If you wish, I will look forward to reporting back to you when we come back from the Near East and from South Asia. Chairman CHIPERFIELD. Mr. Vorys wants to ask one question. Mr. VORYS. It is not a question. I just want to say this. I find that in the European Study Committee, everything they had to say about infrastructure, has been marked secret. We have a very brief paragraph in this book on infrastructure. Before you leave town I hope you will plead with the military that if they want to get some infrastructure they had better get us into shape to be able to tell more about what it is about, how it has been doing, and so forth. So far it is so secret that it will be difficult to explain it. Mr. STASSEN. We will ask the military to declassify as much as they think that they can. Of course I do hope that you feel that we should be very careful on publicizing plans on airfields 2 or 3 years ahead. If you make too much public the other side begins to figure, "Well now, how does that affect us in the future and how do we put in some interceptors and radar to offset that?" With regard to amounts as contrasted to geographic locations, I think the Department of Defense could give you much more as to what is involved. I would say in this whole picture that it is tremendously important that we do not underestimate the capabilities of the Soviet Union as a military threat, and it is also of great importance that we do not underestimate the capabilities of military strength on the part of the free world. There are very substantial military capabilities in our own country and in our own great defense program and on the part of our friends. It is with a sort of a pose of confidence and determination that we can move forward together with some brightening hope, I feel, of coming through without the tragedy of a third world war. Mr. JUDD. Well, Mr. Chairman, I hope that Mr. Stassen and Mr. Dulles will, among all the other things you have to do, keep this constantly in mind: How to offset the Soviet's moves in one place by countermoves in other directions and places. Here in Indochina we are being sucked into the same old game of dancing to their tune, running around trying to put out fires they start. We hastily put up $400 million extra, to put out a new fire in Southeast Asia that we knew was coming all these years, and we are not ready for it and we do not react elsewhere. Isn't there some way that once in a while when they strike in one place the United States can find some way of promptly putting on pressure somewhere else? I think we should have opened up in Korea. That would have. stopped advances in Laos. We go around bleeding and bleeding and trying to retrieve something after it is half lost. Mr. ZABLOCKI. I want to remind the governor that Dr. Judd and I are both anxiously awaiting the reevaluation of the Far East intelligence reports. Mr. JUDD. That is right. You will never get it. Chairman CHIPERFIELD. The committee is adjourned. (Whereupon, at 5: 10 p. m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10:30 a. m., Thursday, May 7, 1953.) MUTUAL SECURITY ACT EXTENSION THURSDAY, MAY 7, 1953 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Washington, D. C. The committee met in executive session, pursuant to call, in room G-3, United States Capitol, at 10: 40 a. m., Hon. Robert B. Chiperfield, chairman, presiding. Chairman CHIPERFIELD. The committee will come to order. We are glad to have you here, General Bradley. I understand you have a statement. You may proceed in any way you desire. STATEMENT OF GEN. OMAR N. BRADLEY, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF General BRADLEY. Mr. Chairman, with the permission of the members I will read this statement and then I think we can cover most of your questions. Representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I am supposed to furnish you a strictly military viewpoint on the Mutual Security Program. (1) As to the military situation in the world, to the best of my knowledge and belief, there is no indication of any kind that the Soviet and Soviet-satellite military capabilities have diminished in the past year. On the contrary, there is every indication that the Soviets continue vigorously to develop and modernize the forces that they could throw against the free world. We believe that their atomic capability is rapidly improving. I know of no intelligence which reveals any change of attitude on the part of the Soviet Union or which would give us any reason to diminish, or slow down, or stretch out our preparedness effort. It may be of interest to you to know that the military chiefs of the 14 NATO nations are of the same opinion. No evidence was offered at the recent NATO meeting of any reduction of the Soviet threat. The risk continues to be great. The possibility of war is still with us. Both conditions will exist as long as our defenses are relatively weak. (2) The military aid part of the Mutual Security Program is all important to the collective security of the free world. For several more years our allies-which we sorely need right now and in time of war if it occurs-will not be able to mobilize effective ground, naval, or air forces without a strong, continuing support, through a program of mutual security. To a large extent our security is dependent upon their security. (3) The defense support funds in the present Mutual Security Program are also of tremendous interest to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We consider them very important, especially in the NATO countries. These funds for the long pull-are almost as important as the military end items to be supplied. The defense support directly assists in the reestablishment of an adequate mobilization base and furnishes additional means for self-help among the producing nations. (4) In Paris last month, the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization