In part, our assistance can be in the form of commodities such as the cloth which they themselves can make into uniforms, or leather which they themselves can make into shoes. In part, our assistance can take that form and to that extent resist inflation. Whether it can be totally resisted or not is a problem that is really beyond me. I just do not see it all the way through.

Mr. JUDD. One reason I brought it up was in connection with our previous interchange on the questions of Mr. Zablocki about the weaknesses of the Chinese Government. It was its inability after the war to deal with inflation and the corruption that goes with inflation which weakened it and it could well break the Korean Government no matter how heroic its military resistance. Our people are perfectly aware of this danger; are they not?

General OLMSTED. Yes.

Mr. JUDD. You have been very generous to come before the committee.

I hope the world situation will get sufficiently better so that you can stay in retirement but I shall not be surprised if you have to be called up again.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I want to particularly thank General Olmsted. (Whereupon, at 1:05 p. m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at the call of the chairman.)

MUTUAL SECURITY ACT EXTENSION

THURSDAY, MARCH 19, 1953

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,

Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 10:20 a. m. in room G-3, United States Capitol, Hon. Lawrence H. Smith (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. SMITH. The subcommittee will be in order.

Do you have a formal statement, Mr. Nash?

STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK C. NASH, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF

DEFENSE

Mr. NASH. I have no prepared statement, but I will try to speak from the notes I have.

Mr. SMITH. I have asked the Secretary if he would tell us something about the targets of the program last year and just how far we were off that target at the end of the year.

I think that will be very helpful to us; and, from that point, we can go on into a discussion of what we are expecting for next year.

Mr. NASH. I think it might be well to go back a little bit to show just what led up to the establishment of these so-called targets that were fixed at the NATO meeting in Lisbon in February 1952.

There has been so much misunderstanding about those targets it is difficult to clear it all up in one short session.

I was particularly disappointed yesterday to read in the newspapers an article attributed to Mr. Lovett's final report as Secretary of Defense, a newspaper article carrying a paragraph that read as follows:

Lovett notes among the failures in the defense build-up the inability of this country's European partners to meet the 1952 NATO goals. Although Europe's defenses were substantially strengthened in the last 6 months of 1952, he said they did not meet the 50 divisions and 4,000 combat planes, as hoped. Now, compare that with what his report actually said. This is the text of the report:

In the field of military assistance to other nations, progress in the approved programs has been steady, but in some phases not as great as planned. Although our NATO allies were unable to achieve completely all the 1952 goals established at the Lisbon meeting of the North Atlantic Council in February 1952, the defenses of Europe had been substantially strengthened during the past 6 months.

The number of units available to NATO command continued to increase, and their military effectiveness was substantially improved as deliveries of modern weapons from the United States, as well as local sources, multiplied.

I would say that is disappointing, because you can understand how an oral statement or a statement made in a press conference might come out a little bit garbled; but, when it is a statement in a report that merely has to be copied, it does seem as though they could reflect it a little more accurately.

Mr. VORYS. Would you tell me, Mr. Nash, what is inaccurate about the newspaper account?

Mr. NASH. The newspaper's statement:

Lovett noted among the failures in the defense buildup the inability of this country's European partners to meet the 1952 NATO goals.

Now I will show you, or try to show you in a few minutes, that isMr.VORYS. The word "inability"? The word "failure" is borne out. Mr. NASH. The impression that statement leaves is that they fell flat on their faces.

The impression left is that they did not come even near to attaining their mark. It leaves out the word that is the key in Mr. Lovett's report, the word "completely," and that is what I would like to concentrate the story on this morning.

You can judge for yourselves when I am through as to whether or not I am fair in my criticism of the newspaper's account of Mr. Lovett's report.

Perhaps the initial mistake was made in trying to set a goal in terms of a certain number of divisions. That is oversimplification.

When the newspapers carried the release at Lisbon that the NATO countries had agreed to raise 50 divisions by the end of calendar year 1952, they gave the public no idea of what was meant by the concept of divisions.

I think it might be useful to go back just a little bit and show how these goals came to be established.

I said at the very end of the meeting last Friday that, concentrating as we should in looking ahead at the problems that are facing us, it is well at times, so as to keep from being too discouraged, to look over our shoulder to see how far we have come.

I commented last Friday that it is only 5 years ago-5 years ago Tuesday of this week-that we started on this so-called cold-war program.

It was President Truman's address to Congress, on March 17, 1948, that declared that we had come to the conclusion, with the rape of Czechoslovakia in February of that year, that the U. S. S. R. was not going to cooperate and try to make this world a world in which people could live in peace.

Now, that was followed a month later by Congress voting the initial funds for the so-called Marshall plan. That was in April of 1948. That was followed a little while later with the adoption of the Vandenberg resolution. The Vandenberg resolution came out in June 1948, and the Vandenberg resolution is really the foundation and philosophy of what the whole NATO effort involves.

