange needed to purchase manufactured goods.

The key to the problem lies in irrigation and intensive farming, backed by adequate storage facilities. At the same time, the water storage installations necessary for irrigation can provide the hydroelectric power which can serve as a basis for the development, over a period of years, of manufacturing industries. Water is thus the basic need to make this land, which once supported a great and wealthy civilization, productive. In ancient times there were great waterways and great cisterns. To quote the final report of the United Nations

Economic Survey Mission: "Old-time wars destroyed these things. The land has dried up and the people have gone. Cisterns are silted up, springs filled in and fouled, irrigation works broken down. Yet the land remains, the rain still falls, the rivers flow. If the water be once more saved and spread upon the land, crops will grow again. Man, now unemployed for lack of soil to till, living on the verge of starvation, gathering elsewhere one precarious catchcrop of poor cereals a year, could once more find a modest acreage which, if irrigated and properly cultivated, would redeem them from penury and give them a chance to achieve that measure of prosperity which makes for stability and peace."

THE NEED FOR UNITED STATES AID

Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan are clearly unable to finance by themselves the cost of constructing the agricultural and river development projects needed to make an impact on farm production commensurate with the problem. While a portion of these projects can and should be financed by bankable loans, the capacity of most of these countries to service foreign loans is limited, and the projects which are most needed for basic economic development are not ones which will yield readily identifiable foreign credit earnings or savings.

Here again, the problem is complicated by the presence of hundreds of thousands of penniless refugees from Palestine. Progress toward a solution of the refugee problem is essential if peace and stability in the area is to be achieved, and UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees), with the full support of the United States, is attempting to help these refugees to become self-supporting. But as General Bedell Smith stated in a document filed with this committee:

"It is unreasonable to expect Arab countries to accept refugees as workers unless means are found to improve conditions of their own citizens at the same time. The refugees cannot be the sole beneficiaries of new opportunities, nor can they hope to elbow settled people aside. Here lies the case for general economic development of the host countries, which deserves to be considered on its own merits as well as in the context of providing opportunities for the refugees. From the conclusion of hostilities in Palestine, until today, little tangible progress has been made in such development in Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Egypt. The interest and plans of these countries hold out hope for the future, but they will need help from the banks and from our own Government as well as from the UNRWA, if their plans are to mature."

If these countries are to be lifted from the vicious circle of low production resulting from the lack of material resources and economic opportunity, prompt steps must be taken to create new cultivable lands and new jobs for the benefit of the area as a whole. In Secretary Dulles' testimony before this committee on June 2, he summed up the problem by saying: "Our feeling is that we must move forward both through the United Nations *** and in our direct dealings with these countries, to develop more places for people to live and to earn a living, and that through that process we can work out a sound solution of the ArabIsrael situation."

THE PROJECTS

Typical of the projects are those which may be considered for Jordan, Syria, and Egypt. Those in Jordan and Syria might well be financed both by UNRWA and through United States special emonomic assistance; the illustrative Egyptian project probably would not qualify for UNRWA financing, although Egypt and UNRWA have under negotiation a project in Egypt which could be wholly financed by UNRWA if refugees will be the sole beneficiaries.

Jordan-Yarmuk River development.-The most important potential in Jordan for economic development is found in the Jordan-Yarmuk River Valley. Only through the planned use of its resources can we hope to create sufficient irrigated land to make self-sustaining a substantial portion of the more than 450.000 Palestine refugees in Jordan. In addition, the effects of the drought of 1950-51 have demonstrated the importance to the basic Jordan economy of large-scale water storage and extensive irrigation.

The proposed development would provide direct benefits for both the indigenous inhabitants of the Jordan-Yarmuk Valley, of whom there are about 40,000 living on a bare subsistence level, and an estimated 100,000 Palestine refugees. This estimate of refugees benefited is based on preliminary hydrological estimates that sufficient water is likely to be available for use within Jordan to provide some 21,000 additional families with an average of 64 acres of irrigated land. If account is taken of the various ancillary services to the farming community, and of the power which might be generated from the development for industrial use, it is estimated that secondary absorption may provide a livelihood in the area in the years immediately following the completion of construction for still another 100,000 persons, or roughly 250,000 in all. The indirect benefits thus would create employment opportunities which would permit both the resettlement of additional refugees and an improvement in the lot of many Jordanians. The construction cost of the irrigation development of the Jordan-Yarmuk Valley (excluding power production, for which financing can be sought through the IBRD or other banking channels) is estimated to be from $60 million to $70 million, depending largely on which of several alternative engineering proposals proves to be most feasible and economic. The preliminary survey work, estimated to cost about $1.5 million, has already been started by Jordan with United States technical assistance, and additional studies encompassing the entire region are also in process. Present engineering work is expected to provide a sound basis for the selection of one of the several engineering proposals made for water storage and control, and for understandings shared by all the interested nations, as to the manner in which the waters of the area can be fairly apportioned.

Concrete proposals now being subjected to detailed analysis provide for the construction of an irrigation canal which will run down the entire length of the Jordan Valley on the east bank to the northern shores of the Dead Sea. Additional proposals for the irrigation of the west bank of the Jordan River are also under consideration. It is believed that construction could be begun in the near future on one or more main canals and much of the lateral ditching, as considerable work need not await the final decision as to storage sites.