Ghab Swamp reclamation.—Syria's potential for agricultural expansion, which is rivaled among the Arab countries only by Iraq, is based in part on the reclamation of swamp areas. The Ghab Swamp in northwestern Syria presents the most important possibilities for reclamation of this type in the country. A Dutch firm completed in 1952 a preconstruction survey of this project, which will add 100,000 acres of rich irrigated land to Syria's agricultural and resettlement potential. The use of the Ghab for refugee resettlement will probably be limited, but it will be an important site for the settlement of Alouites and other native Syrians, and will help to create a more ready setting for the settlement of Palestinian refugees elsewhere in the country. The technical problem is to dredge and deepen the Orontes River so that it may carry water away more effectively, to dig canals and build pumping stations so that the water of the springs may be effectively dispersed, and to construct a dam at Rastan to store the water of the Orontes and control its flow into the Ghab Valley. The Syrians have taken the initiative on the project and are expected to be able to get the dredging, and canal digging phases of the project well under way without foreign aid. The total cost of the project, however, has been estimated at $20 million, and the foreign exchange component has been estimated at one-half of the total. Since this cost is far in excess of Syria's budget for all developmental purposes together, assistance will likely be required for this or similar projects if concrete results are to be obtained in the near future. Irrigation of the Northern Delta.-Egypt's most serious need is for a more widely diversified and productive agriculture, capable of supplying the foodstuffs that its rapidly growing population requires. According to a study recently made by the Ministry of Public Works and approved by Egypt's National Resources Development Board, the region of the Northern Delta offers one of the finest potentials in the country for raising rice, clover, and cereals. The development of this potential, however, requires the construction of large irrigation and drainage works. This project would involve (1) the erection of two large pumping stations, the first for raising irrigation water from the Qalubiya main drain and transferring it to the Wadi Canal, and the second for lifting irrigation water from the drain of Bahr Hadous and transferring it to the Hanout Canal; and (2) the construction of a network of irrigation and drainage ditches to permit the effective use of the waters provided. An estimated 350 million cubic meters of summer water could be utilized under this proposal, to the benefit of an area of nearly 110,000 acres. Of the total estimated cost of $7 million, roughly half would be expended for ditch construction which has a low foreign currency component. Except for a few relatively minor items, such as ditch control units, it is anticipated that Egypt can meet the ditching costs without draining its limited foreign exchange reserves. The pumping stations themselves, however, would require a substantial foreign currency expenditure. The development of this and a number of similar proposals for increasing Egypt's agricultural area might have to be deferred indefinitely unless assistance is forthcoming from abroad. Chairman CHIPERFIELD. Thank you very much, Mr. Gardiner. Mr. Wood. We thought we would go in if you please, sir, with a further description of the request for (deletion secret) military end item assistance in this area, since questions on this subject were raised by the chairman and certain members of the committee yesterday. We have with us for this purpose, Mr. Byroade, Assistant Secretary of State for the Near Eastern, South Asian, and African affairs, who, as you know, has just returned with Secretary Dulles and Mr. Stassen from that area, Mr. Frank Nash, Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs in the Department of Defense, and your old friend. General Stewart. We should like to answer the questions which were raised on this subject, now, if we may. It seems quite appropriate to do so right after Mr. Gardiner's description of the situation in part of this area. STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY A. BYROADE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NEAR EASTERN, SOUTH ASIAN, AND AFRICAN AFFAIRS Mr. BYROADE. I understood yesterday that there was some concern in this committee that the amount of friction and trouble in the area had led to the conclusion that it might not be wise to put military equipment in this area. I would like to speak to that point, if that is the point of concern in the committee, but very frankly I am worried about the record. I have read what is in the record and I think to make you understand the way we feel about this, I have to talk about things that should not be made public. If it is agreeable, I would like to speak to you very frankly and off the record. Chairman CHIPERFIELD. We can go off the record. (Whereupon, the then following remarks were not reported.) Chairman CHIPERFIELD. Are there any questions? Mr. JAVITS. I would like to ask this one question, Mr. Byroade: I notice a statement here in the paper which is furnished to us, that there is something real to this Israeli military potential. What in your opinion--and you have both a diplomatic and military opinion-is there to it? This paper says, "Israel has shown that