acted on the recommendations of the annual review which set forth the defense effort being made by all the member nations. This is the second annual review we have had. From the two reviews, I am quite convinced that the NATO nations are making as great an effort as can be expected of them under present conditions. They have pledged themselves to an increase in ground forces and in the number of aircraft they have planned for their own defense. I point to this as a sign of the continuing progress of the NATO collective defense and the continuing good faith of our allies. In order to more rapidly attain this collective defense, we should continue our Mutual Security Program. (5) As you know, it is not the duty of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to fix the amount of funds to be requested for this program. As a basis for the whole Mutual Security effort, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have developed the force levels of all countries which we believe should be supported. These force levels are then used as a basis for developing the requests for funds. Each year's increment is a step forward toward the final goal of sufficient forces to make the free world relaatively secure in the face of the threats which confront us. When the fiscal determination is made each year, we are then asked to divide up among the 4 titles and among the 3 services. On April 29, the Joint Chiefs of Staff received a memorandum from the Acting Secretary of Defense, Mr. Kyes, giving them the decision as to the amount that the Director of Mutual Security would request the Congress to authorize and appropriate for fiscal year 1954 military assistance activities. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were then asked to recommend the distribution between military departments and titles of the amount to be available for materiel, and for training programs. This amount was considerably less than the amount we had contemplated in our initial recommendation for the military assistance portion for the next fiscal year. However, I would like to make it clear that the Joint Chiefs of Staff support all of this program. From a strictly military viewpoint, we would like to have much more to help equip and modernize, and support, and maintain the forces our allies can be expected to mobilize. Without our help, their progress in attaining military sufficiency would be too slow. (6) I would like to emphasize that the three services, in planning the military aid for the NATO countries, have given emphasis to the improvement of existing units by filling their requirements, rather than by the creation of new units. General Ridgway supports this action. He wants to make the forces he has at his command as effective as possible. He also wants to be sure that the forces in his command have the adequate logistic support to make them battleworthy on a sustained basis. In our opinion, this is sound planning which this program will implement to a great extent. (7) It may be of interest to you that during the maneuvers last fall in Germany, I saw some of our equipment being used by the French forces. The units I saw were taking excellent care of the equipment they had and were making good progress in their training. I believe that this year's maneuvers will show a further improvement in these units, and I would hope that some members of your committee could visit these maneuvers to see how well the units of the organization of the other nations are doing with the equipment we are helping provide. General Ridgway reports that by and large, much progress is being made in the state of training and preparedness of the combat units of the NATO nations who are receiving this assistance. In addition, our own military assistance advisory groups, who are assisting in the training of the Allied forces, are doing an excellent job. We have been furnishing military assistance long enough now to know that it is paying security dividends. I hope that you will continue to give wholehearted support to this program. Chairman CHIPERFIELD. Thank you very much, General. At the suggestion of Mr. Vorys and one or two others with whom I have consulted, we have decided to reverse the process and start with the members at the other end of the table. I am sure at this end of the table there will be no objection. We will start with Mr. Bentley. Mr. BENTLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your consideration and that of the others in reversing the procedure. General Bradley, we are glad to have you here and the other gentleman you have brought with you. I would like to ask one or two general questions, first: In the whole question of the military buildup of Western Europe, the idea is, I presume, to reach a satisfactory defensive position with regard to the Soviet and satellite armed forces. There is no question of putting the Western European forces beyond that position-that is from an offensive viewpoint, am I correct on that, sir? General BRADLEY. That is correct. We believe that the best deterrent to war is to have our defensive forces and a collective defense-that is where we all work together and pool our resources, that that can be attained and should be attained at as early a date as possible. There is no idea that we are going to take any offensive action with these forces. In fact, that is contrary to all of our democratic principles. We do not start wars, we defend ourselves when we are attacked. As you say, there is no idea of using these for aggressive purposes. Mr. BENTLEY. With regard to the buildup of the Soviet and satellite forces, am I correct in believing that they are not increasing the size of their forces, but are engaged in a process of keeping them up to scratch? (Discussion off the record.) Mr. BENTLEY. One more question of a rather hypothetical nature. |