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on a special matter at 10:30. Would it be possible to defer the meeting until 11:30, at which time I could come up?

I think this is a rather short matter, but I really should be there unless you want to make some other arrangements. If nothing else can be done, I can send someone else to the National Security Council. but on this special item I would much rather be there.

Chairman CHIPERFIELD. We will set it at 11:30, then.

Mr. ROOSEVELT. Or even 12:00.

Mrs. BOLTON. The House is in session tomorrow.
Mr. STASSEN. I will try to be up at 11:30.

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Stassen, before you leave I would like to try to find out where we stand on infrastructure.

This committee that was abroad recently was given a cost for the infrastructure programs based on a basis of $969 million. The first three slices, they were told, amounted to $739 million, of which the United States already had made appropriations to cover of $288 million.

Now, does the $750 million-do you add that to the first three slices, or how do you get at the figure that is going to be the total?

Mr. STASSEN. The $770 million you add as the last half of the fourth slice and the entire fifth slice. That is the conclusion of the total program.

Mr. VORYS. Then you talk about $969 million plus $770 million. Mr. STASSEN. I have not verified your $969 million, but whatever the figure is up through December last year you then add $770 million, and that is what you have.

Mr. VORYS. Then the only forward agreement that was made this is $770 million beyond anything that has been talked of before? Mr. STASSEN. That is right.

Mr. VORYS. And brings the total to $1,749,000,000, of which we paid nothing on the first slice, but are to pay what, roughly, $319 million? Mr. STASSEN. We did not participate in the first slice, since it was agreed prior to the advent of the SHAPE command. It was not put into the slice situation. We paid forty-two and a fraction percent of this balance. I think you will find that those tables, if you have the same tables I think you have, show, first, nothing and then up a very high percentage and then various 40 percents. Is that the one? Mr. VORYS. This is from the committee's report, and it is the latest thing I could lay my hands on.

It is information, as I understand, which was secured in Europe? Mr. BULLOCK. That is from the Pentagon people, that particular

one.

Mr. VORYS. The first slice was nothing. The next was 48 percent. The next was 43 percent. The next was-this first instrument of the fourth was 40. That is all.

That goes clear across here and totals $969 million, with the United States paying $380 million, of which $288 million has been already appropriated.

Now, I was trying to figure whether this was added on.

Mr. STASSEN. This is added on. This is $770 million added to what you have read there.

Mr. MORANO. To the $288 million?

Mr. VORYS. No; it is added on to $380 million.

Mr. STASSEN. You add 42.5 percent of $770 million to whatever we paid over there.

Mr. MORANO. In other words, the whole thing will be $388 million plus $315 million, roughly.

Mr. STASSEN. Yes; that is right; but we did not contribute to the first slice.

Mr. MORANO. But it is not in there?

Mr. STASSEN. It is an additional amount.

Mr. VORYS. Do the contributions of other countries include cost of land?

Mr. STASSEN. No.

Mr. MORANO. No land and no taxes?

Mr. STASSEN. No; it is hard-money contributions to the central fund.

Mr. MORANO. There is a prohibition, I think, in the law against acquiring infrastructure where we have to pay taxes.

Mr. STASSEN. That is right.

Mr. MORANO. We are prohibited by law from entering into anything like that.

Mr. VORYS. Yes; I know. I put that in there.

Thank you.

Chairman CHIPERFIELD. Thank you very much.

Mr. STASSEN. If you would like, I can have that table checked and see if it relates to the same thing we have.

Chairman CHIPERFIELD. The committee is adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 12: 15 p. m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 11:30 a. m. Thursday, April 30, 1953.)

MUTUAL SECURITY ACT EXTENSION

THURSDAY, APRIL 30, 1953

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, D. C.

The committee met, pursuant to call, Foreign Affairs Committee Room, United States Capitol, at 11:40 a. m., Hon. Robert B. Chiperfield (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Chairman CHIPERFIELD. The committee will be in order.
You may proceed, Mr. Stassen.

STATEMENT OF HON. HAROLD E. STASSEN, DIRECTOR FOR
MUTUAL SECURITY

Mr. STASSEN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to apologize for being delayed.

As I told you yesterday, we had a special meeting of the National Security Council. While I could have sent an alternate, it was quite important that on this matter I be personally present. We just concluded, and I came right up here.

May I say in this special hearing of this committee that I am. pleased to respond to the invitation of this committee with its able Members of Congress, with its constructive interest and definite responsibility in foreign affairs, for a frank discussion of East-West trade controls, a field in which I am aware you have had both pioneering and follow-through interest of very major significance.

It is an important program, and it is a complex and difficult pro

gram.

I say to you, in the first instance, that President Eisenhower's new administration will carry out its statutory responsibilities under the Battle Act with scrupulous care. You may be sure of that.

I am sure you recognize further that trade controls are not an isolated activity.