its military force can be a formidable one." Well, it won a war, of course, but I think it implies more than that and I ask what you could tell us. Mr. BYROADE. I think that statement is absolutely correct. Not only the standing forces in Israel, but the potentiality of mobilization in İsrael where you have vast training throughout your citizenry, and the natural spirit and drive of the Jewish individual and his knowhow makes this a formidable force. When you get into the utilization of that force in the defense of the area, you get into other types of problems. That force today is not usable in the areas I have been talking about. (Discussion off the record.) Mr. BYROADE. I think you have here a good little force, but it is not susceptible to use in the defense of the area as a whole except as the war gets down toward their area. (Discussion off the record.) Mr. JAVITS. Mr. Chairman, may I say, as I see the outlines of the Defense and State Department's approach to this, it comes to an area concept for the Near East and using the bridges of some economic and military assistance and advice instead of the diplomatic bridge at this stage to try to bring some stability to that area. Is that fair, Mr. Byroade? Mr. BYROADE. It may be a little oversimplification, but that is it. Mr. JAVITS. I am in agreement with you and I will do everything I can to cooperate and also to do all I can to quiet the reported Arab fears of expansionism there which I think it is very important to do. Mr. BYROADE. Thank you very much. Mr. JAVITS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman CHIPERFIELD. Mr. Harrison Mr. HARRISON. Did I understand you to say that our past contribution was $57 to the Jew and $0.50 to the Arab? Mr. BYROADE. When you consider the populations and our assistance to the various states, that is where it comes out if you leave out contributions to the Arab refugees. Mrs. BOLTON. But we contribute to Jewish refugees, also. Mr. BYROADE. That is included in our total assistance to Israel. I gave that as the type of thing one runs into in the area when they complain about our past actions. Mr. HARRISON. Mr. Secretary, any military defense to be of any value must hold out some hope of effective defense, is that not so? Mr. BYROADE. That is so. Mr. HARRISON. Otherwise it is entirely wasted and falls into enemy hands; is that not correct? Mr. BYROADE. That is correct. Mr. HARRISON. If this is not an effective military contribution, if the area is open for any assault upon it regardless of our military aid, why should there be military aid? (Discussion off the record.) Mr. JAVITS. I heard you mention this $57 figure. As I divide $72 million by 1,600,000 people, it comes to about $45. Mr. GARDINER. That is correct, sir. I think that the Secretary originally said 47 and that is correct, not 57. Mr. BYROADE. I said $57. That is what the Arabs told me. Mr. SMITH. Mr. Byroade, what you really are asking us to do this morning is to approve the request for an authorization of [deletionsecret] and that you are to use your own judgment as to where it is to be spread out, is that right? I mean you have no definite program or plan as to its use of the [deletion-secret]. Mr. BYROADE. I have told you the States we were interested in in this regard. From there on it would be the Defense Department and ourselves, with such consultation as you wish. I cannot tell you this morning that we would want to do such and such to a certain regiment in a certain country because we have not talked to the countries in such specific terms. This is the way we started out in Europe, too. Mr. SMITH. We present this matter on the floor of the House. (Discussion off the record.) Mr. SMITH. How is that going to be used? We have not the answer. Mr. BYROADE. I think you could say, sir, that this is about-I have forgotten the total defense effort of the United States-but it is a very small portion to be put into an area to begin strengthening its defense against possible encroachment from the north. It is a vague case, I realize. Next year if we get our military people in there we can come back to you and tell you exactly what we want to do because by then we will have talked to these foreign governments. This is what they want to do. (Discussion off the record.) Mrs. BOLTON. The idea being military missions as against that as we did it in other countries in Europe? Mr. BYROADE. Under our legislation whenever you give even a small amount of military equipment, a military mission goes along with it. They are there to see that our equipment is properly used and then one can get into the question of some joint planning. Mr. SMITH. That is still a lot of money in my part of the country. Mr. WOOD. Mr. Smith, you may recall that General Stewart did put before the committee an illustrative breakdown of this amount among the several countries of the area, indicating what, on the basis of purely staff level consideration, they were tentatively planning. Mrs. BOLTON. That was secret information. Mr. WOOD. You are quite correct. Moreover, the program which General Stewart presented was on an illustrative basis only; he pointed out that it had not been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That presentation represented the furthest that it was humanly possible for us to go in laying our plans in this regard before you. There is, of course, in our proposal the limitation which is inherent in the fact that the use of the funds involved