On the same day that the President-President Truman, that ismade his sort of declaration of the cold war, on March 17, 1948, five of the nations of Western Europe-England, France, Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg-on their own initiative formed what was called the Western Union.

That was a defense pact where those five nations joined together.

The North Atlantic Treaty negotiations which went forward in the summer and fall of 1948 culminated in the signing of the treaty in April of 1949.

Directly after the treaty was signed by us in April of 1949, the other NATO nations followed suit, and I think the last one signed up in August 1949.

It might be useful at this point to put the NATO organization chart up there so when I refer to these committees they might be more meaningful.

(A chart entitled "North Atlantic Treaty Organization," principal agencies and United States members, was referred to.)

Mr. NASH. The North Atlantic Council, at the top, is composed of the foreign ministers, the defense ministers, and the finance ministers. The principal military advice to the North Atlantic Council comes from the Military Committee. That is composed of the Chief of Staff of each of the 14 nations that are now in NATO. General Bradley is the representative of the United States.

Mr. VORYS. Do I understand that the red letters on the right are the American representatives on those things?

Mr. NASH. That is correct. Mr. Dulles is our foreign minister; Mr. Wilson is our defense minister; Mr. Humphrey is our finance minister.

We have what no other of the NATO nations have, this Director of Mutual Security position, with Mr. Stassen, and then we have the so-called special representative in Europe for the Administration of Mutual Security and assistance matters, Mr. Draper.

The North Atlantic Council's permanent headquarters is in Paris. The Military Committee's permanent headquarters, if they had any such headquarters, would be in Paris, also. They meet ad hoc, but they have a permanent group called The Standing Group, which has its locale here in Washington.

The Standing Group is composed of three nations: France, United Kingdom, and the United States.

It has also in Washington the military representatives of all 14 nations. The Military Representatives Committee is a sort of board of deputies to the Military Committee itself.

The real working group, the one who works out the plans, is the Standing Group. They submit them, go over them with the military representatives. If agreed upon, they go on up to the Military Committee, and ultimately are submitted to the North Atlantic Council. General Bradley is our representative on the Military Committee and on the Standing Group.

He has a deputy who works at it full time. General Bradley has a lot of other duties, as you know, as Chairman of our Joint Chiefs of Staff. Vice Admiral Arthur Davis is General Bradley's Deputy on the Standing Group.

Now, the two commanders of the two principal field commands: SACEUR, headed by General Ridgway-those initials add up to Supreme Allied Command in Europe.

He succeeded General Eisenhower. General Eisenhower was the first one appointed in late 1950 and agreed upon at the Brussels meeting in December of 1950. He established SHAPE headquarters in April 1951.

This became operational with the establishment of General Eisenhower's headquarters at SHAPE in April 1951, which was just 2 years ago.

The other commander is the Supreme Commander of the Atlantic Forces, a command set up later than SACEUR, and is presently headed by a United States commander, Admiral McCormick.

Shortly after the North Atlantic Treaty came into being, in the spring of 1950, the Military Committee, working with its Standing Group, developed an overall strategic plan that has come to be fairly well known as the MTDP, meaning the medium term defense plan. (Discussion off the record.)

Mr. NASH. The military task is a defensive task. It is a defensive mission. The job of the NATO military forces under the NATO treaty is one of deterring Soviet aggression, and if aggression should occur, despite the attempts to deter it, a force expected or hoped to be adequate to deal with the aggression.

It does not have an offensive mission. That is important in the way of the philosophy of NATO. It is a defensive organization. It was a defense against aggression. That was the underlying impression of this overall strategic concept that is the basis of all of our military force planning and military buildup that we are talking about this morning.

To take that strategic concept and translate it into specific numbers of divisions, airplanes, and ships. That was a task that went forward in the fall of 1950. Out of that was developed what is called MCmeaning Military Committee-MC 26/1. That is the identification of this military requirement study.

MC 26/1 is the present basis of our military force planning.

That, as I say, took the strategic concept of the MTDP, of May 1950, and developed it into military requirements-I emphasize the word "requirements."

It is what our military experts voice is necessary to carry out the mission, which, I repeat, is a mission to deter aggression and, if aggression should occur, to be able to defend and resist successfully.

After the organization of General Eisenhower's headquarters at SHAPE, in April 1951, he and his planning staff put together their own idea of what is required in the way of ground forces to carry out his mission as Supreme Allied Commander of European Forces (Discussion off the record.)

Mr. SMITH. That was in 1951?

Mr. NASH. This report was submitted by General Eisenhower in October 1951, 4 or 5 months after SHAPE Headquarters was established.

Mr. SMITH. As you recall, that was after the subcommittee from our committee was over there.

We were there in June, were we not Boyd?

Mr. CRAWFORD. June 1951.

Mr. PROUTY. How many planes is that? (Discussion off the record.)

Mr. NASH. On the side of air requirements, as long as that question has been raised, the air requirements were developed initially in the spring of 1951, in Paris by the Air Chiefs of Staff of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Canada.