They cannot be operated in an airtight compartment of their own. They are only a part of a major policy objective of our Government. President Eisenhower described that objective in his state of the Union message in the following words:

Application of our influence in world affairs with such fortitude and such foresight that it will deter aggression and eventually secure peace.

The President also made it plain that the foreign policy we pursue

will recognize and here are his words

will recognize the truth that no single country, even one so powerful as ours, can alone defend the liberty of all nations threatened by Communist aggression from without or subversion within.

That statement by the President is just as applicable to trade controls as to anything else.

This job of trade controls must be done within the context of international cooperation.

An effective system of trade controls is an impossibility without the cooperation of other non-Communist nations.

The United States, with all its great power and resources, cannot alone carry out this task.

We can, and we have, cut off all exports of every description from this country to the aggressors of Red China, and we do not allow American ships to touch the Chinese mainland.

But we cannot, and we should not, coerce the friendly governments of other sovereign nations.

The plain fact of life is that we can get better cooperation by negotiation and persuasion than we could ever get by attempts at coercion. Compulsion in this matter of trade controls would be an unacceptable and impractical method of getting the job accomplished.

If we were to block off some trade by unilateral threat or coercion, but thereby lose a valuable friend and military ally, then we would not be making a net gain, but would have slipped a step backward down the hill toward disunity and the danger of war.

The net advantage of such a move would lie with the Communist side of the Iron Curtain.

We can never afford to forget that not one of our special programs, including the important program of controlling strategic exports, has any real promise of lasting value to the cause of freedom unless the countries that mean to defend their freedom can stand together in mutual respect and united purpose.

Now, does this mean that the United States must follow a timidsoul policy in the control of strategic exports? Of course it does not. This Government will not fail to pursue its convictions energetically in the family of free nations.

This international trade control program is an instrument of economic defense, designed to impede the military buildup of the Soviet bloc and strengthen the free world relative to the bloc.

The cooperative efforts are continuing, and in fact have been steadily expanded. The international groups that were formed for this purpose are participated in by the United States, Canada, West Germany, Japan, and most of the NATO countries of Europe.

The United States Congress, as you know, through a series of amendments to various statutes, has established the concept that American aid should not go to countries that did not cooperate in the control of strategic exports. You are familiar with those developments, of course, and with the fact that on October 26, 1951, the last of those amendments was supplanted by the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act, commonly known as the Battle Act.

The countries of the free world without exception refuse to ship arms, refuse to ship munitions, refuse to ship atomic energy materials to the Soviet bloc.

In addition, the important industrial countries today deny shipment of a wide range of other products and materials, covering those items that might make a significant contribution to the bloc's war potential.

The cooperating countries have agreed to control, though not flatly embargo, another wide range of items of secondary significance.

Shipments to Communist China and North Korea are drastically controlled and the so-called secondary strategic items are embargoed by the cooperating countries, but not by all non-Communist countries. Taken all in all, these programs have already accomplished much. They have pinched the Soviet bloc by withholding materials that the bloc countries could have used in their industrial-military expansion. The effect has been-not to strike a vital blow-but to delay and restrict the efficient production of many items of importance to the Communist warmaking capacity.

Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen of the committee, I feel that one of the best indications of a measure of success is the rather desperate efforts that the Soviet make at very high cost to get certain strategic items.

In other words, one of your best indications that you are pinching down on their supply of something is whether they make a very desperate effort to get it.

We, of course, have much intelligence information on this. Much of this, it would not be wise to given in open hearing. I can properly say to you, that we know of instances in which they have tried to get ferro molybdenum by paying 10 times the regular world price, and they have tried to do it through all kinds of subterfuge and special deals.

We know of many other items that are generally used in military buildup that they have tried to get at prices 2 and 3 times the regular world price.

And when you get confirmation of that kind, you know that you are pinching off the things they would really like to get.

We also know that we have some special problems. In relationship to that, I would like to restate the main objectives, as we see it, of the United States, as reflected from your legislative direction and our whole appraisal of the world situation.

Our policies concerning the controls of the free world could be summarized as follows:

1. Stop the flow-to any part of the Soviet bloc-of strategic exports that would in any material degree increase the warmaking potential.

2. Especially restrict trade with Red China so long as Red Chinese soldiers are fighting troops of the free world in Asia.

3. Endeavor to insure that nonstrategic trade of free nations with the Soviet bloc results in a net security advantage for the free nations. 4. Maintain a close and friendly relationship among the free

nations.

There is much yet to be done in the improvement of international cooperation in the enforcement of controls. As this committee knows, devices such as the rerouting of strategic goods in free ports to Soviet destinations are employed to evade the controls of exporting countries. I hope that before long we can report a very substantial advance in the control of goods in transit. That control of course requires the cooperation of all the major mercantile and merchant marine countries.

I am sure you are interested in the control of shipping in the China trade, and I brought you a statement on that subject 1 month ago, when I testified in executive session.

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