would be confined to the title II area, unless the transfer authority were invoked. It would not be a global fund that could be used anywhere in the world. It is for this area. Mr. SMITH. The same principle is involved in the money for Japan. We are asking for an authorization, but mum is the word. Mr. WOOD. It is the dilemma in which we find ourselves. Mrs. BOLTON. It might, however, kill the bill. Mr. SMITH. We have to have some answers to some of these questions that are going to be raised. (Discussion off the record.) Mr. WOOD. What such a statement would do to the whole security problem in that area I think you know better than I do? Mr. BYROADE. We are in an area of the world here where personal confidence and contacts and friendships mean everything. I think the Secretary spoke about this. The agreements we are sometimes required to make are so long and so legal and so complicated that the good will we try to obtain by a small amount of assistance is offset by the fact that they just are suspicious of what all this legal language means. I cannot stress that too much. I think Mr. Stassen spoke about it. Chairman CHIPERFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I believe we are going to have Mr. Nash. Mr. WOOD. Mr. Nash has a word to say on this. Mrs. CHURCH. I had another question: I would like to have an estimate of how much is included in here for authorization for money which is not definitely assigned, such as the money for Japan, the money for this Near East area, et cetera. We should know exactly how much is in this bill for which there has been no definite planning at this moment. Would you rather our staff made such a study? Mr. WOOD. I will be glad to do that, Mrs. Church. I think, again, that we get into problems of definition. There is definite planning, for example, with respect to the amount for Japan. Mrs. CHURCH. May I change the wording to "specific assignation." Would that help? Mr. WOOD. All these programs in all of the areas are presented as illustrative, because we know that things do change. This has been the precedent in the past. We do ask for a specific sum for military end-item assistance for each area; for a separate, specific sum for economic aid or defense support or defense financing for each area; and, in the case of certain multilateral activities, for specific amounts for each. However, when we break these separate figures down country by country, we do so on an illustrative basis because it has been found that conditions change and that sometimes one country needs more, while another country needs less, than we originally predicted. In that sense, you can say there are no definite assignations of funds, except in a few cases, such as, for example, in the case of those programs for Great Britain about which I testified earlier-the program of commodity assistance and the aircraft program. Mrs. CHURCH. Well, Mr. Chairman, perhaps if I stated what I need, you might be able to satisfy the request: I would like to know how much is included in the bill, the use of which is contingent upon possible agreements that may be made with other countries. That is one thing. I should think that could be given very definitely. That question came up the other day in connection with Latin America. Secondly, I would like to know how many lump-sum blank checks we are providing, the millions for Japan, the millions for this on that project, for which you hope to have within the year, a definite plan for spending. Mr. WOOD. Well, we will try to get up something that will be responsive to those questions. I am sure the first one, as you restated it, can be readily answered. We may have to discuss the second one with you further in order to get a little more precise definition of what you desire. May I say, Mrs. Church, that I am expecting to receive a paper during this hearing which represents an attempt to answer the question which you asked the other day. Mrs. CHURCH. Thank you very much. Mr. HARRISON. Mr. Chairman, in that connection, I would like to ask Mr. Wood this: Mr. Vorys asked the other day for a summary of the recommendations of these businessmen's teams. Mr. WOOD. It will be available tomorrow morning. Mr. BYROADE. Congressman Smith, I am concerned about your question: I would love to have time to tell you what has happened to the positions of the other western powers in the Middle East, and to our own position, but we are in a situation where we either ignore this part of the world or realize that if stability is to be maintained. United States actions are of foremost importance. Now the British have had great experience in working in this part of the world but we have not. By and large they have had a system of government whereby they could respond quickly to local events. Our process of government is such as to make it very difficult for us to be in a position to respond quickly on some minor thing that would really pav dividends here in a political way. Heretofore, if Iraq, let us say, wanted a few tanks, we would have to take them out of somebody else's program which throws the Pentagon in a tailspin, and it takes a lot of time. We want to play the Middle East by ear and respond where we can to the best advantage. I realize that is a bit of a blank check, but I think the United States is in that position in the Middle East. Mr. SMITH. I do not want you to feel that I minimize the situation. I have been conscious of the strategic situation in the Middle East, |